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INTRODUCTION 
Claims-made liability insurance coverage, the New York State Insurance 
Department told us more than a decade ago, "is generally inferior to 
occurrence coverage."1 For a time developments regularly chronicled in the 
trade press seemed to confirm that judgment. Industry efforts to introduce a 
claims-made format for commercial general liability policies were flatly 
rejected by most sophisticated buyers) Some jurisdictions instituted 
1. New York State Insurance Department Opinion and Decision on Issues Raised 
by Insurance Services Office on Commercial General Liability Claims-Made Form, 
4 1. INS. REG. 39, 41 (1986). See also Reg. No. 121, N.Y. COMPo CODES R. & REGS. 
tit. 11, § 73 (1993) (minimum standards for approval of claims-made forms). 
In a "pure" occurrence format, the trigger that activates liability insurance 
coverage usually is bodily injury or property damage allegedly caused by a tortious 
act; less frequently, in professional liability and other settings where determining the 
time of the injury may be difficult, the occurrence trigger may be the negligent act or 
omission itself. In a "pure" claims-made fonnat, the trigger that activates liability 
insurance coverage is a claim for damages made by an injured party against the 
insured during the policy period. As we shall see, such generalizations often obscure 
more than they reveal. 
2. See, e.g., In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(policyholder resistance to claims-made formats), affd in part, rev'd in part by 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). Compare INSURANCE 
SERVICES OFFICE, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE: ISO MAKES THE 
CASE FOR THE CGL (1985) (reciting advantages of claims-made formats) with John 
F. Fitzgerald, Claims-Made and the Agent, BESTS REV. - PROP. & CASUALTY INS. 
ED., Jan, 1988, p. 48 ("Claims-made is a bust, an overreaction, a dead issue."). See 
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regulatory restrictions on the use of claims-made formats.3 Defense lawyers 
complained that courts both in this country4 and abroad5 improperly were 
converting claims-made policies into occurrence policies, and were in tum 
denounced as having mounted a crusade to "rig the common law" to prevent 
such heresies from taking root.6 And, perhaps most visibly to the casual 
observer, major players in the insurance industry found themselves defending 
high profile antitrust litigation alleging that they had employed illegal 
boycotts in an effort to force an unwanted format on unwilling buyers. 7 
also Alison Kittrell, Risk Managers Accept Claims-Made Reluctantly, Bus. INS., Oct. 
13, 1986, at 1, col. 2 (survey indicates more than 50% forced to use claims-made 
policies); Robert A. Finlayson, Insurers Restricting Use of Claims-Made CGL Form, 
Bus. INS., Feb. 9, 1987, at 1, col. 2 (insurers insisting on claims-made format only 
for long tail exposures). The best generally accessible guides to the current use of 
claims-made formats are the publications of the International Risk Management 
Association. See INTERNATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, INC., 
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE VIII.C.3 (1995) (hereinafter "IRMI, 
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE"); INTERNATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
INSTITUTE, INC., COMMERCIAL LIABILITY INSURANCE I1.C.5 (1995) (hereinafter 
"IRMI, COMMERCIAL LIABILITY INSURANCE"). 
3. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-79-306 to 307 (Michie 1992); COLO. REv. 
STAT. § 10-4-419 (1998); CONN. ADMIN. CODE Title 38a §§ 327-1 to 327-6 (1990); 
N.Y. COMPo CODES R. & REGS. title 11, § 73 (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-40-140 
(1994). 
4. See infra notes 50-68, 88 and accompanying text. 
5. See generally Jorge Angell, Claims Made Policies or Occurrence Policies in 
Civil Liability Insurance: A Spanish Judicial Perspective, INT'L 1. INS. L. 112 (1994); 
Jorge Angell, Claims Made Policies or Occurrence Policies in Civil Liability 
Insurance in Spain: Announced Legislative Changes, INT'L J. INS. L. 191 (1994); 
Marcel Fontaine, Claims Made Policies Under Belgian Law, INT'L 1. INS. L. 128 
(1994); Tim Griffiths, Time-Limits in Claims Made Insurance in Australia and New 
Zealand, 5 INT'L INS. L. REv. 85 (1997); Mikael Hagopian, France: The Supreme 
Court Rules that "Claims-Made" Coverage Is a Nullity, INT'L J. INS. L. 52 (1994); 
Susan Hankey, Claims Made Policies and Choice of Law in the European Union, 2 
INT'L INS. L. REV. 267 (1994); Mark Sheller, "Claims Made": The Australian 
Experience, INT'L J. INS. L. 188 (1994). For more accessible summary treatment of 
the European developments, see Sarah Goddard, Directives Command Change in 
Europe: Claims Made Policies Under Fire, Bus. INS., Oct. 9,1995, at 75. 
6. See infra notes 50-71 and accompanying text. 
7. See generally ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, THE INSURANCE ANTITRUST 
HANDBOOK 28-30 (1995); Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Economics of the 
Insurance Antitrust Suits: Toward an ExclUSionary Theory, 63 TuL. L REV. 971 
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But in recent years that apparently settled history has required some 
rewriting. Claims-made policies constitute a growing presence in the liability 
insurance marketplace. University finance departments assure us that "the 
claims-made form represents a preferred form of contracting under 
conditions of non independence between insurable risks."8 Judicial unease 
(1989); George L. Priest, The Antitrust Suits and the Public Understanding of 
Insurance, 63 TuL. L. REV. 999 (1989). In 1988, nineteen states and a number of 
private plaintiffs filed complaints in federal district court alleging that some domestic 
primary and reinsurance companies, a reinsurance broker, and London-based 
reinsurers had conspired to force the Insurance Services Office to make changes in 
its CGL program, to include, especially, claims-made policy triggers. Later that year 
ten other states joined the litigation, and a similar action was filed in Texas state court. 
In 1991, the Texas suit was settled for $6.6 million. See Michael Bradford, Final 
Defendants Settle Texas Antitrust Litigation. Bus. INS., Apr. 1, 1991, at 2. 
The federal suit was dismissed on summary judgment in September, 1989, but 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in a decision that 
defined boycott to mean a "use of economic power of a third party to force the 
boycott victim to agree to the boycott beneficiary'S terms." In re Insurance Antitrust 
Litigation, 938 F.2d 919,930 (9th Cir. 1991). The United States Supreme Court 
reversed; the five to four decision held that allegations that the defendants tried to 
limit liability coverage to claims-made fell within the boycott exception to the 
McCarran-Ferguson exemption, but in the process defined boycott much more 
narrowly than had the Ninth Circuit. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 
U.S. 764 (1993). The suit was finally settled in 1994 by an agreement that industry 
dominance of the ISO board of directors would be ended, and that the defendants 
would pay the plaintiffs' legal fees and contribute more than $26 million to establish 
a public entity data base and a "Public Entity Risk Institute." See generally Judy 
Greenwald, Antitrust Settlement to Alter ISO. Industry, Bus. INS., Oct. 10, 1994, at 1. 
The suits by the attorneys general were preceded by St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 
Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978), in which the only four insurers selling medical 
malpractice insurance in the market were accused of conspiring to boycott prospective 
purchasers of medical malpractice insurance in order to force them to accede to a 
change from occurrence formats to claims-made formats; the complaint alleged that 
St. Paul and the other three insurers agreed that St. Paul would offer only claims-
made coverage, and that the other three would refuse to write medical malpractice 
insurance on any terms. The Supreme Court held that the boycott exception to the 
McCarran-Ferguson exemption from antitrust laws included boycotts that were not 
aimed at hanning competitors. 
8. Neil A. Doherty, The Design of Insurance Contracts when Liability Rules are 
Unstable, 58 J. RISK & INS. 227, 243 (1991). In Doherty's view, the emergence of 
claims-made forms "helped to revive a flagging market" and "challenges the basis 
of recent antitrust suits brought against the industry which suggests that introduction 
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about claims-made coverage seems on the wane, and a variety of legal 
voices can be heard confirming that "the advantages of the claims-made 
form over occurrence policies for professional and commercial liability risks 
are now well documented."9 
So which is it? Are claims-made formats "generally inferior," or a 
"preferred form of contracting" whose "advantages... [are] well 
of the claims made policy is hannful to consumers"). Id. at 243,244. See also infra 
notes 302-304 and accompanying text. 
9. Harry W.R. Chamberlain II, Claims-Made Policies Are Enforceable in 
California: Trends after Bums v. International Insurance Company, 28 TORT & INS. 
L.J. 90, 92 (1992). See also W.F. Young. Is Insurance A Niche Business? ReflectiOns 
on Information as an Insurance Product, 1 CONN. INS. L.J. 1,29 (1995) (seeing no 
sharp dichotomy between "occurrence" and "c1aims-made" coverages: "The two are 
roughly equivalent, so long as the enterprise insured throws off claims that are even 
over time in frequency and magnitude."); Kathleen E. Wherthey, New Lifefor The 
Claims-Made Liability Policy in Maryland, 53 MD. L. REV. 948, 949 (1994) 
(celebrating Maryland's joining "the national trend toward continuing the viability of 
the claims-made fonn of coverage, a cost-effective innovation, which, if drafted with 
reasonable clarity, benefits both insurers and policyholders"). Not all agree that the 
systemic effects are so benign. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 
49-51, 58-59 (1986) (claims-made coverages make cost-internalization more 
difficult). 
A claims-made pncmg system forces insured enterprises to 
internalize some costs. But they are mainly not the future costs of 
today's activities; they are the costs incurred this year as a result of 
activities that took place in the past. In effect, claims-made 
premiums are installment payments for coverage against losses 
caused by past activities. 
Id. at 50. Others recognize some of the greater risks individual insureds are forced 
to bear. See, e.g., ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 
5.10(d)(I) & (3) at 599 (1988) (" [O]ne of the principal disadvantages ... is that the 
policyholder is left to bear much of the burden of uncertainty about future claims 
costs and the premiums which will have to be paid to cover the continuing risk that 
new claims may be asserted for activities that occurred years earlier"); Eugene R. 
Anderson, Current Issues in Claims-Made Insurance PoliCies, ALI-ABA COURSE 
MATERIALS J., Oct. 1989, at 57; Jeanine Dumont, What Every Professional Should 
Know before Buying Claims-Made Liability Insurance, 35 FED. INS. COUNSEL Q. 363 
(1985); Lee Roy Pierce Jr., Professional Liability Insurance: The Claims Made and 
Reported Trap, 19 W. ST. U. L. REV. 165 (1991). 
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documented?" And why has that question provoked so much explicit 
attention from lawyers and judges whose conceptions of their professional 
roles rarely permit any overt examination of the adequacy of contractual 
exchanges? Most observers agree that liability insurance markets seem to 
have settled into a relatively stable pattern in which most coverage is written 
on an "occurrence" basis and "claims-made" coverage is employed chiefly 
for the more troublesome long-tail exposures. Why not conclude that with 
liability insurance formats, as with apples and oranges, such questions of 
relative value may best be left to individual consumers, some of whom may 
have chosen to purchase a less comprehensive and thus less costly product? 
After all, as Judge Richard Posner recently reassured us, with claims-made 
formats ''the coverage is less, but so, therefore, is the cost." I 0 
But is rolling out the standard Rosetta Stone of applied price theory really 
a useful way to decipher the Babel that continues to infect the law and 
literature of claims-made insurance? Is the coverage provided by a claims-
made policy less in the same sense that an insured under a personal auto 
policy has less coverage than if she had purchased collision coverage to go 
with the other coverages she did buy, or in the sense that the coverage 
provided by a homeowner's policy is less because the policy excludes 
liabilities arising out of business activities, or requires that notice of accidents 
be given within a reasonable time? Of course, in some formal and ultimately 
trivial sense these limitations on coverage are all the same. In the simple 
black letter law of contracts, they are all conditions, and the insurer has no 
obligation to perform unless all conditions are fully satisfied. And in the 
simple analytics of applied price theory, they are all reductions in coverage 
that operate to reduce the cost of insurance to insureds, and thus redound to 
the benefit of all insureds except the unfortunate few who actually get caught 
by the limitations. But in this article I will argue that there is more to 
concerns about claims-made formats, and more, both to law and to 
economics, than that. 
10. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Baker & McKenzie, 997 F.2d 305, 306 (7th 
Cir. 1993). The refrain is a familiar one. See, e.g., Livingston Parish Sch. Bd. v. 
Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co., 282 So.2d 478, 483 (La. 1973) ("[T]he insured 
received what [it] paid for by the present policy, with premiums presumably reduced 
to reflect the limited coverage."); Ferguson v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 370 P.2d 379, 
481 (Kan. 1962) (dissenting opinion) ("In this day and age a person gets just about 
what he pays for-whether it be insurance protection or anything else-and that is 
what happened here."). 
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Put simply, claims-made triggers sometimes operate to allocate to 
insureds risks that are different in kind from those assigned by more familiar 
insurance policy coverage restrictions. Because many "claims-made" 
policies are structured and interpreted to include "claims-made-and-
reported" triggers or "potential-claim-discovered-and-reported" triggers, 
they create the potential that in some circumstances even an insured who 
maintains continuous unaltered coverage with the same insurer may fmd that 
fortuities of timing of some of the events in the tort liability sequence mean 
that none of those policies has been triggered even when those same fortuities 
of timing do not affect the burdens borne by the insurer. And, even more 
fundamentally, because they make the triggers for determining whether a 
particular insurer is potentially obligated operate late in the liability claim 
sequence, claims-made policies create the potential that "preexisting 
circumstances" will become known and render the insured effectively 
uninsurable in a way not usually encountered outside of medical expense 
msurance. 
Unfortunately, these characteristics of claims-made policies-what I will 
call the "forfeiture risk" and the "classification risk"-though familiar to the 
professional risk managers who led the resistance to adopting claims-made 
triggers for commercial general liability policies, have not received the 
attention they deserve. There are several reasons. First, these particular 
devils are in the details, and the details of claims-made policies are far from 
standardized and often devilishly complicated. Rather than fight through 
these complexities, too many discussions settle for stylized characterizations 
of the differences between idealized "pure" versions of occurrence and 
claims-made formats, and thus fail to train scrutiny on the ways claims-made 
formats can create occasions for insurer opportunism and encourage 
forfeitures. Second, though the failure of claims-made triggers to take root 
in commercial general liability insurance may be an especially useful 
example of how even a thin margin of informed buyers can protect a larger 
group of unsophisticated, not all parts of the liability insurance buying market 
seem to have produced such leaders, and only sometimes are both claims-
made and occurrence formats available in the same markets for the same 
risks. In medical malpractice, legal malpractice, products liability, 
environmental impairment and a host of specialty product lines, occurrence 
coverage simply is not an available option for most buyers, and the separation 
of buyer from insurer by intermediaries like bar and medical associations, 
managing partners, and brokers may prevent many of those most affected 
from appreciating the differences. Third, the last decade has been a period of 
512 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:2 
extraordinarily soft markets in which renewals come easily; we simply have 
not yet seen the hard markets that would push these concerns to the forefront. 
But there is another reason as well. Even when the multiple-event trigger 
and preexisting circumstances problems are squarely presented, the neo-
classical habits of thought still dominant in both the law and the economics 
of insurance provide few tools to help lawyers to understand the problems 
posed by "forfeiture risk" and "classification risk" and to construct ways to 
ameliorate them. 
Thus, this article has two principal ambitions. The first is to rescue 
understanding of the operation of claims-made liability formats from the 
stylized and often misleading descriptions found in the insurance decisions 
and much of the professional commentary. In this, my effort is not to root out 
all errors nor to provide a complete systematics of claims-made formats, but 
rather to suggest a conceptual structure and vocabulary that will permit a 
more nuanced examination of the very real issues posed by various claims-
made formats. The second is to suggest that our understanding of the 
problems posed by claims-made policies and of the legal responses that may 
be possible will be enhanced by drawing on the literatures of neo-institutional 
economics and relational contracting. Neo-classical economic and legal 
models that use spot market transactions as their paradigm, and that regard 
each insurance policy as a fully-presentiated contract that speaks clearly to 
dictate a specific allocation of risks for a specific term, operate from much 
different premises than the new institutional models grounded in behavioral 
assumptions concerning "bounded rationality" and "opportunism" and 
informed by a methodological sensitivity to the vulnerabilities that sequential 
performances and transaction-specific investments can create. In the neo-
classical tradition, a condition is a condition, and there is no reason to inquire 
why it was included in a contract, why one party failed to satisfy it, or 
whether the other party was adversely affected by the failure. In this world, 
defense lawyers understandably regard any unhappy judicial decision as a 
"refusal to enforce" the policy by a court that has strayed into efforts to 
"rewrite the contract," and lawyers representing insureds, struggling to find 
an explanation for why failure to satisfy a policy condition should not be fatal 
to their client's claim, end up casting their challenges as broad-gauge 
assertions that claims-made forms contravene public policy or violate the 
reasonable expectations of insureds. By contrast, neo-institutional economics 
and its legal analogs permit the focus to move from whether claims-made 
forms on balance are a good thing or a bad thing to how they operate in a 
particular context, and offer a conceptually coherent explanation for judicial 
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policing of the application of claims-made fonnats that the neo-classical 
tradition simply cannot provide. 
The organization of this essay mirrors this agenda. Part I begins with a 
brief field guide to insurance policy triggers, the variety of triggers to be 
found in nominally "claims-made" policy fonnats, and recent claims-made 
litigation; here we encounter insurance policy exotica so dense that legal 
taxonomy using traditional classification tools can only hint at the problems 
claims-made insureds encounter with their claims-made fonnats and the 
problems their attorneys encounter with the inadequate doctrinal tools 
insurance law puts at their disposal. Part II follows with a primer on the law 
of insurance policy conditions, with particular attention to differences 
between dominant ex ante perspectives summarized by traditional insurance 
law efforts to vindicate the hypothetical objective reasonable expectations of 
insureds and subterranean ex post policing designed to excuse nonoccurrence 
of conditions to avoid disproportionate forfeitures; here we seek to identify 
a fuller array of tools than usually will be found in the insurance lawyer's 
kitbag. Part III then offers a preliminary exploration of how these doctrinal 
tools might operate if applied to some of the peculiar challenges of clairns-
made fonnats. 
The result is an academic's exercise, part polemic decrying continued 
debasements of insurance law by uncritical application of the acontextual 
formalisms of neo--classical economics and contracts, part homiletic 
preaching that contextualization requires us to acknowledge that both 
bounded rationality and opportunism contribute to the special challenges of 
insurance law, and part speculative meditation about what the problems 
posed by claims-made fonnats might tell us about how such an enriched 
version of insurance law might work in practice. Thus it should not surprise 
that the focus throughout is less about who should prevail in specific disputes 
in this small slice of the insurance market than about the different habits of 
mind that constrain and channel the rhetorical resources that can be brought 
to bear in controversies throughout insurance. 
I. A SHORT FIELD GUIDE To CLAIMS-MADE POLICY TRIGGERS AND 
CLAIMS-MADE TRIGGER LITIGATION 
We seldom worry about insurance policy triggers. If my teenage 
daughter negligently backs our insured automobile into my neighbors' 
recreational vehicle, the insurer that issued our family automobile policy 
quickly will see that the damaged vehicle is repaired. What ''triggered'' that 
obligation? In a fundamental legal sense, the insurer's present active duty to 
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pay rests on satisfaction of all of the conditions precedent to that duty: my 
daughter was an "insured" within the policy definitions, the premiums had 
been paid, the damage was not something my daughter "expected or 
intended," she was not engaged in business activities, she gave timely notice 
to the insurer and cooperated in its investigation of the accident, and so on 
throughout the multi-page litany of conditions that establish the limitations 
of the family auto insurer's obligations. But that is not what insurance 
lawyers mean when they speak of policy triggers. They mean that before we 
can set about determining whether all a policy's conditions have been 
satisfied, we first must determine which policy is applicable to the particular 
insurance story. I I 
Of course, there is no mystery about what insurance policy was triggered 
by my daughter's accident. Family automobile policies are "occurrence" 
policies, and so the policy triggered was the one in effect at the time the RV 
suffered physical damage. Do we care? In this case we do not, because 
everything that we are likely to consider an element of my daughter'S 
accident, from her initial inadvertence to the insurer's payments to the 
neighbors, seems likely to be conveniently packed within a single policy 
period. But what if the sequence takes longer? What if we decompose a 
liability insurance story into constituent elements and stretch that story over 
several policy periods? If my 1990 landscaping efforts include negligently 
leaving a large rock perched on the precipice at the edge of my property, but 
the rock does not actually crush my neighbor's perambulator until 1991, and 
the neighbor's claim is not settled until 1992, do we care whether my 
homeowner's insurer regards the problem as attributable to the 1990, 1991, 
or 1992 policy years? Usually we do not, so long as I maintained the same 
homeowner's coverage with the same insurer for each of the years in 
question. But what if a renewal policy differs in some material way from the 
policy it replaced, or I changed insurers part way through the sequence, or 
other claims have exhausted some or all of the policy limits for a particular 
year? Then we would care, for knowing that the physical damage is the 
policy trigger tells us which insurer will be obligated to perform if all of its 
policy conditions are satisfied. 
11. In Professor Fischer's felicitous metaphor, "the trigger concept ... acts as a 
gatekeeper, matching particular claims with particular periods of time and hence 
particular insurance policies." James M. Fischer, Insurance Coverage for Mass 
Exposure Tort Claims: The Debate over the Appropriate Trigger Rule, 45 DRAKE L. 
REv. 625, 631 (1997). 
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A. Choosing a Policy Trigger 
Why would a liability insurer choose one trigger over another? Ease of 
application is one major factor. We know when the rock crushed the 
perambulator, but can we confidently locate in one and only one policy year 
my failure to use reasonable care in planning, executing, and maintaining my 
landscaping? In that setting an occurrence trigger has obvious advantages 
over a negligence trigger. 12 But though occurrence triggers often will be 
satisfied by unambiguous scenes of crumpled metal and bleeding bodies, 
sometimes they too prove difficult in ways that over the last decades have 
kept legions of lawyers fully employed. If the perambulator was full of 
triplets, all of whom were injured, has there been one occurrence, or three (or 
four)?13 Does it matter ifthe triplets were old enough to be walking single 
file down the sidewalk, and were hit seriatim by the negligently driven car? 
Because liability insurance usually is written with limits per occurrence, the 
answer to that question can matter a great deal. If an insured sells livestock 
feed contaminated with polybrominated biphenyl so that 28,679 cattle, 4,612 
swine, 1,399 sheep, and over 6,000 chickens and other farm animals must be 
destroyed, do we count the mistakes, or count the injuries, or count the 
farmers bringing suit? 14 If an asbestos manufacturer in operation since the 
1940's should have foreseen an unreasonable danger of asbestosis to both its 
workers and users of its products, should we treat the resulting injuries as 
having occurred when the victims first inhaled the asbestos fibers, when the 
fibers became resident in the victims' lungs, when scarring of the lungs could 
12. Of course, the ease-of-application factor can cut the other way. Before the 
advent of claims-made policies made them obsolete, "occurrence" professional 
liability policies often were triggered when the professional services were rendered 
-and the negligent act or omission allegedly occurred-rather than when the client 
was injured. For a discussion of the difficulties encountered in trying to locate the 
time of injury in lawyer's malpractice litigation, see RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY 
M. SMITH, 4 LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 33.9-33.11 (4th ed. 1996). 
13. Don't forget the perambulator. 
14. See Michigan Chern. Corp. v. American Home Assur. Co., 728 F.2d 374 (6th 
Cir. 1984). Probably most courts agree that "[t]he general rule is that an occurrence 
is determined by the cause or causes of the resulting injury .... [T]he court asks if 
there was but one proximate, uninterrrupted, and continuing cause which resulted in 
all of the injuries and damages." Id. at 379, n.5. See also Bartholomew v. 
Appalachian Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1981). 
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have been discovered, when the scarring actually was discovered, when 
medical treatment was required, or all of the above? 15 
Of course, such familiar lawyers' concerns about ease of application are 
not the only important criteria for selecting a policy trigger. Other things 
being equal, the insurer's fmancial people will want to employ a policy 
trigger that falls later in the sequence rather than earlier, in order to shorten 
the time between when a policy obligation is priced and when the extent of 
that obligation is determined. Statistical models of insurance pools that help 
inform insurance underwriting and pricing decisions depend in part on the 
quality of the loss frequency and severity estimations they employ.l6 
Consequently, the longer the period for which one must "develop" immature 
historical loss data in order to estimate ultimate loss costs for policies written 
in the past, and the longer into the future one must peer in an effort to trend 
those estimates of past loss costs in order to make predictions about future 
loss costs for new policies, the greater the likelihood for error. In the 1970's 
and 1980's, as insurers wrestled with newly reported claims implicating 
occurrence policies priced and underwritten (and triggered) decades earlier, I 7 
many became convinced that the best way to shorten the "tail" on liability 
insurance policies was to choose a policy trigger that would operate later in 
the tort liability sequence. How much better, the argument ran, if a claim 
made against an insured in 1985 based upon a latent injury that "occurred" in 
1945 could have been treated as triggering the 1985 policy rather than the 
1945 policy; with the benefit of forty additional years of experience to reflect 
the correlated changes in inflation, loss frequency, legal doctrine, medical 
15. See generally John P. Amess & Randall D. Eliason, Insurance Coverage for 
"Property Damage" in Asbestos and Other Toxic Tort Cases. 72 VA. L. REV. 943 
(1986); Stephen V. Gimigliano, Note, The Calculus of Insurer Liability in Asbestos-
Related Disease Litigation: Manifestation + Injurious Exposure = Continuous 
Trigger, 23 B.C. L. REV. 1141 (1982). For more recent surveys of the field after 
attention moved from asbestos-related claims to other progressive injury and 
progressive damage claims, see Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and 
the Limits of Insurance. 88 COLUM. L. REv. 942 (1988); Tung Yin, Nailing Jello to 
a Wall: A Uniform Approach for Adjudicating Insurance Coverage Disputes in 
Products Liability Cases with Delayed Manifestation Injuries and Damages. 83 CAL. 
L. REV. 1243 (1985). 
16. See generally David Cummins, Statistical and Financial Models of Insurance 
Pricing and the Insurance Firm, 58 J. RISK & INS. 261 (1991). 
17. See. e.g.. Boyce Thompson Inst. for Plant Research v. Insurance Co. of N. 
Am., 751 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)(in 1988, insurer tendered defense of claims 
based on activities that occurred between 1924 and 1969). 
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technology, and jury attitudes over that period, the best pricing guesses for 
1985 must necessarily be superior to the best pricing guesses for 1945. 
Though it was too late to rewrite history to replace occurrence coverage with 
claims-made coverage for already triggered policies, a change to claims-
made formats for future years would assure that future tails would not be so 
long, and that the uncertainties to which insurers would be exposed by future 
policies would not be so great. 
Thus, claims-made formats could seem to offer a way for liability 
insurers to avoid at least some of the problems that have so occupied their 
recent pasts. lithe policy trigger no longer must be the injury, but instead 
could be the claim, many of the nasty lawyer problems involved in 
determining when an occurrence occurred disappear, and the guesswork 
involved in determining a price for future liability coverage can be made less 
daunting. There is little reason to try to change my family auto and 
homeowners policies to a claims-made format, for the claim by my unhappy 
neighbors is likely to follow closely behind the sound of an unambiguous 
crash. But for other settings, where the potentials for multiple or progressive 
injuries and for long tails seem more threatening, making the policy trigger 
a claim against the insured could promise insurers an attractive way to avoid 
some of the problems posed by occurrence triggers. 
However, for insureds, the move from an occurrence trigger to a claims-
made trigger could prove much less attractive, for two principal reasons. 
First, claims-made triggers themselves present real lawyer problems. But, 
unlike the uncertainties of application associated with the "occurrence" 
trigger, where much of the litigation involved which among several insurers' 
policies should be deemed to have been triggered,18 the burden of 
uncertainties associated with determining when a claims-made policy has 
been triggered fall most heavily on insureds. And second, the uncertainties 
the insurer avoids by pushing the trigger deeper into the tort claim sequence 
do not go away; they are shifted to insureds, and claims-made policies are 
structured in such a way that the insurer may be empowered to make those 
risks fall on an individual insured, rather than on the entire pool of insureds. 
These two ways in which claims-made policies can result in coverage gaps 
for insureds are at the core of the claims-made problems addressed in this 
article. 
18. See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Allocation of Settlements in Multi-
Insurer Coverage Disputes, 48 FED. INS. & CORP. COUNSEL Q. 427 (1998); Michael 
G. Doherty, Allocating Progressive Injury Liability Among Successive Insurance 
Policies, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 257 (1997). 
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B. Beyond "Pure" Occurrence and "Pure" Claims-Made Policy 
Triggers 
In the conventional telling, then, liability insurance comes in two flavors: 
occurrence, and claims-made. As explained by Gerald and Sol Kroll, the 
most influential of the early prophets of claims-made fonnats: 
At present two types of insurance policies are offered in the 
professional liability field: the "claims made" (or 
"discovery") policy and the "occurrence" policy. A "claims 
made" policy is one whereby the carrier agrees to assume 
liability for any errors, including those made prior to the 
inception of the policy, as long as a claim is made within the 
policy period. On the other hand, an "occurrence" policy 
provides coverage for any acts or omissions that arise during 
the policy period, regardless of when claims are made. 19 
Thus: 
The major distinction between the "occurrence" policy and 
the "claims made" policy constitutes the difference between 
the peril insured. In the "occurrence' policy, the peril 
insured is the "occurrence" itself. Once the "occurrence" 
takes place, coverage attaches even though the claim may 
not be made for some time thereafter. While in the "claims 
made" policy, it is the making of the claim which is the 
event and peril being insured and, subject to policy language, 
regardless of ~hen the occurrence took place.20 
19. Gerald Kroll, The "Claims-Made" Dilemma in Professional Liability 
Insurance, 22 UCLA L. REV. 925, 925-26 (1975) (footnote omitted). Numerous 
courts and commentators have relied on Kroll's simple dichotomy in explaining 
"claims-made" policy fonnats, even where the characterization does not fit the policy 
format in question. See, e.g., Hasbrouck v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 511 
N.W.2d 364, 366 (Iowa 1993). The two-kingdoms vision of the liability insurance 
world also holds sway from the other side of the divide. See, e.g., Montrose Chern. 
Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 904 (Cal. 1995) (to adopt "manifestation" 
interpretation of occurrence trigger would be same as "transforming the broader and 
more expensive occurrence-based CGL policy into a claims made policy"). 
20. Sol Kroll, The Professional Liability Policy "C/aims Made, " 13 FORUM 842, 
843 (1978). For many courts this passage has become the short-hand description of 
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As described by the Krolls and most commentators, nothing could be 
simpler.21 The reality is much more complex. [fwe decompose liability 
insurance stories into their constituent elements, beginning with the act or 
omission by the insured and running all the way through to the final payment 
by the insurer, we will generate a list likely to include at least the following 
potential stages in the evolution of liability insurance claims: 
Exhibit 1: Potential Stages in the Evolution of Liability Insurance Claims 
allegedly tortious act or omission by insured 
exposure of potential victims 
injury in fact 
manifestation ofvictim's injury 
insured should have discovered circumstances that may give rise to a claim 
insured discovers circumstances that may give rise to a claim 
insured discovers specific acts or omissions that may give rise to a claim 
insured reports to insurer circumstances that may give rise to a claim insured 
reports to insurer specific acts or omissions that may give rise to a claim 
claim for compensation by victim against insured 
insured reports claim to insurer 
victim tiles suit against insured 
investigation by insurer 
defense and reserving decisions by insurer 
negotiations between insurer and victim 
judgment or settlement 
payment to victim 
the difference between occurrence and claims-made policies. See, e.g., American 
Cas. Co. v. Continisio, 17 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 1994); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Ashland 
Oil, Inc., 951 F.2d 787, 790 (7th Cir. 1992); Insurance Corp. of America v. Dillon, 
Hardamon & Cohen, 725 F. Supp. 1461, 1469 (N.D. Ind. 1988); Sherlock v. Perry, 
605 F. Supp. 1001, 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1985). See also Sol Kroll, "Claims Made"-
Industry's Alternative: "Pay As You Go" Products Liability Insurance, 1976 INS. LJ. 
63. 
21. See, e.g., JEAN LUCEY, INSURING AND MANAGING THE PROFESSIONAL RISK 
32 (1993) ("How encouraging it is to fmd terms which accurately express intent and 
meaning: in this case, claims-made policies provide coverage for claims which are 
made during the policy period."); I ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS & 
DISPUTES § 1.07, at 29 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing "the standard claims-made policy"); 
Fischer, supra note 11, at 636 ("Under an occurrence policy, the insured risk covered 
bodily injury or covered property damage happening within the policy period. Under 
a claims-made policy, the insured risk was a covered claim being asserted against the 
policyholder during the policy period."). 
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The exercise of exploding liability insurance stories into their constituent 
parts can serve to remind us of a number of things that will help us to 
understand the structure and operation of claims-made formats. First, and 
perhaps most obviously, there is the question of pace: sometimes, as in my 
daughter's simple auto accident, the entire sequence will play out in a few 
days; sometimes, as with some insidious disease, products liability, and 
professional malpractice exposures, the sequence-or even portions of it-
can extend over many decades. Second, there is the question of order: though 
we can imagine liability insurance stories that follow the sequence outlined 
in Exhibit I, we also can imagine stories that do not. Discovery by the 
insured of circumstances that may give rise to a claim, for example, may 
occur at various places in the sequence, and may not happen at all; if it occurs 
before a policy has been triggered, the insured mayor may not report that 
information to the insurer. Third, there is the question of when to cut off the 
sequence: though insurers' rhetoric tends to focus on their desire to avoid 
uncertainties associated with liabilities that have been incurred but not 
reported by the end of the policy period (the "ffiNR" tail), and academic 
models often assume that all claims are paid at the end of the policy year, in 
fact tail problems do not end with tender of the defense to the insurer; even 
after a claim has beeri reported to the insurer, the claims-adjustment process 
still may involve many continuing sources of uncertainty concerning the 
ultimate impact of the claim on the insurer's treasury.22 
But the most salient consequence of decomposing liability insurance 
stories into constituent parts is that it forces recognition that "occurrence" 
and "claims-made" are not the only possible policy triggers, and that neither 
is free from troublesome questions of application. The fierce battles over the 
last two decades about how to apply "occurrence" triggers have resulted in 
22. See generally ROBERT J. PRAHL ET AL., LIABILITY CLAIM CONCEPTS AND 
PRACTICES 458-75 (1985) (emphasizing difference between "settlement value" of 
claim at time of initial report and "ultimate probable cost"); RUTH E. SALZMANN, 
ESTIMATED LIABILITIES FOR LOSSES & Loss ADJUSTMENT EXPENSES (1984) 
(emphasizing role of judgment in making and revising reserving decisions). See also 
INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY FOR COMMERCIAL GENERAL 
LIABILITY: SURVEY RESULTS 4-5 (1991) (for "large claims of $75,000 or more that 
drive the costs of the liability insurance system," average elapsed time between date 
of report and date of final judgment or settlement more than three times averaged 
elapsed time from date of accident to date of report); FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., 
INSURING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 125 (1991 ) (only 21.1 % of medical malpractice 
claims made and reported during policy year had been paid by end of three additional 
years; only 77.5% by end of six years). 
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decisions that locate the occurrence trigger at several different, sometimes 
overlapping, points on the continuum: some courts have been willing to say 
that "exposure to harm" satisfies an occurrence trigger; some say there has 
been no occurrence until manifestation; still others recognize a continuous 
trigger)3 
The concept of a "claims-made" trigger also proves slippery, even about 
such fundamental questions as whether we mean a "claim made by the victim 
against the insured," or a "claim made by the insured against the insurer."24 
And what does our exploded sequence tell us about the now-nearly-standard 
characterization of "claims-made" policies as "discovery" policies,25 and 
about the judicial refrain that "claims-made or discovery policies are 
essentially reporting policies?"26 Claims made by whom against whom? 
23. See general(v 1 EUGENE R. ANDERSON ET AL., INSURANCE COVERAGE 
LITIGATION §§ 4.1 - 4.24 (1997); 2 WINDT, supra note 21, §§ 11.04 - 11.05; Fischer, 
supra note 11, at 629 n.lO (collecting citations). 
24. See infra notes 28-36 and accompanying text. 
25. See, e.g., Jones v. Continental Cas. Co., 303 A.2d 91,93 (N.J. 1973) (quoting 
Zarpas v. Morrow, 215 F. Supp. 887,888 (D.N.J. 1963»: 
The type of policy in question has been termed a discovery policy. 
. .. "In a 'discovery' policy the coverage is effective if the 
negligent or omitted act is discovered and brought to the attention 
of the insurance company during the period of the policy, no 
matter when the act occurred. In an occurrence policy, the 
coverage is effective if the negligent or omitted act occurred during 
the period of the policy, whatever the date of discovery." 
The second sentence made it into Appleman, from whence it metastasized. See, 
e.g., Merrill & Seeley, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 275 Cal. Rptr. 280, 282 (1990) ("By 
way of background, we note that the two common types of insurance policies offered 
in the professional liability field are the 'claims made' (or discovery) policy and the 
'occurrence' policy"); James J. Brogger & Assocs., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. 
Co., 595 P.2d 1063, 1064 (Colo. App. 1979) ("The policy is generally described as 
a 'discovery' or 'claims made' insurance agreement. See 7 J Appleman, Insurance 
Law & Practice § 4262 (Cum. Supp. 1972)"). 
26. See, e.g., Thoracic Cardiovascular Assocs., Ltd. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 
Co., 891 P.2d 916,920 (Ariz. 1994): 
The "claims made" policy differs from an "occurrence" policy in 
several important aspects. Because it triggers coverage, transmittal 
of the notice of the claim to the insurer is the most important aspect 
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Discovery of what by whom? Reports of what by whom to whom? We can 
imagine pure reporting policies in which the policy trigger would be a report, 
to the insurer, of something, by someone: it could be a report of a claim by the 
injured person against the insured, or a report of an injury, or a report of an 
act or omission that creates a risk of injury. And, of course, given the 
insurer's concerns about lags between the time the policy is priced and the 
time the insurer's liability is finally determined, we could imagine moving the 
trigger still deeper into the sequence: much of what we think of as "health" 
insurance is really "medical expense" insurance in which coverage is not 
triggered, no matter how long-standing the exposure or injury or disease and 
no matter how much the insurer knows about those things, until actual 
medical expense is incurred. 
So, the possible triggers are many. What do insurers actually use as 
triggers in "claims-made" forms? A lawyer looking only in reported 
opinions will encounter at least those identified in Exhibit 2.27 
of the claims made policy. A claims made policy extends 
coverage if "the negligent or omitted act is discovered and brought 
to the attention of the insurer within the policy term." /d. (quoting 
7A John Alan Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4504.01, 
at 312 (Berdal ed. 1979)}. "Thetiming of the making of the claim 
in such policies stands in equal importance with the error or 
omission as the insured event." [citation omitted] Notice to the 
insurer of a claim made against the insured is generally required to 
be given during the policy period or within a specified amount of 
time after the policy period. "The essence, then, of a claims-made 
policy is notice to the carrier within the policy period." 
27. The events designated with a"?" - exposure and manifestation--are not, so 
far as I know, explicitly identified as triggers in any claims-made formats; however, 
following the practice for "occurrence" triggers, both exposure and manifestation 
might be adopted as the standard for when the injury in fact occurs. 
The event designated with a "!" -payment to the victim-is not, so far as I 
know, a trigger in any reported decision, but the appearance of "claims-paid" medical 
malpractice policies has been chronicled in Ilene Davidson Johnson, Occurrence vs 
Claims-Made Medical Professional Liability Insurance Policies: Fundamental 
Differences in the Concept of Coverage, 266 JAMA 1570, 1571 (1991). For a 
discussion of some of the implications of such a trigger, see irifra notes 3l3-15 and 
accompanying text. 
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Exhibit 2: Triggers Employed in Claims-Made Liability Formats 
allegedly tortious act or omission by insured T 
exposure of potential victims ? 
injury in fact T 
manifestation of victim's injury ? 
insured should have discovered circumstances that may give rise to a claim T 
insured discovers circumstances that may give rise to a claim T 
insured discovers specific acts or omissions that may give rise to a claim T 
insured reports to insurer circumstances that may give rise to a claim insured T 
reports to insurer specific acts or omissions that may give rise to a claim T 
claim for compensation by victim against insured T 
insured reports claim to insurer T 
victim files suit against insured 
investigation by insurer 
defense and reserving decisions by insurer 
negotiations between insurer and victim 
judgment and settlement 
payment to victim 
Why do we find such triggers lurking beneath face-page warnings that 
the policy is a "claims-made" policy and that ''the coverage of this policy is 
limited generally to liability for only those claims that are first made against 
the insured while the policy is in force?"28 Sometimes policy definitions 
attempt at least a rhetorical reconciliation: thus, for example, one prominent 
medical malpractice insurer begins by requiring that "[t]he claim must ... 
first be made while this agreement is in effect," but then creates a reporting 
trigger by declaring: "A claim is made on the date you first report an incident 
28. The quoted warning is drawn from the notice required by CAL. INS. CODE 
§ 11580.01(c) (West 1988) (applicable to a professional liability policy "which 
generally limits the coverage thereof to liability for only those claims that are first 
made while the policy is in force"): 
Each such policy ... shall contain on the face page thereof a 
prominent and conspicuous legend or statement substantially to the 
following effect: 
NOTICE 
"Except to such extent as may otherwise be provided herein, the 
coverage of this policy is limited generally to liability for only 
those claims that are first made against the insured while the policy 
is in force. Please review the policy carefully and discuss the 
coverage thereunder with your agent or broker." 
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or injury to us or our agent."29 However, most of the variety of policy 
triggers in nominally claims-made policies are not the product of such 
semantic legerdemain; we will find no occurrence policies sailing under 
29. For example, a medical malpractice policy employed by St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Insurance Company uses the following language: 
When you are covered. 
To be covered the professional service must have been 
performed (or should have been performed) after your 
retroactive date that applies. The claim must also first be 
made while this agreement is in effect. 
When is a claim made? 
A claim is made on the date you first report an incident or 
injury to us or our agent. You must include the following 
information: 
*Date, time and place of the incident. 
*What happened and what professional servIces you 
performed. 
*Type of claim you anticipate. 
*Name and address of injured party. 
*Name and address of any witness. 
For a telling criticism of the two different ways in which "claim" is employed in 
this policy, see Thoracic Cardiovascular Assoc., Ltd. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 
Co., 891 P.2d 916, 924-25 (Ariz. 1994) (dissenting opinion). Compare Skandia 
America Reinsurance Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 951 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 
1991) (policy not ambiguous; "claim" means claim against insurer) with St. Paul Fire 
& Marine Ins. Co. v. House, 554 A.2d 404 (Md. 1989) (policy ambiguous as to 
whether trigger is claim made against insured or claim made to insurer). See also , 
Driskill v. EI Jamie Marine, Inc., 1988 WL 93606, at *1 (E.D. La. 1988) (policy 
specifying trigger as a claim made against an insured but defining a claim as having 
been' made "when notice of such claim is received and recorded by any insured or by 
[the insurer], whichever comes first"). For what is arguably another way to create a 
pure reporting trigger, see Helfand v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 4th 
869, 886 (Cal. App. 1992) (insurer promises to pay for loss arising from claims first 
made against the insured during the policy period, but then says that "[t]he time when 
a loss shall be incurred within the meaning of this policy shall be the date on which 
... Insureds shall give written notice to the Insurer as hereafter provided"). 
1999] CLAIMS MADE FORMATS 525 
"claims-made" flags,30 Rather, the reason nominally claims-made policies 
employ such a variety of policy triggers is that many of what we call "claims-
made" policies in fact employ "multiple-event triggers" -triggers requiring 
that two or more events must happen within a particular policy period--or 
"altemative-event triggers" -triggers identifying two or more events some 
of which must happen within a particular policy period. 
Thus, as we shall see, many "claims-made" forms in fact are multiple-
event-trigger "claims-made-and-reported" or ''potential--claim-discovered-
and-reported" policies that require that at least two things must happen 
during a particular policy period in order to trigger the policy: with a "claims-
made-and-reported" fonnat, the injured party must assert a claim against the 
insured during the policy period, and the insured must report that claim to the 
insurer during the policy period;3! with a "potential--claims-discovered-and-
reported" format, the insured must both discover circumstances that might 
ripen into a claim during the policy period and report that discovery to the 
insurer during the policy period,32 Moreover, many nominally "claims-
30. Sometimes hybrids may appear. Thus, CGL policies written on an 
occurrence basis may nonetheless have claims-made riders for certain exposures. 
Nominally claims-made formats that include a "circumstances-discovered-and-
reported" trigger, or that include some form of extended reporting period, sometimes 
will operate by virtue of such provisions much as would an "occurrence" policy. 
And, of course, insurers and insureds continue to experiment with other triggering 
mechanisms. See, e.g., Kate Tilley, Australian Liability Form Has Different Trigger, 
Bus. INS., Oct. 24, 1994, p. 37 (reporting growing use of "c1aims-occurring" 
coverage in Australia and some European markets). 
31. For example, a lawyers' professional liability policy issued by Home 
Insurance Company contains the following insuring clause: 
To pay on behalf of the Insured all sums in excess of the deductible 
amount ... which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay 
as damages as a result of CLAIMS FIRST MADE AGAINST THE 
INSURED DURING THE POLICY PERIOD AND REPORTED 
TO THE COMPANY DURING THE POLICY PERIOD caused by 
any act, error or omission for which the insured is legally 
responsible, and arising out of the rendering or failure to render 
professional services for others in the insured's capacity as a 
lawyer or notary public. 
32. "Potential-claim-discovered-and-reported" provisions, often misleadingly 
called "discovery" or "awareness" provisions, or more-usefully "notice of potential 
claim," "claim substitute," "c1aims-after-termination" or "occurrence first reported" 
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made" policies also include a "retroactive date" after which the injury to the 
victim or the negligent act or omission must have happened;33 some more 
liberal "retro date" provisions provide "prior acts" coverage for negligence 
or injuries prior to the retro date if the insured neither knew nor should have 
provisions, permit an insured to lock in coverage before a claim has been made by 
reporting to the insurer circumstances that may ripen into a claim. Often the reporting 
requirements are quite detailed, demanding identification of specific acts or omissions 
or specific injuries that have been or may be suffered by potential claimants; in some 
policy formats, however, a more general notice is all that is required. The differences 
and their implications have been explored in a series of decisions arising out of efforts 
by the FDIC and FSLIC as receivers of failed financial institutions to recover on 
director's and officer's liability policies issued to the failed institutions. Compare, 
e.g., FDIC v. Caplan, 838 F. Supp. 1125 (W.D. La. 1993) (report insufficient because 
iffailed to identify specific wrongful acts and specific directors and officers); FDIC 
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 783 F. Supp. 1176 (D. Minn. 1991) (detailed 
information about potential claims in renewal application did not satisfy potential 
claim reporting provision); RTC v. Artley, 24 F.3d 1363 (lith Cir. 1994) (forwarding 
to insurer detailed information of improper lending practices did not satisfy potential 
claim reporting provision) with RTC v. American Cas. Co., 874 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. 
Mo. 1995) (general identification of potential claimant and circumstances enough to 
satisfy potential claim reported provision that did not require specificity); FSLIC v. 
Heidrick, 774 F. Supp. 352 (D. Md. 1991) (same). For treatment of the considerations 
that should go into deciding whether to take advantage of such a provision, see IRMI, 
PROFESSSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE, supra note 2, at VIII.C.9 - VII.C.12 (detailing 
"Advantageous Uses" and "Catch-22 Aspects" of use of such provisions); Laird 
Campbell, The Claims Made Policy - A Trap for the Unwary Lawyer, 18 COLO. 
LAW. 1121 (1989); Robert Knowles. The Reporting of "Potential Claims" under a 
Claims-Made Policy, FOR THE DEFENSE, July, 1993, p. 23. 
33. The standard explanation for retro dates is that they are a necessary protection 
against adverse selection; without them, a prospective insured could wait until a claim 
is imminent before first buying claims-made coverage. See, e.g., LUCEY, supra note 
21, at 34. The literature of adverse selection is vast. Three classics are George A. 
Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons ": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 
84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970); Georges Dionne & Neil Doherty, Adverse Selection in 
Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO INSURANCE 
ECONOMICS (G. Dionne, ed., 1992); Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: The Economics of Markets with 
Imperfect Information, 90 Q. 1. ECON. 629 (1976). More nuanced explanations 
recognize that retro dates can be used as a blunt alternative to laser exclusions for 
avoiding known risks, and to avoid problems associated with adjusting "stale" claims. 
See IRMI, PROFESSSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE, supra note 2, at VIII.C.3; IRMI, 
COMMERCIAL LIABILITY INSURANCE supra note 2, at II.C.5. 
1999] CLAIMS MADE FORMATS 527 
known of those circumstances at the time of the retro date.34 And, as we 
shall see, some "claims-made" and "claims-made-and-reported" policies 
include an alternative "discovery" trigger that allows the insured to trigger 
coverage by reporting circumstances that might give rise to a claim to the 
insurer during the policy period during which the circumstances were first 
discovered, even though the victim's claim against the insured may not come 
until well after the end of the policy period.35 Finally, claims-made formats 
34. For example: 
PROVIDED ALWAYS THAT such act, error or omission 
happens: 
a) during the policy period; or, 
b) prior to the policy period, provided that prior to the [start of 
continuous coverage from this insurer]: 
1) The insured did not give notice to any prior insurer of any 
such act or error, and 
2) The [insureds] had no reasonable basis to believe that the 
insured had breached a professional duty or to foresee that 
a claim would be made against the insured; and 
3) There is no prior policy or policies which provide 
insurance for such liability or claim, unless the applicable 
limits of such prior policy or policies are insufficient to 
pay any liability or claim, in which event this policy will 
be excess over any such prior coverage .... 
The retro date provision quoted above is relatively liberal, for it at least holds out 
the possibility of "nose" coverage for acts prior to the period covered by the current 
insurer; some claims made policies establish an absolute retroactive date at the 
beginning of the insuring relation, or even at the beginning of the particular coverage 
period. 
35. For example: 
If, during the policy [or any tail coverage] ... the insured first 
becomes aware that an insured has committed a specific act, error 
or omission in professional services for which coverage is 
otherwise provided hereunder, and if the insured shall during the 
[policy period or tail period] . . . give notice to the Company of: 
a) the specific act, error or omission; and 
b) the injury or damage which has or may result from such act, 
error or omission; and 
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often provide or permit the purchase of "extended reporting" coverage that 
applies the last policy period's coverage limits to the tail of claims made, or 
reported, or both, after the end of the policy period.36 
C. The Trouh/e(s) with Claims-Made Formats 
We may now feel ready for our first explorations into deepest claims-
made land. There we encounter an insured who has purchased identical 
calendar-year claims-made professional liability policies continuously from 
the same insurer during the years 1985 to 1995. In 1994 a client for the first 
time makes a malpractice claim against him. Which, if any, of his ten 
policies has been triggered? 
c) the circumstances by which the insured first becomes aware 
of such act, error or omission then any claim that may subsequently 
be made against the insured arising out of such act or omission 
shall be deemed for the purpose of this insurance to have been 
made within [the coverage period]. 
36. Some "claims-made" policies contain "extended reporting" or "tail" 
coverage provisions that guarantee a right to purchase (for an additional premium) a 
limited extension of the coverage for future claims arising out of acts or omissions 
committed prior to the termination of the coverage. In effect, "tail" coverage is 
"occurrence" coverage for occurrences within the policy period producing claims 
within the specified extended reporting period. Such tail coverage may be "one 
way" -i.e, available for a price if the insurer cancels or nonrenews, but not if the 
insured terminates the relationship with the insurer--or, more infrequently, "two-
way" -i.e., available for a price even if the insured terminates the relationship; the 
practice apparently varies with the kind of professional liability being insured. See 
IRMI, PROFESSSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE, supra note 2, at VIII.D.6. The same 
professional liability policy may carry two tail options, one for terminations of 
coverage while professional activities continue, another to provide coverage for a 
"non-practicing tail." Some forms provide an automatic extension of the reporting 
date; thus, a nominally "claims-made-and-reported" policy for calendar 1996 might 
in fact require that for the policy to be triggered the claim be made during calendar 
1996 but permit the report to the insurer of the claim to be made during calendar 1996 
or in the first sixty days of 1997. See generally id. at VIII.C.8. 
Two factors may limit the value of tail coverage: 1) the premiums for the optional 
tail coverage may be left to negotiation at the time the tail coverage is purchased, or 
fixed for only the first few years of the tail coverage; 2) usually tail coverage only 
extends the last policy period's policy limits over the last policy period and the tail 
period, so that claims made in the last policy year may deplete the limits available 
during the tail period. 
1999] CLAIMS MADE FORMATS 529 
Presented in this fashion, the process for determining the answer may 
appear easy. We simply Exhibit 3: Pure Claims-Made Trigger 
determine what each policy 
identifies as the trigger or 
triggers for coverage, and 
then determine whether the 
A policy is triggered if, during the policy 
period, the victim first makes a claim 
against the insured 
trigger or triggers were satisfied. If the policy employs a "pure" claims-
made trigger like that summarized in Exhibit 3, the only thing that matters is 
the timing of the first claim. If that happened in 1994; the 1994 policy has 
been triggered. 
If the policy employs a Exhibit 4: Pure Reporting Trigger 
pure "reporting" claims-made 
trigger like that summarized 
in Exhibit 4, the only thing that 
matters is when the insured 
reported a claim to the 
insurer. Equally simple. If 
the policy employs a "pure" 
A policy is triggered if, during the policy 
period, the insured first reports to the insurer 
that a victim has made a claim agaisnt the 
insured. 
Exhibit 5: Claims-Made Trigger with 
Retro Date 
claims-made trigger with a ....-----------------, 
retro date like that summarized 
in Exhibit 5, we must 
determine not only whether 
the claim was first made 
during the policy period, but 
also whether the allegedly 
A policy is triggered if: 
1) the lallegedly tortious act, error or 
omission) linjury to the victim) took place 
after the applicable retro date; and 
2) during the policy period. the victim 
first made a claim against the insured. 
negligent act or omission that prompted the claim (or, in some policies, the 
injury to the victim) occurred after the retro date. In our case, if the retro date 
established in the 1994 policy (the policy covering the year in which the 
claim was first made) is a date prior to the insured's alleged negligence (or, 
where relevant, the injury), then the 1994 policy has been triggered; if the 
insured's negligence occurred prior to that retro date, then the 1994 policy 
has not been triggered. 
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If the policy employs a 
"reported potential claim" 
trigger with a retro date like 
that summarized in Exhibit 6, 
then the timing of the claim 
by the victim against the 
insured is irrelevant; the 
policy will only be triggered 
if the insured reports to the 
insurer during the policy year 
that the insured has 
Exhibit 6: Potential-Claim-Reported 
Trigger with Retro Date 
A policy is triggered if: 
I) the [allegedly tortious act, error or 
omission] [injury to the victim] took place 
after the applicable retro date; and 
2) during the policy year, the insured 
reported to the insurer [a specific 
wrongful act] [circumstances] that might 
give rise to a claim. 
discovered circumstances that may ripen into a claim, and if the retro 
date is satisfied. 
If the insured's policy employs a multiple-event "claims-made-and-
reported" trigger with a retro 
date, like that summarized in 
Exhibit 7, then our inquiry 
becomes three-pronged. To 
trigger such a policy, the 
alleged negligence must have 
occurred after the applicable 
retro date, and both the first 
claim by the victim against 
the insured and the report of 
the claim by the insured to the 
insurer must have occurred 
during the policy period. 
Exhibit 7: Claims-Made-and-Reported 
A policy is triggered if: 
I) the [allegedly tortious act, error or 
omission) [injury to the victim] took place 
after the applicable retro date; and 
2) during the policy period, 
a) the victim made a claim 
against the insured; and 
b) the insured reported the claim 
to the insurer. 
If the insured's policy employs the combination of dual and alternative 
triggers summarized in Exhibit 8, we in effect go through the process twice. 
Did the alleged negligence occur after the retro date and did the insured give 
notice to the insurer of circumstances that might give rise to a claim in the 
policy period in which the insured first became aware of those circumstances? 
If so, then the policy in effect at the time of the notice has been triggered. If 
no policy was triggered by that method, then we investigate the second 
possibility. Did the alleged negligence occur after the retro date and during 
a single policy period did the victim make a claim against the insured and the 
insured report the claim to the insurer? If so, then the policy in effect at the 
time the claim was made and reported has been triggered. Detailed perhaps, 
but still simple enough. 
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But what is it about this exercise that makes it so (tediously) simple? The 
answer is that we have assumed away all the juicy questions. We assumed 
that we knew the policy 
triggers, and we assumed that 
we knew the facts necessary 
to apply those policy triggers. 
In the claims-made thicket, 
things are not so simple. 
Might not an insured 
professional who each 
year tucks her prominently-
labeled "claims - made" 
renewal policy into her safety 
deposit box feel aggrieved 
to learn that her insurer 
denies any obligation to 
defend or indemniry her 
because she really has a 
"claims-made-and-reported" 
policy, and the claim made 
against her on Friday fell in 
one policy year and her report 
Exhibit 8: Claims-Made-and-Reported/ 
Potential-Claim-Discovered-
and-Reported Triggers with 
Retro Date 
A policy is triggered if: 
1) the lallegedly tortious act, error or 
omissionl linjury to the victim 1 occurred 
after the applicable retro date; and 
2) during the policy period, EITHER 
A) the victim made a claim 
against the insured; and the insured 
reported the claim to the insurer; OR 
8) the insured first discovered la 
specific wrongful actllcircumstancesl that 
might give rise to a claim; and the insured 
notified the insurer of la specific wrongful 
act)lcircumstances) that might give rise to 
a claim. 
the following Monday fell in a second policy year? And might not an insured 
who knows exactly what his claims-made-and-reported policy says and who 
conscientiously reports a suit against him on the same day he is served feel 
aggrieved to learn that the multiple-event "claims-made-and-reported" 
trigger was not satisfied because a billing dispute or a regulatory inquiry in 
an earlier year is deemed a "claim" that was first made then but went 
unreported until the victim's suit against the insured prompted action? They 
might indeed, and yearn for a world of simple hypotheticals where triggers 
are unequivocal and well understood, and events necessary to satisry those 
triggers come with labels neatly attached. And then they might consult their 
lawyers. 
The exercise is artificially simple for another reason as well. It evinces 
no interest in when the insured first became aware that she might have 
committed an act or omission that could give rise to a claim. But insurers are 
interested, and claims-made policies and marketing practices are designed to 
assure that, when the insured knows or should know of circumstances that 
may give rise to a claim, the insurer soon will have that information too. 
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Sometimes, of course, pre-trigger knowledge by the insured is not an issue. 
Sometimes the first inkling an insured has that something has gone wrong 
comes when a claim is filed against her. But often the insured will receive 
warning signals that she may have committed an act or omission that could 
give rise to a claim in the future, and if she does, "notice"37 provisions in the 
policy and renewal application questions are supposed to assure that the 
insurer soon will have access to that information as well. Where does that 
leave the insured? Identified to the insurer as especially likely to have a 
claim in the future, thus inviting the insurer to advance the retro date, or to 
use a laser exclusion to carve the identified source of potential liability out of 
policy coverage, or to raise the price of future coverage, or even to refuse to 
renew coverage for the future. For insurers, these devices are only common-
place manifestations of their desire to avoid adverse selection when making 
underwriting decisions. For insureds, however, the conjunction of annual 
renewal underwriting with policy triggers that operate late in the tort 
insurance claim sequence means that the insured may be subjected to serious 
problems of "classification risk." Might not claims-made insureds feel 
aggrieved to learn that a change from an occurrence to a claims-made trigger 
means not only that insureds rather than insurers will bear the risk of 
increased costs due to correlated changes during the IBNR period, but also 
that insurers have been empowered to shift to individual insureds the burden 
of bearing the liability costs that become both inevitable and known during 
a coverage period but before any policy has been triggered? They might 
indeed. And then they might consult their lawyers. 
D. Lawyering in a Claims-Made World 
And what will their lawyers tell them? The news will not be good. 
Consider, for example, the lessons to be learned from the battle between 
Dolan, Fertig & Curtis, a Florida law firm, and its claims-made insurers. The 
Dolan firm purchased a claims-made errors and omissions policy from Gulf 
Insurance Company for the period from November 20, 1978 to November 20, 
1979. In fact, the policy was a triple-event-trigger claims-made-and-
37. In some policies, the insured is only required to give prompt notice of a 
claim, a requirement that adds little to the "reporting" requirement of the insuring 
clause. But in some policies, the insurer's liability is conditioned on notice if the 
insured becomes aware of an act or omission that might reasonably be expected to 
ripen into a claim covered by the policy, even if there is as yet no claim to report, and 
even if there is no "discovery" clause to make the notice operate as a trigger of 
coverage. 
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reported policy with a retro date of November 20, 1978; thus, by its terms, the 
Gulf policy would be triggered only if 1) a claim was made against the law 
firm in the 1978-79 policy year, 2) the claim was reported to insurer during 
the 1978-79 policy year, and 3) the claim was based upon professional 
activities during the 1978-79 policy year. Toward the end ofthe policy year 
the Dolan firm contracted with a second insurer, Lawyers Professional 
Liability Insurance Company (LPLIC), to provide liability coverage for the 
period from November 20, 1979 to November 20, 1980. The LPLIC policy 
was a claims-made-and-reported policy with a retro date of November 20, 
1977, but it expressly excepted from coverage 
any claim arising out of acts or omissions occurring prior to 
the effective date ofthis policy ifthe insured at the effective 
date knew or could have reasonably foreseen that such acts 
or omissions might be expected to be the basis of a claim or 
suit. 
Thus, by its terms the LPLIC policy would be triggered only if 1) a claim 
was made against the law firm in the 1979-80 policy year, 2) the claim was 
reported to the insurer during the 1979-80 policy year, and 3) the claim was 
based upon professional activities after November 20, 1977, and the insured 
on November 20, 1979, was not chargeable with knowledge of a potential 
claim based on such professional activities. 
On November 19, 1979, the fmal day of the Gulf policy period, the law 
firm received a letter from a client claiming that the law firm had been 
negligent in the provision of legal services during the period after the 
policies' retro dates. The law firm reported the claim to LPLIC on December 
6, 1979; after being informed by LPLIC that two of the three triggers for 
LPLIC coverage had not been satisfied, the law firm on February 12, 1980, 
reported the claim to Gulf. Gulf too denied coverage; although two of its 
three triggers had been satisfied, the third-report of claim within the policy 
period-had not. By early 1988 the Florida courts had confirmed the 
obvious. In the straight-forward world of the conventional insurance law 
syllogism, all of a policy's conditions must be fully satisfied if an insurer is 
to have a duty to perform, the reporting condition in the Gulf policy and the 
retro date and claim conditions in the LPLIC policy were not satisfied, and 
therefore neither insurer had a duty to perform.38 
38. GulfIns. Co. v. Dolan. Fertig & Curtis, 433 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1983); Lawyers 
Prof. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis, 524 So. 2d 677 (Fla. App. 1988). 
534 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:2 
Exhibit 9: Dolan Case: Claims-Made-and-Reported Policies with Retro 
Dates' Different Insurers 
" 
1978-79 Gulflns. Co. 1979-80 LPLIC 
CONDITIONS: CONDITIONS: 
1) Neg after 11120/78 1) Neg after 11120178 
2) Claim in 78-79 2) Claim in 79-80 
3) Report in 78-79 3) Report to LlPIC in 79--80 
FACTS: Neg in 78-79; Claim in 78-79; Reports in 79-80 
For a lawyer in search of a way to escape the simple force of these 
catechetical understandings, the choices may seem dauntingly few. Absent 
facts sufficient to support equitable doctrines of waiver, estoppel, or 
reformation,39 rummaging through the standard-issue lawyers' kitbag of 
neo-dassical insurance law is likely to produce little more than what is often 
a litany of last resorts: Is the policy ambiguous so that it can be construed 
against the insurer? Does it violate the objective reasonable expectations of 
the insured? Is there something about it that makes it contrary to public 
policy? Usually, of course, the answers are "no," "no," and "no." 
Still, in the early days of claims-made formats, a few lawyers did manage 
to guide their insureds along these routes. Thus, for example, in Gyler v. 
Mission Insurance Company, careless drafting that obligated a professional 
liability insurer to respond to "claims for breach of professional duty as 
Lawyers which may be made" during the policy period provided an opening 
for a court to declare itself uncertain as to "whether coverage is limited to 
claims asserted during the policy period or extends to claims maturing during 
the policy period but not asserted until later," and so to invoke contra 
proferentem rules of construction to assure that what the insurer thought was 
a c1aims-made-and-reported form would operate in that instance as an 
occurrence form.40 And, at a time when claims-made formats could seem 
39. See, e.g., Cornell, Howland, Hayes & Merryfield, Inc. v. Continental Cas. 
CO.,465 F.2d 22 (9th Cir. 1972) (second insurer precluded from invoking retro date 
provision against insured by express assurances that coverage would be provided for 
a known circumstance); Stein, Hinkle, Dawe & Assoc., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 
313 N.W.2d 299 (Mich. App. 1981) (agent's failure to recommend prior acts 
endorsement precludes insurer from denying coverage for prior acts). 
40. Gyler v. Mission Ins. Co., 514 P.2d 1219 (Cal. 1973). See also Chamberlin 
v. Smith, 72 Cal. App. 3d 835 (1977) (construing same language as in Gyler); J.G. 
Link & Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 470 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 
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as strange to some judges as to the insureds seeking to escape them, a few 
decisions concluded that particular claims-made formats were 
unconscionable or contrary to public policy or violations of reasonable 
expectations of insureds because they did not provide either the prospective 
coverage of a pure occurrence policy or the retrospective coverage of a pure 
claims-made policy. 
Thus, in one briefly-famous decision, Brown-Spalding & Assoc. v. 
International Surplus Lines Ins. Co.,41 a California Court of Appeals held a 
reporting requirement contrary to public policy and a violation of reasonable 
expectations of insureds: 
A claims made policy which requires the insurer to be 
notified during the policy period severely limits the scope of 
coverage so that the objectively reasonable expectations of 
the purchaser of professional liability coverage are not met. 
. . . [T]he reporting requirement effectively precludes 
coverage for claims made toward the end of the policy 
period which cannot reasonably be reported until after 
expiration.42 
And in one much-criticized 1985 decision, Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co.,43 
the New Jersey Supreme Court rescued a claims-made-and-reported insured 
who had failed to report a claim within the policy period by giving canonical 
status to an idealized characterization of a "pure" claims-made trigger 
providing unlimited retrospective coverage, and then refusing to enforce the 
policy because the presence of a retro date meant that the policy failed to live 
up to that unlikely ideal. 
u.S. 829 (1973) (ambiguous as to whether policy requiring both negligent act and 
report of negligence act within policy period provided claims-made or occurrence 
coverage). For a recent example along the margins, see St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 
Co v. MetPath Inc., No. 3-96-703,1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2264 (D. Minn. Jan. 26, 
1998) (exclusion of known prior acts ambiguous as applied to acts prior to acquisition 
of company by insured). 
41. 254 Cal. Rptr. 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
42.254 Cal. Rptr. at 195. The opinion was later decertified by the California 
Supreme Court. See infra note 60. 
43. 100 N.J. 325,495 A.2d 406 (N.J. 1985). 
536 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:2 
[T]he policy at issue here is substantially different from the 
standard "claims made" policy. Indeed, St. Paul's policy 
combines the worst features of "occurrence" and "claims 
made" policies and the best of neither. It provides neither 
the prospective coverage typical of an "occurrence" policy, 
nor the "retroactive" coverage typical of a "claims made" 
policy. 
[A] policy that defmes the scope of coverage so narrowly is 
incompatible with the objectively reasonable expectations of 
purchasers of professional liability coverage. We assume 
that there are vast numbers of professionals covered by 
"claims made" policies who are unaware of the basic 
distinction between their policies and the traditional 
"occurrence" policy. However, those professionals covered 
by "claims made" policies who do understand how their 
policies differ from "occurrence" policies would expect that 
in return for the loss of prospective coverage provided by 
"occurrence" policies, they would be afforded reasonable 
retroactive coverage by their "claims made" policies. A 
leading proponent of "claims made" coverage has 
characterized this quid pro quo-the relinquishment of 
prospective coverage in return for retroactive coverage-as 
"the essential trade-off inherent in the concept of 'claims-
made' insurance."44 
44. Id. at 339-40, 495 A.2d at 414-15 (citation omitted). The "leading 
proponent," of course, was Sol Kroll. See supra note 20. In a companion case, 
Zuckerman v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 395 (N.J. 1985), a similar 
failure to satisfy a reporting condition was fatal to the insured's claim because the 
policy contained no retro date and thus provided the "retroactive coverage" the court 
demanded. However, the force of the distinction was less than might appear. The 
Sparks decision indicated that multiple--event triggers would be pennitted to truncate 
both "prospective" and "retroactive" coverage if the limitations were "specifically 
understood and bargained for" by the insured, 495 A.2d at 416 n.6, and the insured 
did not need coverage for pre-issuance activities because a newly-minted 
professional or covered by earlier occurrence coverage. /d. at 416 n.4. On remand, 
the insurer was able to convince the trial court that these conditions had been satisfied, 
and the Appellate Division affinned. Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., A-3213-85T8 
(App. Div. Feb. 3, 1987). See generally Kenneth F. Oettle & Davis 1. Howard, 
Zuckerman and Sparks: The Validity of "Claims Made" Insurance Policies as a 
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In similar fashion, a lower court in New Jersey declared contrary to 
public policy a retro date provision that provided coverage for earlier errors 
and omissions only if the same insurer had provided coverage in the earlier 
years,45 and a lower court in New York refused to enforce as unconscionable 
a condition requiring the claim to be made in a policy year when the insurer 
refused to renew for subsequent years because it knew the insured had 
suffered an explosion almost certain to produce claims after the end of the 
policy period.46 But such apostasies could easily be distinguished or ignored, 
and would pose little long-tenn threat to the prevailing orthodoxy. In the 
conventional understanding, modern claims-made fonnats are too well-
established, and the buyers look too sophisticated, for the fonns to fall prey 
to arguments that they offend public policy47 or are unconscionable or violate 
the reasonable expectations of insureds.48 
Function of Retroactive Coverage, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 659 (1986); Richard D. 
Catenacci, Sparks Revisited: Sparks v. St. Paul Insurance Co., 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 
707 (1988). For a more supportive view of the Sparks decision and an argument that 
courts should use the doctrine of reasonable expectations to abrogate retro date 
provisions, see Carolyn M. Frame, Note, "Claims-Made" Liability Insurance: 
Closing the Gaps with Retroactive Coverage, 60 TEMPLE L.Q. 165 (1987). 
45. Jones v. Continental Cas. Co., 303 A.2d 91 (N.J. Ch. 1973) (prior acts 
liberalization of retro provision contrary to public policy and reasonable expectations 
of insured because limited to prior acts while insured with the same insurer). 
46. Heen & Flint Assoc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 400 N.Y.S.2d 994, 998-99 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977). 
It is my determination that a provision in a "claims made" policy 
that permits an insurer, where it has notice of a potential claim, to 
refuse to renew that policy, is unconscionable. Such a provision 
allows an insurer to avoid the risk of serious potential claims 
arising from accidents committed within the policy period, and 
leaves the insured without coverage after the expiration of the 
policy, since no other insurer will be willing to accept the known 
risk and thus buy its way into a potential lawsuit. 
I, therefore, limit the provision of the Travelers' policy that 
requires a claim to be made against the insured during the policy 
period, to instances where continued coverage is available from the 
same or from some other insurer .... 
47. See, e.g" James & Hackworth v. Continental Cas. Co., 522 F. Supp. 785 
(N.D. Ala. 1980) (reporting trigger not contrary to state statute prohibiting shortening 
\ 
538 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:2 
Still, there was one argument that might seem to commend itself to a 
lawyer in search of escape from the failure of her client to satisfy the 
conditions of a dual-trigger claims-made-and-reported policy. By the time 
that claims-made disputes began making their way into court in significant 
numbers many jurisdictions had "adopted" a "notice-prejudice rule" that, in 
the conventional understanding, alters the strict common law rule governing 
some failures of condition. If, for example, an insured involved in an auto 
accident fails to give the timely notice required by her personal automobile 
policy, the "notice-prejudice rule" pennits the insurer a defense only if the 
failure of condition "prejudiced" the insurer.49 Why not apply the "notice-
prejudice rule" to liability coverage where the trigger is a claim in the same 
way it is applied when the trigger is an occurrence? 
Why not indeed, some courts responded. In California,50 Michigan,51 
Massachusetts,52 Maine,53 Minnesota,54 and perhaps Maryland,55 courts 
of statutes of limitations); James 1. Brogger & Assoc., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. 
Co., 595 P.2d 1063 (Colo. App. 1979) (claims-made format not anticompetitive tying 
arrangement because insured free to move to other insurers). Cf Home Ins. Co. v. 
Adco Oil Co., 987 F. Supp. 1057 (N.D. III. 1997), rev'd, 154 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(Illinois public policy means insured's intentional failure to report claim to insurer 
could not defeat victim's vested rights against insurer); Murray v. City of Bunkie, 
686 So. 2d 45 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (direct action statute gives victim vested rights 
against insurer that cannot be lost by insured's failure to report claim within policy 
period). 
48. See, e.g., ROBERTH. JERRY, IT UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 289 (1987) 
("As long as consumers understand the limitations inherent in claims-made coverage 
and alternative occurrence coverage is available, no good reason exists for not having 
claims-made coverage available to consumers."). See generally Martin 1. McMahon, 
Event Triggering Liability Insurance Coverage as Occurring within Period of Time 
Covered by Liability Insurance Policy where Injury or Damage is Delayed-Modern 
Cases, 14 A.L.R. 5th 695 (1997). 
49. In Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Texas and Wisconsin, the "notice-
prejudice rule is a [statutory/administrative] creation; most other states have 
announced the rule judicially." Charles C. Marvel, Annot., Modern Status of Rules 
Requiring Liability Insurer to Show Prejudice to Escape Liability Because of 
Insured's Failure or Delay in Giving Notice of Accident or Claim, or in Forwarding 
Suit Papers, 32 A.L.R. 4th 141 (1984). For a recent survey of "late notice rules by 
state," see ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 23, at § 5.9 (1997). See also WINDT, supra 
note 21, at § 1.04. 
50. Northwestern Title Ins. Co. v. Flack, 6 Cal. App. 3d 134 (1970); Mt. Hawley 
Ins. Co. v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 695 F. Supp. 469 (CD. Cal. 1987). 
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allowed the effect of failure to report a claim to the insurer within the policy 
period to tum on whether the insurer was prejudiced by that failure. 56 
The industry counter-attack was swift, mounted on several concurrent 
fronts, and strikingly effective. Did a panel of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the 9th Circuit apply the California prejudice rule to a reporting 
condition in a claims-made policy?57 Then take advantage of the happy 
circumstance that both parties to the litigation were insurers and settle the 
litigation with a stipulation that the parties would join in a request that the 
decisions be vacated and the opinions withdrawn from publication; surely the 
court would go along.58 Did a division of the California Court of Appeals 
51. Wood v. Duckworth, 401 N.W.2d 258 (Mich. App. 1986) (prejudice shown); 
Sherlock v. Perry, 605 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Stine v. Continental Cas. 
Co., 349 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1984) (dictum concerning application of statute 
excusing late notice when compliance impracticable). 
52. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Bowes, 409 N.E.2d 185 (Mass. 1980). 
53. American Home Assur. Co. v. Ingeneri, 479 A.2d 897 (Me. 1984). 
54. Reliance Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Ins. Cos., 239 N.W.2d 922 (Minn. 1976). 
55. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. House, 554 A.2d 404 (Md. 1989) (dictum). 
The court backed away in T.H.E. Ins. Co. v. P.T.P. Inc., 628 A.2d 223 (Md. 1993). 
See generally Whertley, supra note 9. 
56. New Zealand and Australia also applied statutory prejudice requirements to 
failures to satisfy some claims-made triggers. See Sinclair Horder O'Malley & Co. 
v. National Ins. Co. of N.Z. Ltd, 2 N.Z.L.R. 257 (1995) (applying prejudice 
requirement of § 9 of NEW ZEALAND INSURANCE LAW REFORM ACT 1977 to a 
potential-claim-discovered-and-reported condition); Bradley West Clarke List and 
Anor v. Keeman and Ors, 9 ANZ Ins. Cas. 76,742 (1997) (applying prejudice 
requirement to claims-made-and-reported policy); East End Real Estate Pty Ltd v. 
C.E. Heath Cas. & Gen. Ins. Ltd., 7 ANZ Ins. Cas. 61,092 (Ct. App. N.S.W. 
1992)( effect of failure to report claim governed by § 54 of Insurance Contracts Act 
1984 (Cth»; FAI Gen. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Perry, 7 ANZ Ins. Cas. 61,164 (Ct. App. 
N.S.W. 1993) (failure to report potential claim governed by § 54). 
57. New England Reins. Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 822 F.2d 887 
(9th Cir. 1987), rev'g 654 F. Supp. 742 (C.D. Cal. 1986). 
58. New England Reins. Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 829 F.2d 840 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (vacating earlier decision). Policyholder Attorney Eugene Anderson, 
quoted in Roger Parloff, Rigging the Common Law, The American Lawyer, March 
1992, p.74, said of the original court of ·appeals decision in New England 
Reinsurance: "That was a great case for us. . .. A few days later, zingo. It was 
gone." Not completely, however; though unavailable in the reporter systems, and on 
Westlaw and Lexis, the opinion still can be found at 1987 CCH Fire & Cas. Cases. 
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hold that a dual trigger claims-made-and-reported policy violated the 
reasonable expectations of insureds?59 Get that opinion decertified too.60 
Did another division ofthe California Court of Appeals apply the prejudice 
rule to a claims-made-and-reported policy?6\ Then settle after oral 
argument contingent upon no opinion being filed in the case.62 When the 
court refuses "[t]o bow to this pressure" and files its opinion63 applying the 
407 and on Anderson's "Vacatur" web site. See Anderson Kill & Olick, infra note 
60. 
59. Brown-Spaulding & Assoc., Inc. v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., et 
aI, 254 Cal. Rptr. 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
60. The Brown-Spaulding opinion was decertified on March 16, 1989, pursuant 
to CAL. CT. RULE 979. See 206 Cal. App. 3d 1580 (1989) (acknowledging deletion 
of opinion). Application of the "notice-prejudice rule" to claims-made-and-reported 
policies prompted "a massive letter-writing campaign" by insurers, according to one 
attorney for insureds, Stacy Gordon, Only California Allows Justices to "De publish • .. 
Bus. INS., June 15, 1992, p.14, and provoked howls that the industry was turning the 
courts into a "system of private justice," Stacy Gordon, Vanishing Precedents: 
Policyholders Can Get Better Deal-if Rulings Are Erased" Bus. INS., June 15, 1992, 
p. 1 ("A system of private justice is emerging nationwide. Insurers are agreeing not 
to press appeals of pro-policyholder decisions and are even paying policyholders 
more than courts have awarded if policyholders help persuade judges to vacate their 
opinions.). 
Eugene Anderson has been especially critical of the practices involved in New 
England Reinsurance and Brown-Spaulding: "You see brief after brief where [the 
insurance lawyers] say, 'The weight of authority is .... ' or 'most ofthe cases hold 
that .... ' The fact that they can manipulate the god damn numbers is beyond belief." 
See Parloff, supra note 58, at 76. Anderson's campaign against disappearing authority 
now includes a web site clearing house. See Anderson Kill & Olick, Vacatur Center. 
<http://www.andersonkill.com/vacatur.htm>. For a rebuttal, see Fred F. Gregory, 
Letters, THEAMERlCANLAWYER,June 1992,p.18. Cf Roberto Ceniceros, Decision 
Will Keep Rulings on the Books, Bus. INS., Nov. 14, 1994, p. 1 (reporting reactions 
to U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 115 S.Ct. 
386 (1994) (party to federal litigation cannot request that defeat in lower court be 
erased by settlement)). 
61. Village Escrow Co., Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 248 Cal. Rptr. 687 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
62. Stacy Adler, Ruling Transforms Claims-Made Cover into Occurrence. Bus. 
INS., July 25, 1988, p. 1. 
63. The court noted that the case was of first impression in the United States, 
recited the terms of the proposed settlement, and refused to go along: 
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prejudice rule, organize a letter-writing campaign to the California Supreme 
Court and get the offending decision decertified.64 Eventually a court would 
hold that the California notice-prejudice rule should not be applied to 
reportit).g conditions in claims-made policies.65 In the meantime, flood the 
To bow to ~is pressure and refrain from filing our opinion would 
do disservice not only to the public interest implicated in this case 
but to the proper functioning of the appellate courts in future cases. 
For it would send a message to other appellants and respondents 
that they can wait until oral argument and, if they sense the 
probability or possibility the appellate court will rule against them, 
buy their way out of an unfavorable precedent often at the 
relatively cheap price asked by the single opponent they face in that 
appeal. This would tend to inhibit appellate judges from asking the 
tough questions at oral argument which might suggest the direction 
of their thinking. It would result in the squandering of public 
resources on the research, analysis and writing of opinions which 
never get filed even though they resolve issues of great public 
import. And it could even distort the law by allowing parties who 
possess ample means to prevent the filing of adverse precedents 
while those without means are unable to do so. 
Village Escrow Co., Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 248 Cal. Rptr. 687, 694-96 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
64. The American Insurance Association and eight insurers asked the Supreme 
Court to decertify that decision, even before the court decided whether to grant 
review. Stacy Adler, Court Asked to Decertify Claims-Made Ruling, Bus. INS., Mar. 
6, 1989, p. 43. Less than three months later, the decision was decertified, Stacy 
Adler, Ruling on Claims-Made Decertified in California, Bus. INS., Nov. 28, 1988, 
p. 2, making it not available for citation in California and in practice - elsewhere. 
For a demonstration of the effects of decertification even outside the jurisdiction, see 
Civic Assocs., Inc. v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 749 F. Supp. 1076, 1080 (D. Kan. 
1990). 
65. In Burns v. International Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1422 (9th Cir. 1991), the Court 
of Appeals reviewed the split in the California courts of appeal, read the tea leaves 
strewn by the California Supreme Court in Village Escrow and Brown-Spalding, and 
concluded that to apply the prejudice rule to a c1aims-made-and-reported policy 
would be to "extend coverage." Id. at 1425. By the time a California court, in Pacific 
Employers Ins. Co. v. The Superior Court olLos Angeles County, 270 Cal. Rptr. 779 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990), for the first time held that the insurer position should prevail, 
the three decisions that had applied the notice-prejudice rule to disputes arising in 
California had all but disappeared from the official records. Almost, but not 
completely. In Slater v. Lawyers' Mut. Ins. Co., 278 Cal. Rptr. 479 (Cal. Ct. App. 
542 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:2 
trade press with complaints that courts are "refusing to enforce" claims-made 
forms and are "converting claims-made policies into occurrence policies."66 
And throughout, insist as an article of the insurers' faith that reporting 
conditions in claims-made liability policies are fundamentally different than 
notice conditions in an occurrence policy. Gulf Insurance Company v. 
Dolan, Fertig & Curtis67 would supply one of the canonical texts: 
A claims-made policy is a policy "wherein the coverage is 
effective if the negligent or omitted act is discovered and 
brought to the attention of the insurer within the policy 
term." 7A Appleman at 312 .... The essence, then, of a 
claims-made policy is notice to the carrier within the policy 
period." 
Notice within an occurrence policy is not the critical and 
distinguishing feature of that policy type. . .. Coverage 
depends on when the negligent act or omission occurred and 
not when the claim was asserted. . .. The giving of notice is 
only a condition of the policy, and in no manner is it an 
extension of coverage itself. It does not matter when the 
1991), a summary judgment in favor of the insurer was affirmed even though the 
insurer had canceled the policy at the end of the policy year and even though the 
insured had not learned of the claim against him until months later. His anger 
palpable, Judge Johnson wrote a stinging dissent, id. at 1428-29,278 Cal. Rptr. at 
487-88, that essentially repeated his decertified Village Escrow opinion. Finally, in 
Helfond v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1992), the First District refused to apply the "notice-prejudice rule" even to a 
claims-made policy that was not explicitly "claims-made-and-reported." 
66. See, e.g., Stacy Adler, Ruling Transforms Claims-Made Cover into 
Occurrence, supra note 62, at 28 (discussing Village Escrow); Stephen Tarnoff, 
Claims Made: Court Grants Coverage Despite Late Reporting, Bus. INS., Aug 31, 
1987, p. 1,76 (quoting American Insurance Association official: "I don't think it is 
unreasonable to say that the effect is to tum the claims-made policy into an 
occurrence-based policy."). This characterization, though patently inaccurate, has 
become so much a part of the conventional wisdom that it is blithely repeated even 
in technical manuals. See, e.g., IRMI, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE, supra 
note 2, § VIII.C.1 ("[L ] ate reports of claims made it more difficult for underwriters 
to project ultimate claim liabilities (which defeated the purpose of the claims-made 
coverage trigger) and, in effect, transformed the policies into occurrence forms."). 
67.433 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1983) (discussed supra note 38 and accompanying text). 
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insurer is notified of the claim by the insured, so long as the 
notification is within a reasonable time and so long as the 
negligent act or omission occurred within the policy period 
itself. 
With claims-made policies, ... coverage depends on the 
claim being made and reported to the insurer during the 
policy period. Claims-made or discovery policies are 
essentially reporting policies. If the claim is reported to the 
insurer during the policy period, then the carrier is legally 
obligated to pay; if the claim is not reported during the 
policy period, no liability attaches. If a court were to allow 
an extension of reporting time after the end of the policy 
period, such is tantamount to an extension of coverage to the 
insured gratis, something for which the insurer has not 
bargained. This extension of coverage, by the court, so very 
different from a mere condition of the policy, in effect 
rewrites the contract between two parties. This we cannot 
and will not do.68 
543 
Thus, by the early 1990s, the notice-prejudice heresy in California had 
been extirpated and the offending texts mostly purged. One by one other 
pockets of apostasy recanted,69 and the growing orthodoxy was swelled by 
new adherents who made it clear that they brooked no uncertainties about the 
correctness of their position: the notice-prejudice rule should not be 
applicable to reporting conditions in claims-made liability insurance 
policies.70 And that, so far as most cases and commentators were concerned, 
was that'?) 
68.Id. at 514-16. 
69. See, e.g., T.H.E. Ins. Co. v. P.T.P. Inc., et ai, 628 A.2d 223 (Md. 1993) 
(repudiating dicta in St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. House, et ai, 554 A.2d 404 
(Md. 1989»; Chas. T. Main v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 551 N.E.2d 28 (Mass. 1990) 
(backing away from Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Bowes, 409 N.E.2d 185 (Mass. 1980». 
70. Recently, the New Zealand Law Revision Commission has recommended 
legislative reversal of decisions in New Zealand that applied a legislative "prejudice" 
requirement to reporting conditions in claims-made policies. NEW ZEALAND LA W 
REVISION COMMISSION, SOME INSURANCE LAW PROBLEMS (NZLCR 46) 20-23 
(1998). Given the insular character of the debate, perhaps it should not surprise that 
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But, of course, for those willing to venture beyond such potted legal 
history, there is more that bears on the way claims-made formats operate and 
on the way insurance law is practiced at the end of the twentieth century. Do 
we wonder why so many claims-made insureds fail to satisfy claims-made 
reporting triggers? Under the strict common law rule, it doesn't matter, and 
consequently the reported opinions offer only occasional information on that 
subject, but there is enough to suggest the range of snares that claims-made 
formats can set. Sometimes the insured is careless,72 or mistakenly expects 
the claim to be within the policy deductible,73 loses a calculated gamble that 
he can resolve a claim without involving the insurer,74 or reports the claim 
to some but not all ofthe relevant insurers,75 Sometimes the claim arrives at 
the end of one policy year and the report, though quickly made, is untimely 
because it falls in the next policy year.76 Sometimes the claim is made but 
the insured does not learn about it until much later,77 or does not recognize 
it for what it is later held to be.78 Sometimes the one seeking to invoke 
the Commission appeared to rely heavily on Burns v. International Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 
1422 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussed supra note 65) and Chamberlain, supra note 9. 
71. See, e.g., WINDT, supra note 21, at § 1.07 n.78 (collecting authorities). For 
passionate defense ofthe heresy, see Anderson, supra note 9; Pierce, supra note 9. 
72. See, e.g., Troy & Stalder Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 290 N.W.2d 809 (Neb. 
1980) (written report of claims mailed to wrong address). 
73. See, e.g., Zuckerman v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 395 (N.J. 
1985). 
74. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. of Illinois v. Adco Oil Co. ,987 F. Supp. 1057 (N.D. 
III. 1997) (malpractice insured thought claim was frivolous and was concerned that 
notice to insurer would prompt a premium hike). 
75. See, e.g., Chas. T. Main, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 551 N.E.2d 28 
(Mass. 1990) (timely report to primary insurer but not to excess insurer). 
76. See, e.g., United States v. Strip, 868 F.2d 181 (6th Cir. 1989) (applying Ohio 
law) (policy year ended August 2; complaint served on insured on July 26 while out 
oftown); GulfIns. Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis, 433 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1983) (claim 
made last day of policy period). 
77. See, e.g., Thoracic Cardiovascular Assocs., Ltd. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 
Co., 891 P.2d 916 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (suit filed October 15,1987; coverage ended 
May 1, 1988; service on defendant not until July 12, 1988); Slater v. Lawyer's Mut. 
Ins. Co., 278 Cal. Rptr. 479 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (suit within policy period but service 
on defendant insured delayed more than four months); Village Escrow Co. v. National 
Union Fire Ins. Co., 248 Cal. Rptr. 687 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (suit filed within policy 
period but service on defendant insured delayed more than eleven months). 
78. Is a claim made when the lawyer's client demands that the lawyer redo 
allegedly deficient work, or when the client gets mad enough to file suit? Compare 
1999] CLAIMS MADE FORMATS 545 
coverage is not the insured who failed to make a report; 79 sometimes the 
report was made, but later was determined to be inadequate. so Although our 
reactions to the stories insureds have to tell may depend on such differences, 
the strict common law of conditions remains stubbornly indifferent to such 
variations. If reporting a claim to an insurer within a particular policy year 
was an express condition of the policy, the decisions tell us, then the insured 
bears the risk of failing to satisfy that condition. 
Do we wonder what effect failure to make a conforming and timely 
report to the insurer had on the insurer? Again, the strict common law of 
conditions professes indifference, but the cases and commentary nonetheless 
hasten to explain that any report that arrives late will deny the insurer pricing 
advantages that the shift from occurrence to claims-made formats was 
supposed to provide: 
The purpose of the notice requirement in "claims made" 
policies is to ensure "fairness in rate setting," whereas its 
purpose in an "occurrence" policy is ''to permit an insurer to 
make an investigation of the facts ... relating to liability." A 
late notice would clearly always inhibit the insurer's task of 
setting its future premiums and reserves with full knowledge 
of the outstanding claims it is obligated to meet, while it 
would not necessarily have the same effect with regard to the 
investigation of the facts pertaining to the insured event. 
Hence, a showing of prejudice is justly required in the latter 
while not in the former. S) 
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Sukut Constr. Co., Inc., 186 Cal. Rptr. 513 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) 
(client request that lawyer correct admitted error without charge later characterized 
as "claim") with Hoyt v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 607 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(client letter to lawyer questioning work on will held not a claim). When a regulator 
demands that a financial institution get its house in order, when it seizes the 
institution, or when it brings suit against the officers and directors for negligent 
supervision? See. e.g .• Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. F.S.L.I.C., 695 F. Supp. 469 (C.D. 
Cal. 1987). 
79. See, e.g., Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 270 Cal. Rptr. 779 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (late report given by administrator of estate of deceased insured). 
80. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Tinney, 920 F.2d 861 (lIth Cir. 
1991) (timely report to insurer did not detail names and addresses of witnesses and 
date, time, and place of incident). 
81. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Talcott, 931 F.2d 166 (1st Cir. 1991) 
(applying Massachusetts law and quoting from Chas. T. Main v. Fireman's Fund Ins. 
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Of course, it does not require great expertise with the niceties of loss 
reserving, loss development, trending, and other elements of the pricing 
process to recognize that even with perfect reporting of all claims by the end 
of the policy period, pricing and underwriting decisions will still be made 
with far less than the "full knowledge" of past experience the courts seem to 
imagine, that projection of that experience into the future still remains the 
most daunting part of the pricing process, and that most of the pricing and 
underwriting advantages of claims-made formats would remain even if the 
tardiness of an occasional report were excused.82 Still, within the reigning 
orthodoxy, all this is quite fundamentally beside the point. The strict law of 
conditions makes clear that there is no need to ask whether an insurer was 
prejudiced by failure to provide a report necessary to trigger coverage. So 
why, we might wonder, do courts go to such lengths to adorn opinions with 
paeans celebrating the pricing advantages of claims-made triggers? 
There is more about which we might wonder. Why, those who come to 
the question with some appreciation for the variety of claims-made formats 
Co., 551 N.E.2d 28 (Mass. 1990)). Kroll, supra note 19, at 928, provided one of the 
creedal formulations: 
An underwriter who is secure in the fact that claims will not arise 
under the subject policy ... after its termination or expiration can 
underwrite a risk and compute premiums with greater certainty. 
The insurer can establish his reserves without having to consider 
the possibilities of inflation beyond the policy period, upward 
spiraling jury awards, or later changes in the definition and 
application of negligence. 
Though Kroll's first sentence clearly is true--more information can only help--
the second clearly is not; even if the insurer has received a report of all claims that 
may trigger a policy, the ultimate cost of those claims to the insurer still will be in 
doubt. See generally authorities cited supra note 22. 
82. The rhetoric that equates the excuse of a reporting condition with a return to 
occurrence triggers is badly otfthe mark. Excusing a reporting condition in a claims-
made-anel-reported policy makes the provision operate much the same as do the large 
number of "claims-made" formats which do not insist that the report be made within 
the policy period, and those forms still provide the insurer with significant pricing 
advantages over occurrence formats. They free the insurer from the "incurred but not 
made" (IBNM) portion of the IBNR; a reporting trigger tries to free the insurer from 
the remainder of the IBNR, the "made but not reported" (MBNR) claims. See 
discussion of multi-event triggers infra Part III ( a). 
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actually being employed in the market might ask, do those differences seem 
to matter so little in the claims-made litigation immunizing reporting 
conditions from the notice-prejudice rule? True, in a few pivotal early battles 
the fact that the insuring clause was explicitly "claims-made-and-reported" 
helped with the argument that the reporting condition should be regarded as 
coverage-defming.83 But courts and commentators were far more likely to 
rely on Appleman, the Krolls, and other glossators of the claims-made canon 
for broad assertions that "[t]he essence ... of a claims-made policy is notice 
to the carrier within the policy period"84 and "claims-made or discovery 
policies are essentially reporting policies,"85 and to treat those 
characterizations as determinative without regard for the niceties of the kind 
of claims-made format actually at issue. Would the same stubborn 
indifference to detail hold if the report were timely but failed to include the 
name or address of a witness required by the reporting condition ?86 If instead 
of invoking the "notice-prejudice rule," the insured predicated his excuse 
argument on a claim of impracticability, or waiver, or prior breach by the 
83. Most claims-made-and-reported policies carefully locate both triggers in the 
insuring clause; occurrence policies often leave notice provisions to languish pages 
later with other loss adjustment conditions. For an argument that location of a 
reporting condition in the insuring clause should insulate it from excuse arguments, 
see Barry G. Kaiman & Laura C. Nachison, Courts in the Business of Insurance: 
Claims Made and Reported Policies, DEFENSE COUNSEL. J. 43 (1990); for the 
contrary argument that function, not form, should govern, see Slater v. Lawyers' Mut. 
Ins. Co., 278 Cal. Rptr. 479, 487-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (Johnson, dissenting). 
84. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis, 433 So. 2d 512, 514. See, e.g., 
Thoracic Cardiovascular Associates, Ltd. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 891 P.2d 
916,920 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); Serrmi Prods. v. Ins. Co., 411 S.E.2d 305, 306 (Ga. 
App. 1991); Continental Cas. Co. v. Maxwell, 799 S.W.2d 882, 887 (Mo. 1990). 
85. GulfIns. Co., 433 So. 2d at 515. See, e.g., United Nat' I Ins. Co. v. Jacobs, 
754 F. Supp. 865, 868 (M.D. Fla. 1990); First Alabama Bank v. First State Ins. Co., 
1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 6744 (N.D. Ala. 1988); City of Harrisburg v. International 
Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 596 F. Supp. 954,961 (D. Pa. 1984); Sletton v. St. Paul Fire 
& Marine Ins. Co., 780 P.2d 428, 430 (Ariz. 1989); KPFF, Inc. v. California Union 
Ins. Co., 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 36, 42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
86. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Tinney, 920 F.2d 861 (l ph Cir. 
1991) (error to grant summary judgment to insurer simply because timely report to 
insurer did not detail names and addresses of witnesses and date, time, and place of 
incident). 
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insurer?87 Are we to understand that every condition in a claims-made policy 
is immune from excuse arguments? If not, why not?88 
And why, those who come to this same history with some knowledge of 
the development of the notice-prejudice rule might ask, has an argument that 
a particular'nonoccurrence of a condition should be excused been so easily 
and so regularly conflated with arguments that the policy provision 
establishing that condition is contrary to public policy or unconscionable or 
did not make it into the contract because contrary to objective reasonable 
expectations of insureds? Whether a reflection of the conceptual and 
rhetorical poverty of insurance law, or a tactical choice by defense lawyers 
who know better, the result is an odd mix in which legal formalism, 
dominated by the assumption that policy provisions speak plainly to dictate 
precise results, combines with a bargain-basement legal realism that sees in 
every coverage dispute another skirmish in a titanic struggle between freedom 
of contract and social control. The insurance law on display in claims-made 
litigation is an insurance law that trades in results and disdains such doctrinal 
distinctions: application of the notice-prejudice rule to reporting conditions 
is characterized as a refusal to enforce claims-made formats; decisions 
declaring reporting conditions immune from the notice-prejudice rule are 
characterized as vindication of claims-made formats. 
And why, those who venture into the thickets of claims-made litigation 
from outside the insular traditions of insurance may wonder, has the dispute 
over whether reporting conditions in claims-made policies should be immune 
from the notice-prejudice rule drawn so little on the sources of guidance 
available elsewhere in insurance law and the more generalized law of 
contracts? Whether the notice-prejudice rule should apply, both sides agree, 
turns on whether the reporting condition is a essentially a "coverage" clause 
87. See, e.g., Thoracic Cardiovascular Associates, Ltd. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co., 891 P.2d 916, 923 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (excuse offailure to report claim 
during policy period on grounds of impracticability unavailable even though insured 
did not receive service until many months after suit filed and policy period ended; 
according to the court, a c1aims-made-and-reported "insured assumes the risk that 
claims will not be covered unless they are both discovered and reported during the 
policy period"); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Estate of Hunt, 811 P.2d 432, 434-
35 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (excuse for impracticability due to mental impairment not 
available because "the condition requiring the insured to provide notice of a claim 
during the policy period was a material part of the agreed exchange"). 
88. For one exception to the general obliviousness to these issues, see Richard L. 
Suter, Insurer Prejudice: Ana/yis of an Expanding Doctrine in Insurance Coverage 
Law, 46 ME. L. REv. 221 (1994). 
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and thus immune, or essentially something else-a "procedural," "loss 
adjustment," "administrative," "merely technical" condition-and thus not 
immune. The distinction between "core" and "noncore" contractual 
provisions is an important one both inside and outside insurance law, 89 and 
insurer resistance to the development of the "notice-prejudice rule" for 
occurrence policies included assertions that notice provisions there too were 
at the "essence of the contract."90 But there is no hint of those connections 
in the claims-made literature. An insurance law that characterizes every 
insurer defeat as a refusal to enforce the policy is not likely to be looking for 
doctrinal guidance in the long history of insurance litigation concerning 
which policy provisions should be classed as "coverage" provisions immune 
from warranty statutes, incontestable clauses, and excuse on the basis of 
impracticability and waiver, and even less likely to break out of its insularity 
to consult the Restatement (Second) of Contracts about what should be 
involved in determining when a contract condition is so central to the bargain 
that noncompliance should not be excused. 
And, so, we must fmally wonder, what if insurance lawyers were not so 
easily convinced by their job description that they are adrift in conceptual 
backwaters in which traditional contracts rules cannot be expected to function 
in the normal ways? What if those involved in claims-made trigger litigation 
were to have recourse to the Restatement and to other windows into the 
general law of contracts in search of bases upon which to distinguish 
noncompliance with insurance policy conditions that sometimes may be 
excused from noncompliance with insurance policy conditions for which 
excuse will not be available? What would they learn about the various ways 
in which insurance policy conditions operate to lessen the insurer's 
obligation? And what might that mean for future claims-made litigation? 
II. A LONGER PRIMER ON INSURANCE POLICY CONDITIONS AND 
WHEN THEIR NONOCCURRENCE MAy BE EXCUSED 
We can now return to the questions with which we began: In what sense 
is the coverage provided by claims-made formats "less" than the coverage 
provided by "occurrence" formats? Is the coverage provided by various 
forms of claims-made policies less in the same sense that an insured under 
89. See infra notes 240-45. 
90. See, e.g., Edward A. Shure, Contract Provisions/or Notice and Proof After 
Discovery o/Loss Are Conditions Precedent to the Insured's Right o/Recovery, 1967 
ABA INS. NEG. & COMPo LAW PROC. 95. 
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a family auto policy has less coverage than if she had purchased collision 
coverage to go with the other coverages she did buy? In the sense that her 
homeowner's policy provides less coverage than it otherwise would because 
it excludes liabilities arising out of business pursuits and excepts property 
damage caused by rodents? Should we regard these risk-allocation 
provisions differently than we regard provisions that purport to immunize the 
insurer from liability for property damage occurring while the insured 
property is vacant or unoccupied, for theft losses not evidenced by visible 
external marks of forced entry, and when notice of an otherwise-covered 
event is not given within a reasonable time? And what should we make of the 
recurrent reassurance that the coverage provided by a claims-made policy 
"may be less, but so, therefore, is the cost?" 
Of course, within the reinforcing orthodoxies of neo--classical contract 
and neo--classical economics,91 such questions are quite meaningless. In a 
world where value is equated with willingness to pay, where every preference 
can be satisfied at a price, and where both insurer and insured can be 
imagined to have foreseen, priced, and allocated all relevant risks for every 
possible future state of the world,92 there simply is no reason to try to 
distinguish among the variety of provisions that populate insurance policies. 
91. "The classical contract ... is so to speak the legal corollary of the zero-
transactions-cost conception of the world." Erik Furubotn & Rudolf Richter, The 
New Institutional Economics: An Assessment, 1992 J. INST'L & THEORETICAL ECON. 
1,20. 
92. Rational choice models typically assume that the players "know, or can 
know, all the feasible alternative actions open to them, that they know, or can easily 
discover, all relevant prices, and that they know their wants or desires." Thomas S. 
Vlen, Cognitive Imperfections and the Economic Analysis of Law, 12 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 385, 385-86 (1989). When the decisions involve the future, as contracting 
decisions must, models of rational choice under uncertainty assume: 
that individual decisionmakers can compute (subjective) 
probability estimates of uncertain future events; that they perceive 
accurately the dollar cost or outcome of the uncertain outcomes; 
that they know their own attitudes toward risk; that they combine 
this information about probabilities, monetary values of outcomes, 
and attitudes toward risk to calculate the expected utilities of 
alternative courses of action and choose that action that maximizes 
their expected utility. 
Id. at 386. 
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If each has been validated by the actual assent of expected-utility-
maximizing parties, then each should be strictly enforced. 
But in a world in which the soothing assumptions of expected utility 
models do not hold,93 where bounded rationality94 guarantees that not all 
93. For an accessible introduction to the limits of rational choice models as 
guides to human decision making, and to contracts and contract law, see Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits o/Contract, 47 STAN. L. REv. 211 
(1995). The literature of "behavioral economics" is expanding rapidly as both 
economics and law confront the "now incontestable point" that" economic rationality 
is systematically violated, and that decision-making errors are both widespread and 
predictable." David Laibson & Richard Zeckhauser, Amos Tversky and the Ascent 
of Behavioral Economics, 161. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 9 (1998). See generally 
RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1991); Christine Jolls, Cass R. 
Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics. 50 STAN. 
L. REv. 1471 (1998); Mark Kelman, Behavioral Economics as Part of a Rhetorical 
Duet: A Response to Jolls. Sunstein. and Thaler, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1577 (1998); 
Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 1. Ec. LIT. 11 (1998). 
The lessons are applicable to decision making by both parties to the insurance 
transaction. See. e.g .• Robin M. Hogarth & Howard Kunreuther, Risk. Ambiguity. 
and Insurance, 2 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (1989) (traditional expected utility 
models of insurance markets inadequate because imprecision of estimates of 
probability of loss affects decisions of both buyers and sellers of insurance); Eric J. 
Johnson et aI., Framing. Probability Distortions. and Insurance Decisions, 7 J. RISK 
& UNCERTAINTY 35 (1993) (loss aversion framing and status quo framing found in 
actual insurance markets as well as experimental settings); Richard Kihlstrom & Alvin 
Roth, Risk Aversion and the Negotiation of Insurance Contracts, in FOUNDATIONS OF 
INSURANCE ECONOMICS 264, 268 (George Dionne & Scott Harrington, eds. 1991) 
(when insurer uncertain of ability to diversify, assumption that insurer will be risk 
neutral no longer holds; "behavior of negotiated insurance contracts for more general 
insurance problems thus remains an open question"); Gary H. McClelland et aI., 
Insurance for Low -Probability Hazards: A Bimodal Response io Unlikely Events, 7 
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 95 (1993) (bimodality found in laboratory reactions to low 
probability, high consequence risks); Paul 1.1. Schoemaker & Howard C. Kunreuther, 
An Experimental Study of Insurance Decisions. 46 J. RISK & INS. 603, 616 (1979) 
(cost much more acceptable if framed as insurance premium rather than simple loss). 
See also HOWARD KUNREUTHER ET AL., DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC 
POLICY LESSONS (1978) (decisions by consumers of insurance inconsistent with 
expected utility models); Robert Eisner & Robert Strotz, Flight Insurance and the 
Theory of Choice. 691. POL. ECON. 355 (1961) (same). 
94. By "bounded rationality," I mean not only that obtaining and using 
information can be costly, and not only that there may be absolute limits on abilities 
to acquire and process information, but also that there may be systematic cognitive 
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uncertainties will be converted effortlessly into probabilities, and where the 
potential for opportunism95 must be included among the hazards the future 
may hold, we may be less inclined to concede that the presence of a visible 
external marks provision in the theft-from-automobile coverage provided by 
a homeowners policy means that the insured has manifested a preference for 
that condition--or that, along the margin, some more-sophisticated insured 
has manifested it for her96-in the same way she has manifested a preference 
for limiting price and coverage by choosing not to buy collision coverage. If 
bounded rationality prevents the parties from lingering over a complete menu 
and motivational barriers to rational choice. The first receives recognition in 
economic models that incorporate search costs and informational asymmetries, the 
second in economic models of decision making under uncertainty, but the third is 
potentially more deeply subversive. See Kenneth E. Scott, Bounded Rationality and 
Social Norms, 150(1) J. INST'L & THEORETICAL ECON. 315 (1994). The term is 
generally credited to Herbert Simon. See, e.g., HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF 
BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1982); Herbert A. Simon, Rationality in Psychology and 
Economics, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND 
PSYCHOLOGY 25 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds. 1987); Herbert A. 
Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955). For a 
useful modem summation, see John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. 
LIT. 669 (1996). 
95. By "the potential for opportunism," I mean the risk that "human agents will 
not reliably self-enforce promises but will defect from the letter and spirit of an 
agreement when it suits their purposes." OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 388 (1985). For other efforts to define opportunism, 
see, e.g., id. at 65 ("self-interest-seeking with guile"); George M. Cohen, The 
Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 941, 957 
(1992) ("any contractual conduct by one party contrary to the other party's reasonable 
expectations based on the parties' agreement, contractual norms, or conventional 
morality."); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 
67 VA. L. REv. 1089, 1139 n. 118 (1981) ("strategic behavior designed to exploit a 
contractually created monopoly.position"); Timothy 1. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior 
and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REv. 521 (1981)(conduct that is "contrary to 
the other party's understanding of the contract, but not necessarily contrary to the 
agreement's terms"). 
96. For a crisp statement of the argument, see Alan Schwartz & Louis Wilde, 
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic 
Ana~vsis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979); for a recent examination of the limitations 
of that argument, see R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper: The 
Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS 
L.J. 635 (1996). 
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of possible policy provisions-each with its associated price tag-as they 
make fully-infonned, fully-rational choices about how to construct their 
fully-specified, fully-presentiated insurance contract, and if the threat of 
opportunistic behavior makes deferring decisions about how to allocate 
responsibility for the unknown an unattractive option, what then?97 
A. En/orcing Reasonable Expectations or Policing Against 
Opportunism? 
How we respond to that question may depend on which of the ''twin 
behavioral assumptions''98 of bounded rationality and opportunism we choose 
97. That question has fueled a vigorous debate. For a recent version of the claim 
that rational choice models should incorporate new insights about cognitive and 
motivational behaviors, see Cass R Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis o/Law, 64 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 1175 (1997). For the view from the other side of the methodological divide, 
see Robert E. Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaldng: An Essay 
on the Relationship between Cognitive Illusions and the Management o/Choices, 59 
S. CAL. L. REv. 329 (1986); Alan Schwartz, Proposals/or Product Liability Re/onn: 
A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 380-82 (1988). For a sense of the 
passions that these issues can stir, see Richard Posner, The New Institutional 
Economics Meets Law and Economics, 149(1) J. INST'L & THEORETICAL ECON. 73 
(1993); O.E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics Meets Posnerian Law and 
Economics, 149(1) 1. INST'L & THEORETICAL ECON. 99 (1993); Richard Posner, 
Reply, 149(1) J. INST'L & THEORETICAL ECON. 119 (1993). 
98. The phrase is taken from OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, REVISITING LEGAL 
REALISM: THE LAW, ECONOMICS, AND ORGANIZATION PERSPECTIVE 16 (Working 
Paper No. 95-12, Center for the Study of Law and Society, Berkeley 1996). As 
Williamson delights in pointing out, the traditional assumptions of classical 
economics and classical contracts-that contracts are fully specified and leave no 
room for opportunistic behavior-render both economics and law uninteresting. In 
this "contractual utopia," relaxing but one assumption at a time does not change 
things: with unbounded rationality and opportunism, comprehensive ex ante 
contracting might be expected to take the sting out of opportunism; with bounded 
rationality and no opportunism, "general clauses" could be used to defer potential 
problems for peaceful resolution if and when they arise. Thus, says Williamson, the 
only interesting contracts questions are prompted by the coincidence of bounded 
rationality and opportunism, "which I maintain accords with reality and is where all 
of the difficult contracting issues reside." WILLIAMSON, supra note 95, at 67. Dieter 
Schmidtchen, Time. Uncertainty. and Subjectivism: Giving More Body to Law and 
Economics, 13 INT'L REv. L. & Ec. 61, 75 (1993), summarizes the neo-institutional 
criticism of an exclusively ex ante perspective: 
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to emphasize. On the one hand, we might try to assess the effects of bounded 
rationality on the quality of the insured's assent to the inclusion of various 
provisions in standard insurance policy fonns, and respond by trying to 
detennine an appropriate insurance contract ex ante. On the other hand, we 
might focus on the vulnerability that results from sequential perfonnance of 
aleatory insurance contracts chock-full of express conditions and try to derive 
ways to police contractual perfonnance ex post. The first approach springs 
naturally from deeply-imbedded intuitions that contract law "is designed 
primarily to facilitate market exchange by providing ex ante safeguards 
against contract or market failure";99 the second is animated by alternative 
visions of contract law offered by neo-institutionalists who seek to identify 
conditions under which opportunism is likely to flower and who emphasize 
the role of contract institutions and contract law as ex post governance 
mechanisms for controlling opportunism. l 00 For lawyers contemplating an 
insurance coverage question, the first hand points toward the "Doctrine of 
The result of unbounded rationality and given probability 
distributions for all states of the world will be the perfect 
contingent contract. If we further assume that court ordering is 
efficacious, nothing unexpected will happen. All relevant issues of 
a contract are settled at the ex ante bargaining stage .. " The ex 
post (execution) stage of a contract does not bring up any 
interesting issues for further analysis. This is the world of the 
traditional necrclassical theory. . .. Orthodox law and economics, 
in the Chicago style, for example, drops the assumption of perfect 
contingent contracts and efficacious cost adjudication. But the 
maximizing man stays on stage, while the analysis of the ex post 
(execution) aspects of contracts is withdrawn within the 
background. 
99. JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS & WRONGS 73 (1992). 
100. As Professor Cohen notes, the second approach "has traveled under several 
different names-relational contracting, transaction cost theory, new institutional 
economics .... [T]he distinguishing feature common to all variants of this approach 
. . . is the focus on the need to deter opportunistic, as opposed to negligent, 
contracting behavior." Cohen, supra note 95, at 953. For an excellent survey of some 
of this work, see Howard A. Shelanski & Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in 
Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11 1. L. Ec. & ORG. 335 
(1995). For recent efforts to set out the agenda ofthe new institutional economics, 
see DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 17-18 (1990); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF 
GOVERNANCE (1996); Furubotn & Richter, supra note 91. 
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Reasonable Expectations," I 0 I construction contra proferentem, I 02 and similar 
doctrinal tools concerned with determining the content and meaning of the 
contract; 103 the second hand beckons the lawyer in a different direction, 
toward "bad faith" I 04 and "excuse of failure of condition" I 05 and a host of 
similar devices for policing opportunistic performance and enforcement of 
10 l. The "Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations" properly is attributed to 
Professor (now Judge) Robert E. Keeton, who announced discovery of the "principle" 
underlying some judicial decisions "at variance with policy provisions" in 1969 and 
then guided its evolution into a "doctrine." See Robert Keeton, Insurance Law Rights 
at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REv. 961, 967,1281 (1970); Robert 
E. Keeton, Reasonable Expectations in the Second Decade, 12 FORUM 275 (1976). 
See also JERRY, supra note 48, § 25D; ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, 
INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINE AND 
COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 6.3(a)(3), at 632 (Practitioners ed. 1988); Kenneth S. 
Abraham, Judg~Made Law and Judg~Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable 
Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 (1981); Stephen J. Ware, A 
Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461 (1989); 
William Mark Lashner, Note, A Common Law Alternative to the Doctrine of 
Reasonable Expectations in the Construction of Insurance Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 1175 (1982). For efforts to capture the modem state of the "doctrine," see 
BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE 
DISPUTES § 1.03[b][2] (3d ed. 1995); Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of 
Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823 
(1990). 
102. For useful recent indications of the sorts of things that go on under this 
rubric, and efforts to wrestle with their normative implications, see Kenneth S. 
Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REv. 531 (1996); 
Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why Insurance 
Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REv. 171 (1995). 
103. See, e.g., JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE 
CONTRACTS: LAW AND STRATEGY FOR INSURERS AND POLICYHOLDERS § 5.2 (1995); 
James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of 
Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995 (1992); Peter Nash 
Swisher, Judicial Interpretations of Insurance Contract Disputes: Toward a Realistic 
Middle Ground Approach, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 543 (1996). 
104. See generally STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS: LIABILITY AND 
DAMAGES (2d ed. 1997); WILLIAM M. SHERNOFF, INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION 
(1984); KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 101, at §§ 6.2, 7.8, 7.9; Symposium, The Law 
of Bad Faith in Contract and Insurance, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1203 (1994). 
105. See general(y RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225 cmt. b (1981) 
(identifying seven categories of excuse of failure of condition). 
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contract obligations. \06 Although contract law and contract institutions 
involve efforts of both sorts, I 07 in insurance-as throughout contracts-the 
first hand is much better developed than the second. I 08 
106. See infra notes 196--207 and accompanying text. 
107. See generally Cohen, supra note 95 (distinguishing "least cost avoider" and 
"opportunism" traditions in law and economics literature); Charles J. Goetz & Robert 
E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory 0/ Contractual 
Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967,968 n.5 (I983) (contrasting "two distinct and largely 
unrelated analytic traditions," which they label the "bargain model" and "transaction 
cost" traditions); Jason Scott Johnston, Law, Economics, and Post-Realist 
Explanation, 24 LAW & Soc'YREv. 1217 (1990) (contrasting "model of precautions" 
and "transaction cost economics"). For Stanley Fish, those tensions give contract law 
its strength: "It is because it is a world made up of materials that pull in diverse 
directions that contract law can succeed in its endless project of making itself into a 
formal whole." Stanley Fish, The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence, in THE 
FATE OF LAW 159, 184 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1991). 
Long before high-stakes coverage litigation sparked renewed interest in 
insurance law, Professor Slawson combined both perspectives in a single influential 
article. W. David Slawson, Mass Contracts: La~l Fraud in California, 48 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1 (1974). For a recent return visit to these themes, see W. DAVID SLAWSON, 
BINDING PROMISES 151-74 (I996) (posing choice directly for insurance). For a view 
from the outside, see Per-Olof Bjuggren et aI., Should A Regulatory Body Control 
Insurance Policies Ex Ante or Is Ex Post Control More Effective?, 19 GENEVA 
PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 37 (1994). 
108. The dominance of the first hand is easily explained. Neo-classical 
economics naturally is drawn by a powerful methodological tropism toward the ex 
ante. Academics who move away from classical contingent claims modeling to 
acknowledge the role of asymmetries of information gravitate toward agency theory, 
mechanism design, and similar efforts to construct efficient ex ante solutions to the 
problems posed by information costs; in such modeling, the threat of opportunistic 
behavior is collapsed into moral hazard, and moral hazard becomes just another 
aspect of asymmetric information. Neo-classical contracts displays the same 
methodological preoccupation with "anticipating problems, specifying contingencies, 
aligning incentives, and, in general, prespecifying obligations fully." Thomas Palay, 
Relational Contracting, Transaction Cost Economics and the Governance o/HMOs, 
59 TEMPLE L.Q. 927, 930 (1986). See also Wallace K. Lightsey, A Critique o/the 
Promise Model o/Contract, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 45, 49 (1984) (criticizing 
"three primary inadequacies of the promise model: ·discreteness, discontinuity, and 
presentiation"); Peter Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Relational 
Approach, 1988 ANN. SURVEY AM. LAW 139 (exploring extent to which consent and 
presentiation remain the primary building blocks of contracts). 
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1. Vindicating Reasonable Expectations? 
Law students, flushed with first recognition of how far the realities of 
standard insurance policy form marketing sometimes depart from idealized 
"strong assumptions about the capacities of rational commercial actors to 
calculate the probability of even remote events and, when desirable, to strike 
ex ante bargains that reflect their expected value,"109 often are quick to 
conclude that not all provisions in standard insurance policy forms were 
created equal and that we should make distinctions on the basis of perceived 
differences in the quality of the insured's assent. Thus, for example, whether 
or not to buy collision coverage was a choice that almost certainly was 
brought home to the insured at the time she applied for auto insurance and 
again at each renewal. By contrast, the business exclusion from liability 
coverages is a standardized part of homeowners policies, but whether the 
insured realizes it or not, its effects often can be avoided by purchasing an 
inexpensive rider. And, of course, a prospective insured is not likely to know 
much about rodent damage exclusions, vacancy-or-unoccupancy warranties, 
visible-external-marks evidentiary conditions, or notice provisions, or to 
worry about them if she does know about them, and in any event, if she wants 
insurance there's probably nothing she can do to prevent them from 
becoming a part of her contract with the insurer. Shouldn't those differences 
count for something, law students habitually ask. 
Not really, they quickly learn. True, standard form insurance contracting 
is in tension with conventional pieties of orthodox autonomy- and consent-
based contracts models. I I 0 True, most of the provisions that repeat-player 
insurers, through the Insurance Services Office and other industry support 
organizations, think to include in standard insurance policy forms cannot 
fairly be said to have been validated by actual assent of the insureds. And, 
true, efforts within the academy to wrestle with the implications of relaxing 
assumptions about informational and cognitive resources of contracting 
parties have produced a rich theoretical literature concerning the inevitability 
of incomplete contracts, how to identify the resulting gaps, and how best to 
go about filling those gaps with default rules. I I I In insurance, those efforts 
have been mirrored by a parallel academic and practice literature working 
109. Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection o/Defoult 
Rules/or Remote Risks, 19 J. LEG. STUD. 535, 539 (1990). 
110. For an especially useful description of this tension, see MICHAEL J. 
TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 78-146 (1993). 
Ill. See generally Symposium on De/ault Rules and Contractual Consent, 3 S. 
CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 1 (1993); authorities cited infra note 116. 
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riffs on the theme that sometimes "objectively reasonable expectations" of 
insureds will be vindicated "even though a painstaking study of the policy 
provisions would have negated those expectations."112 
But these developments do not mean that insurance law is now in the 
business of ignoring standard insurance policy forms in favor of building a 
contract by combining the dickered terms with judicially-supplied gap fillers 
designed to mimic the expectations of actual or hypothetical insureds. The 
reality, of course, is that real insureds simply do not have expectations of any 
kind about most of the subjects treated by the provisions that lurk unread in 
their policies, and no one who thinks about it for more than a moment is 
likely to imagine that it should be any other way.l13 But then what? It is 
difficult to muster much enthusiasm for telling insureds that coverage-
enhancing provisions of their policies may not be available because they and 
other reasonable insureds did not know they were there, and even the most 
sanguine concerning judicial competence to construct appropriate gap-filling 
112. Robert Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 
83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970). See also authorities cited supra note 101. 
113. As Michael Trebilcock notes: "Almost implicit in the transaction cost 
justification for standard form contracts is the assumption that parties will often not 
read them or, if they do, will not wish to spend significant amounts of time attempting 
to renegotiate the terms." TREBILCOCK, supra note 110, at 119. See also Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1986) (reasonable for consumers to 
refuse to read form contracts); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in 
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1226 (1983) ("The ideal adherent who 
would read, understand, and compare several forms is unheard of in the legal 
literature and, I warrant, in life as well."). Empirical work seems to validate these 
impressions: 
When asked about their insurance decisions, subjects in both 
laboratory studies and survey studies indicated a disinclination to 
worry about low probability hazards. Such a strategy is 
understandable in view of the fact that limitations of people's time, 
energy, and attentional capacities create a "finite reservoir of 
concern." Unless we ignored many low-probability threats we 
would become so burdened than any sort of productive life would 
become impossible. 
Howard Kunreuther & Paul Siovic, Economics, Psychology, and Protective Behavior, 
68 AM. ECON. REV. 64, 67 (May 1978). 
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default rules 1 14 are unlikely to fmd much in the thousands of law review 
pages to help with a project of judicial construction of off-the-rack gap fillers 
to supplement the parties' agreement in fact. "Whatever is, is efficient" 1 15 is 
one way out of the dilemma, but those who refuse to subscribe to such simple 
verities are unlikely to fmd in any of the contending theories of default 
rules 116 anything useful to say about whether damage to the front of an 
insured auto caused by striking a deer should be covered under the "collision" 
or "other than collision" coverage of a personal auto policy. 
In practice, then, even the most aggressive of the insurance law analogs 
to the "hypothetical contract" literature do not try to build the undickered 
114. For less-than-sanguine evaluations of that competence, see TREBILCOCK, 
supra note 110, at 101; Richard Craswell, Remedies When Contracts Lack Consent: 
Autonomy and Institutional Competence, 33 OSGOODE H. L.J. 209 (1995); Gillian K. 
Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts, 23 J. 
LEG. STUD. 159 (1994). 
115. The phrase is attributed to Armen Alchian by John Lott, In Celebration of 
Armen Alchian 's 80th Birthday: Living and Breathing Economics, 34 ECON. INQ. 412, 
413 (1996). 
116. Prescriptions include gap-filling default rules designed variously to "mimic 
the market," e.g., Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for 
Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990); David Charny, Hypothetical 
Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 
1815 (1991); to reflect "communitarian values," e.g., Steven J. Burton, Default 
Principles, Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
115, 116-17 (1993); Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 
UCLA L. REV. 829, 858 (1983); to recognize "norms implicit in the parties' 
relationship" to "avoid contractual breakdown," e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: 
Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neo-classical, and 
Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854 (1978); and to create incentives to 
induce potential contracting parties to disclose asymmetrically-distributed 
information. E.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: 
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). 
For skepticism about the possibility of any overarching approach, and insistence 
on the importance of contextual issues, see Dennis Patterson, The Pseudo-Debate 
Over Default Rules in Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. LJ. 235 (1993) 
(characterizing literature of default rules as pseudo debate posing old questions in 
language of other disciplines); Todd D. Rakoff, Social Structure, Legal Structure, 
and Default Rules: A Comment, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 19 (1993) (emphasizing 
need for contextualization); W. David Slawson, The Futile Search for Principlesfor 
Default Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 29 (1993) ("Default rule analysts have 
contributed nothing new to the subject except the new word they have coined for it."). 
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portions of insurance contracts from scratch. Instead, they assume, more or 
less explicitly, that the policy must be the starting point for determining the 
contours of the insurance contract, I 17 and that the "reasonable expectations" 
to be vindicated must be Llewellynesque generalized expectations that policy 
provisions will be neither unfairly surprising nor surprisingly unfair. I 18 Now 
117. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1) (1981): 
Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement 
signs or otherwise manifests assent to a writing and has reason to 
believe that like writings are regularly used to embody terms of 
agreements of the same type, he adopts the writing as an integrated 
agreement with respect to the terms included in the agreement. 
118. In Karl Llewellyn'S familiar formulation: 
What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few dickered 
terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and but one thing 
more. That one thing more is a blanket assent (not a specific 
assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may 
have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable 
meaning of the dickered terms. 
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING ApPEALS 370 
(1960). See also Karl N. Llewellyn, The Standardization of Commercial Contracts 
and Continental Law, 52 HARV. L. REv. 700 (1939) (book review). The policing 
function prescribed by Llewellyn finds somewhat circumspect expression in 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981): "Where the other party has 
reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew 
that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not a part of the agreement." 
The critical explanation is provided in Commentf: 
f Terms excluded. Subsection (3) applies to standardized 
agreements the general principles [governing interpretation of 
contracts]. Although customers typically adhere to standardized 
agreements and are bound by them without even appearing to know 
the standard terms in detail, they are not bound to unknown terms 
which are beyond the range of reasonable expectation. . .. [A] 
party who adheres to the other party's standard terms does not 
assent to a term if the other party has reason to believe that the 
adhering party would not have accepted the agreement if he had 
known that the agreement contained the particular term. Such a 
belief or assumption may be shown by the prior negotiations or 
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that most jurisdictions have abandoned jejune flirtations with enforcing only 
provisions about which the insured had actual subjective knowledge, I 19 the 
outside possibility that a court might excise a provision of a standard 
insurance policy form on the grounds that it was unexpected is unlikely to put 
most standard form provisions in muchjeopardy.l20 In the absence of any 
real expectations on the part of insureds about most of the subjects treated by 
standard insurance policy forms, the search for the unexpected almost 
inevitably will be degraded into a search for the extraordinary, and 
standardized forms are hardly the place to go prospecting for anything other 
than the ordinary. 
Thus, even in jurisdictions where some version of the Doctrine of 
Reasonable Expectations is in full flower, there are good reasons not to 
embrace law student enthusiasms for a project of distinguishing among most 
standard insurance policy fo~ provisions on the basis of the quality of the 
insured's assent. The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations can be put to 
many uses, but refusing to enforce a policy provision because the insured did 
not know it was there or did not understand its purport should not be among 
them.121 We know that the rodent-damage exception in a homeowners policy 
inferred from the circumstances. Reason to believe may be 
inferred from the fact that the term is bizarre or oppressive, from 
the fact that it eviscerates the non-standard terms explicitly agreed 
to, or from the fact that it eliminates the dominant purpose of the 
transaction. 
For a skeptical review of the limited use (and misuse) of * 211 (3) in insurance 
decisions, see James 1. White, Form Contracts under Revised Article 2,75 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 315 (1997). 
119. The highwater mark for this approach may have been Hionis v. Northern 
Mutual Insurance Co., 230 Pa. Super. 511,327 A.2d 363 (1974). The Pennsylvania 
court backed away from the implications of this approach in Standard Venetian Blind 
Co. v. American Empire Insurance Co., 503 Pa. 300,469 A.2d 563 (1983). 
120. See generally Abraham, supra note 101 (cataloging variety of functions to 
which "Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations" can be put); Henderson, supra note 101 
(similar project). 
121. No one has improved on Professor Letrs characteristically pointed 
comment about such projects: "[D]eal control is ordinarily a stupid option; it is silly 
to seek to shape and control the contours of a process that does not take place." 
Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 148 (1970). The 
problem, Leffargued, is that "so long as one is bemused by the word • contract, , even 
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will be treated as an effective part ofthe integrated agreement of the parties 
even though we also know that the insured may not have been aware of the 
exclusion, usually will have no effective understanding of how it is affected 
by concurrent causation analyses, and as a practical matter could not have 
contracted to allocate the risk of squirrel damage to the insurer. So too will 
virtually every other provision to be found in insurance policy forms. And 
yet, experienced insurance lawyers will acknowledge, some of the provisions 
we are considering are more likely to receive rough treatment from judges 
than are others. Distinctions do get made. How should we make them? 
2. Policing Against Opportunism? 
The answer will not become truly accessible until we move beyond 
reflexive bargain-model ways of thinking about insurance contracts and 
begin to confront the implications of the neo-institutional claim that-in 
Williamson's trenchant phrase-"ex post support institutions of contract 
matter." 122 Neo-institutional economics incorporates into its models not 
only "bounded rationality" but also recognition that "some individuals are 
opportunistic some of the time and that differential trustworthiness is rarely 
transparent ex ante,"123 and thus takes as part of its task to identify and to 
explore contract institutions that fmd their explanations in efforts to control 
opportunism by contracting parties. 124 For the neo-institutional economist 
working in the intersection of law, economics, and organization theory, the 
principal concern is to identify the conditions under which opportunism is 
most likely to occur and to match transaction types with the most appropriate 
mode of governance. For those who come to such questions from the legal 
side of the disciplinary divide, the agenda is the same: to determine when a 
combination of bounded rationality and transaction specific investments will 
create the potential for opportunism and to determine which institutional 
when it is intell igently modified by the cognomen 'adhesion,' it is likely that one will 
sometimes seek to impress his controls on a process which does not exist." !d. at 149. 
122. WILLIAMSON, supra note 95, at 29 (emphasis in original). 
123. [d. at 64 (emphasis in original). 
124. "Taken together, the overall import of bounded rationality and opportunism 
for transaction cost economics is this: organize transactions so as to economize on 
bounded rationality while simultaneously safeguarding the transactions in question 
against the hazards of opportunism." OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANICS OF 
GoVERNANCE 48 (1996). For an examination of private enforcement activities outside 
"the shadow of the law," see Edward L. Rubin, The Nonjudicial Life of Contract: 
Beyond the Shadow of the Law, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 107 (1995). 
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devices 125 offer the best protections against opportunism m contract 
negotiation,126 performance, 127 and enforcement. 128 
In insurance, of course, it is not hard to fmd both industry practices and 
legal techniques that are prompted by concerns about effects of opportunism. 
Because asymmetric information renders insurers vulnerable to fraud and 
misrepresentation, adverse selection, and moral hazard,129 insurers employ 
a battery of pre-issuance underwriting procedures designed to allow them to 
be selective about those with whom they will contract, buttress those with 
125. The case against "single institutionalism" is put most effectively in NEIL A. 
KOMESAR: IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS 
& PUBLIC POLICY (1994). For a quick introduction to the basic argument, see Neil 
A. Komesar, Exploring the Darkness: Law, Economics, and Institutional Choice, 
1997 WIS. L. REv. 465; David A. Luigs, Imperfoct Alternatives: ChOOSing Institutions 
in Law, Economics, and Public Policy, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1559 (1995) (book review). 
Although comparative institutionalism in the legal academy often poses the choices 
as between markets or legislative or judicial control, private ordering though contracts 
and organizational form also should be counted among the contenders. See, e.g., 
Palay, supra note 108, at 931-32: 
In contrast to the traditional economics approach which always 
finds the necessary binding mechanisms [to hold the agreement 
together] in markets or legal orderings, the relational contracting 
and transaction cost approach argues that the relational glue 
sometimes is supplied by private orderings, that is, through the 
efforts and expenditures of the parties themselves .... 
126. See generally G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation 
o/Commercial Contracts: Toward a New Cause 0/ Action, 44 VAND. L. REV. 221 
(1991); Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, and Sunk 
Costs: A Defoult Rule/or Precontractual Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS LJ. 621 (1993). 
127. See generally Steven J. Burton, Breach o/Contract and the Common Law 
Duty to Perform in Good Faith. 94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980); Robert S. Summers, 
The General Duty 0/ Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 
CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982). 
128. See generally STEVEN J. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL 
GOOD FAITH: FORMATION, PERFORMANCE, BREACH, ENFORCEMENT chs. 5-7 (1995). 
129. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK 
BEARING 142--43 (1971); CAROL HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION: 
MANAGING MORAL HAZARD IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS (1985); Michael Rothschild 
& Joseph E. Stigl,itz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the 
Economics o/Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. ECON. 629 (1976). 
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contractual provisions designed to control the insurer's exposure to other 
potential sources of claims on the insurance fund, and reinforce those efforts 
with post-loss claims adjustment techniques designed to ferret out fraud and 
limit loss adjustment costs. Insurance law provides the underpinnings for 
such insurer efforts with the principle of uberrimae fideii and other doctrinal 
devices for protecting insurers against the dangers of dealing with insureds 
with power to behave opportunistically. 130 
Both insurance economics and insurance law historically have tended to 
emphasize the potential that insurers may be victimized by opportunism on 
the part of insureds.131 However, in recent decades discussions have 
broadened to include· consideration of how best to deter opportunistic 
behaviors on the part of insurers. Can traditional contract damages measures 
and concern for reputational effects really be expected to deter opportunistic 
breaches by insurers?132 Or is their force significantly undercut by "legal 
130. See generally Hugh Gravelle, Insurance Law and Adverse Selection, 11 
INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 23 (1991); THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 
AND THE LAW 344 (Peter Newman, ed. 1998). 
131. Richard Epstein captures the dominant perspective this way: 
The English developed a law of marine insurance, and its content 
was shaped by the 19th century judicial presumption of distrust. 
The party to an insurance contract about which the Courts were 
most sceptical [sic] was not the rich and powerful insurance 
company, but rather the insured party. It is not difficult to see why. 
The insured was in possession of the property, and had the lion's 
share of the information about the nature of the risks that were 
being run. 
Richard Epstein, Do Judges Need to Know Any Economics?, 1996 NEW ZEALAND LJ. 
235, 236. Cj Harris Schlesinger, Uncommon Knowledge: Bilateral Asymmetry of 
Information in Insurance Markets, RISK MGM'T & INS. REV., Vol. 1, No.2, p. 1 
(noting that classic treatments of imperfect information in insurance markets all focus 
on insureds' private information about their own loss probabilities, and decrying lack 
of work on how insurers' private information affects markets for insurance). 
132. "In many transactional settings, promises are kept for reasons wholly 
unrelated to the existence of a legally enforceable contract." Lisa Bernstein, Social 
Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 59,67 (1993). See also 
David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 
375. (1990); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support 
Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1993). Muris, supra note 95, at 526-528, 
summarizes the literature on "non-contract solutions to the opportunism problem" as 
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efficiencies of scale" enjoyed by mass-contracting insurers l33 and by the 
difficulties consumers experience when they try to determine the "claims 
1) reputation; 2) price adjustments to recognize effects of opportunism or to create 
incentives to not shirk; 3) vertical integration; 4) precision in contract language to 
make opportunistic behaviors more clearly breaches of contract. Of course, as he 
notes, id. at 527, "[e]ach of these methods ... will fail to deter opportunism in some 
situations." Insurance often is one ofthose situations. Although insurers are repeat 
players who must be concerned about consumer perceptions, individuals only 
infrequently have claims, and when insurers do resist claims, it is often difficult to 
determine whether or not the resistance was justified. 
133. When the other party is a "mass contractor," the usual damage rules often 
operate to provide even less deterrence to unwarranted breaches: 
Since a mass contractor is a mass contractor, he will have had 
sufficient legal business both in and out of court to have at least 
one lawyer, and frequently a battery of lawyers, already familiar 
with his business, with the fields of law to which it pertains, and 
with his standard forms. Familiarity with the standard forms is 
particularly important. An attorney for an insurance company, for 
example, will know the clauses of the policy virtually by heart and 
will have available detailed legal memoranda already composed, 
providing all the pertinent law on the interpretation and probable 
enforcement of each clause. These legal efficiencies of scale not 
only significantly reduce the mass contractor's average cost; they 
lower the marginal cost of each case to nearly zero .... Thus, the 
mass contractor's attitude toward each particular case is likely to 
be, "Of course, we'll fight it. We're already tooled up and ready 
to go, so fighting it will cost us only X dollars-perhaps zero 
dollars-more than if we don't. 
Slawson, supra note 107, at 29-30. See also STEMPEL, supra note 103, at § 19.3; at 
466-67 ("[I]nsurers always get to 'play the float' in any dispute."); Mark Pennington, 
Punitive Damagesfor Breach of Contract: A Core Sample From the Last Ten Years, 
42 ARK. L. REv. 31, 54 (1989) ("Insurance is far from the market ideals of complete 
information and no transaction costs. Opportunistic breaches are especially likely, and 
traditional damage rules do not sufficiently deter them."). 
With regard to claims for small amounts of money, the insurance 
company has some incentive to refuse payment because little 
likelihood exists that the claimant will pursue the claim. As for 
large claims, the insurance company may find it profitable to delay 
payment as long as possible to keep for itself the time value of the 
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service quality" of competing insurers? 134 Unfair claims practices statutes, 
prejudgment interest, statutory provisions for attorney's fees for insureds 
who successfully pursue coverage litigation against insurers, mutualization, 
and-especially-the emergence oftheories for imposing extra-contractual 
liability on insurers who in bad faith drag their heels in paying claims or 
performing their defense or other obligations all can be understood as 
reactions to the threat of insurer opportunism. 135 
What does all this have to do with how we should regard different sorts 
of policy provisions purporting to allocate risks between insurer and insured? 
Unfortunately, for most involved in insurance litigation, the answer remains 
less than obvious. Say "bad faith" to an insurance lawyer, and you suggest 
the possibility of extra-contractualliability,136 usually sounding in tort, and 
provoke worries about how best to keep the concept from metastasizing 
amount due. Finally, prolonged delays in payment may make the 
insured more willing to settle for less than the amount due, 
particularly if the insured is financially desperate. 
Id. at 53-4. The problem is not limited to claims by the small or the unsophisticated; 
in the words of the chairman of Dow Coming Corporation, "it has become standard 
operating procedure for some insurance companies to procrastinate and dispute rather 
than honor policies with companies that become embroiled in litigation." Richard 
Hazleton, The Tort Monster That Ate Dow Corning, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1995, at 
A2l. 
134. In some economic modeling, a lower quality insurance product is equated 
with a higher risk of default-through insolvency, or bad claims service. See, e.g., 
Marla Stafford & Brenda Wells, Service Quality in the Insurance Industry: Consumer 
Perceptions Versus Regulatory Perceptions, 13 J. INS. REG. 462 (1995); Marla 
Stafford & Brenda Wells, The Effect of Demographic Variables on Perceived Claims 
Service Quality, 19 J. INS. ISSUES 163 (1996). For an important theoretical and 
empirical challenge to the "assumption that the market treats all alike," see Tom 
Baker & Karen McElrath, Whose Safety Net? Home Insurance and Inequality, 21 L. 
& Soc. INQ. 229 (1996) (documenting importance of adjuster discretion in claim 
settlement processes and outcomes). 
135. See generally Gary Schuman, The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing: Responsibilities of First-Party Insurers, 47 FED. INS. & CORP. COUNS. 107 
(1997) (explaining that competition does not protect insureds in claims context 
because insured no longer can take business of covering that risk to another insurer); 
William T. Barker et aI., Is An Insurer a Fiduciary To Its Insureds?, 25 TORT & INS. 
L.J. 1,8 (1989) (same). 
136. See general(v Ashley, supra note 104; Shemoff, supra note 104; The Law 
of Bad Faith in Contract and Insurance, supra note 104. 
1999] CLAIMS MADE FORMATS 567 
beyond its proper role as an incentive for insurers to promptly perform 
contractual obligations that clearly are owing. 137 Suggest that the implied 
obligation of good faith also imposes limits on when an insurer may invoke 
a failure of condition as a basis for refusing to perform or that hard-nosed 
insistence on the letter of the policy should be branded "opportunism," and 
at best you provoke head-shaking and politely-suppressed condemnation of 
the unworldliness of fuzzy-headed academics. 1 38 But, as Professor Eric 
Andersen most forcefully has argued, both the Uniform Commercial Code 
and the Restatement make clear that the good faith obligation implicit in 
contracts of all kinds operates as a restraint not just on opportunistic efforts 
to avoid clear-cut performance obligations, but also as a restraint on bad faith 
in the exercise of discretion granted by enforcement terms. Professor 
Andersen's gloss on the statutory and Restatement language, featured in a law 
review article 139 and more recently in his treatise on bad faith, 140 may not be 
137. See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, "Bad Faith" Breach of Contract by First-Party 
Insurers, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 405 (1996); Alan O. Sykes, Judicial Limitations on the 
Discretion of Liability Insurers to Settle or Litigate: An Economic Critique, 72 TEx. 
L. REv. 1345 (1994). 
138. In the conventional understanding, there can be no bad faith tort liability in 
the absence of coverage. See, e.g., Schuman, supra note 135, at 115-118 (reviewing 
authorities). 
139. Eric G. Andersen, Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts, 73 IOWA L. 
REV. 299 (1988). In Andersen's view, 
an enforcement term may be invoked only if, under the 
circumstances existing at the time enforcement is sought, the term 
would advance the purposes for which it was included in the 
agreement without imposing needless costs on the nonenforcing 
party. If that test is not satisfied, the benefits of the term should not 
be available to the party seeking them, even though inclusion of the 
term was unobjectionable when the contract was formed. 
!d. at 301. Andersen emphasizes the difference between this "good faith in 
enforcement" obligation and standards of conduct required in order to avoid liability 
for tortious bad faith: 
Making effect rather than motive the touchstone of good faith in 
enforcement does not make the good faith doctrine a miserly one. 
To the contrary, it makes the doctrine more generous. The costs 
imposed when enforcement is inconsistent with the agreement's 
purposes are no more necessary or less expensive because they are 
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part of the stock in trade of most lawyers, but in fact if not in name 141 both 
the general law of contracts and the law of insurance are full of examples of 
doctrinal devices for policing exercise of discretion to employ enforcement 
mechanisms apparently authorized by the contract. 142 In the general law of 
sought innocently rather than with malice. Thus, good faith in 
enforcement not only embraces the notions of "decency, fairness 
or reasonableness" by responding to the harm caused by malicious 
invocation of an enforcement term, it also covers those situations 
in which such a term would accomplish something other that what 
it was intended to do, even though the enforcing party invoked it 
in the honest belief that it was appropriate to do so. 
[d. at 324. 
140. See BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 128. 
14l. See id. at 271 (good faith in enforcement is "an emerging doctrine. 
Evidence of its influence is widespread, yet it is overtly applied in relatively few 
cases. "). Andersen, supra note 139, at 301, says: 
The doctrine accounts for many cases in which courts have, or 
should have, declined to enforce an express contractual condition 
and illustrates that a number of decisions in which courts have cited 
public policy reasons for refusing to enforce a contract can be 
justified more satisfactorily by a good faith doctrine that respects, 
rather than trumps, freedom of contract. 
142. Other useful explorations of this theme include Thomas A. Diamond & 
Howard Foss, Proposed Standards/or Evaluating When the Covenant o/Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing Has Been Violated: A Framework/or Resolving the Mystery, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 585, 609-12 (1996) ("failure to utilize a less harsh alternative"as bad 
faith); Eisenberg, supra note 93; Mark P. Gergen, A De/ense 0/ Judicial 
Reconstruction a/Contracts, 71 IND. LJ. 45, 46 (1974) (when "terms malfunction 
because of the unexpected," interpretive techniques must include "judicial 
reconstruction" of the contract to prevent opportunism and to vindicate the "principle 
of loss alignment [which] relieves a party from a significant and unexpected loss 
under a contract when such relief would leave the other party in a position no worse 
than she would have been in had the contract not been made"); Muris, supra note 95; 
Dennis M. Patterson, A Fablefrom the Seventh Circuit: Frank Easterbrook on Good 
Faith, 76 IOWA L. REV. 503 (1991) (good faith polices manner in which contract 
rights are exercised); Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis 
0/ Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 313 
(1992) ) ("Process values are offended ... [if] the other party relies on minor contract 
technicalities to breach in bad faith or extort a more favorable performance."). 
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contracts, these efforts range from the mundanely familiar (constructive 
conditions l43 and the mitigation principle l44) through the familiar but 
controversial (the rules against enforcing penalties 145 and regulating the use 
of limited remedies146) to more exotic and controversial applications of the 
bad faith principle (lender liabilityl47 and employer liability for strategic 
143. See generally Edwin W. Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 
42 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 926-28 (1942) (role of constructive conditions in avoiding 
forfeitures and unjust enrichment); Rakoff, supra note 113 (sensitivity of gap-filling 
constructive conditions to differences in context at time of performance). 
144. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (1981); 
U.C.C. § 2-708(1) (1977); Goetz & Scott, supra note 107. 
145. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1) (1981); 
U.C.c. § 2-718(1) (1977). Andersen summarizes this way: 
[W]hen a contract is enforced through the invocation of a 
liquidated damages clause, the law requires the same 
accommodation of the parties' interests that is made under the 
common-law damages remedy. The enforcing party's expectation 
interest will be protected, but only in a way and to an extent that 
eliminates unnecessary costs to the breaching party. 
Andersen, supra note 139, at 310. Under the traditional formulation of the anti-
penalty rule, the measure of any disproportion compares the agreed sum with the 
damages anticipated at the time of contracting. 5A ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN 
ON CONTRACTS § 1059 (1964). That understanding has been relaxed in the modem 
UCC and Restatement provisions allowing the injured party to save a liquidated 
damages provision by showing that it was proportional to actual damages. See 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Comment, Liquidated Damages: A Comparison of the Common 
Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1349, 1353-58 
(1978). For a sense of the controversy penalty rules inspire, compare Eisenberg, 
supra note 93, and Gergen, supra note 142, with Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, 
Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on 
an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 
(1977), and Alan Schwartz, The Myth That Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory 
Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 YALE LJ. 369 
(1990). 
146. See generally U.C.C. § 2-719 (1977); Jon Eddy, On the "Essential" 
Purposes of Limited Remedies: The MetaphysiCS ofUCC Section 2-719(2), 65 CAL. 
L. REV. 28 (1977). 
147. See generally Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 
YALE LJ. 131, 139 (1989); Gillette, supra note 109; William H. Lawrence & Robert 
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violation of the implicit nonns of internal labor markets 148). In insurance, 
''the competing goals of contract enforcement: securing to the injured party 
the benefits of its bargain and avoiding the imposition of unnecessary costs 
on the breaching party" 1 49 have been forced to play out differently, but many 
otherwise inexplicable features of the insurance terrain reflect a common 
preoccupation with policing against opportunism by insurers in the use of 
failure of condition defenses apparently authorized by contract. 
Thus, I will argue, when viewed through this neo-institutional lens, 
insurance contracts pose special problems for insureds not only because they 
often are embodied in standard policy fonns full of provisions dealing with 
low-salience, low-probability contingencies-that can be said of many, 
perhaps most, contracts encountered in a modern mass economy I 50_but 
because three features of insurance contracts tend to make the insured 
especially vulnerable to opportunistic behavior on the part of the insurer. Put 
simply, because the obligations of parties to an insurance contract will be 
perfonned sequentially, if at all, the insured is vulnerable to opportunistic 
decisions by insurers that sometimes may produce disproportionate 
forfeitures. Because insurance contracts are full of express conditions, there 
is little room for creative use of constructive conditions to ameliorate that 
vulnerability. And because insurance contracts are aleatory, restitution is not 
available as a device for ameliorating the insured's vulnerability. The point 
is central enough-and, in the context of modern insurance law, unfamiliar 
enough-to warrant making it in some detail. 
D. Wilson, Good Faith in Calling Demand Notes and in Refosing to Extend 
Additional Financing, 63 IND. L.J. 825 (1988). 
148. See generally PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE 
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 63-67 (1990); Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle 
Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8 
(1993). 
149. Andersen, supra note 139, at 301. 
150. For an early influential introduction, see Matthew O. Tobriner & Joseph R. 
Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the New Industrial State, 
55 CAL. L. REV, 1247 (1967). 
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B. The Special Vulnerability of the Insured to Insurer Opportunism 
1. Ameliorating Techniques Available for Most Non-
Insurance Contracts 
Consider the following conditional promises to pay money, each in its 
own way a familiar part of the contracts canon: various promisors undertake 
to pay, respectively, IF (1) a promisee delivers a specific horse; or (2) a 
promisee constructs a mansion according to specifications; or (3) a promisee 
works for 12 months; or (4) an insured suffers a covered loss to covered 
property. 
Scenario 1. Sale of Goods: Vulnerability Avoided by Concurrent 
Performances. A dusty crossroads sale: seller promises to deliver a 
particular horse; buyer promises to pay the specified price. Seller then fails 
to perform. Must buyer nonetheless pay? 
Of course not, at least not since Kingston v. Preston. ISI Such a result 
would "outrage common sense,"IS2 for we understand that the "parties 
contemplate not merely an exchange of their mutual promises, but also an 
exchange of the two performances that are being promised."IS3 Indeed, if 
we imagine our hypothetical to be peopled by the rugged individualists of the 
great American horse-trading tradition, we do not really anticipate that they 
will be asking a court for guidance about how to flesh out their 
incompletely-specified one-time spot market exchange. Instead, we expect 
the seller to hold tightly to the reins until satisfied that she is receiving the 
payment she was promised, and we expect the buyer to part with his money 
only when the reins are firmly in hand. But should the parties fail to make 
this relationship between their performances clear, the law will supply gap-
filling constructive concurrent conditions of exchange to assure that neither 
party is rendered too vulnerable to nonperformance by the other. True, if the 
buyer breaches, the seller may lose the value of her expectancy, but she still 
has her horse and still can go back into the market in search of an alternative 
buyer; if the seller breaches, the buyer may lose his expectancy, but he still 
has his money to spend at the local sale bam. By structuring perfect tender 
of the performances as concurrent conditions of exchange - either expressly, 
or with the help of judicially-supplied gap fillers-forfeitures can be avoided 
151. 2 Doug\. 689,99 Eng. Rep. 437 (K.B. 1773). 
152. Goodison v. Nunn, 4 T.R. 761, 764,100 Eng. Rep. 1288, 1289 (K.B. 1792) 
(Lord Kenyon). 
153. 3A CORBIN, supra note 145, § 728, at 399-400. 
572 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:2 
even without judicial intervention and neither side will be vulnerable to loss 
of more than the benefit of the bargain. 
Thus, the great American horse trading tradition can work well enough 
when we are trading horses in spot market transactions structured to 
guarantee concurrent performances. But, as noted by observers ranging from 
Thomas Hobbes I 54 and Arthur Allen Leffl55 to Danny Manning I 56 and John 
Grisham,157 with sequential performances comes vulnerability to 
opportunistic behavior. If sequential performances cannot be avoided, what 
then? 
Scenario 2. Construction Contract: Vulnerability Due to Sequential 
Performances Ameliorated by the Doctrine of Substantial Performance. 
A construction contract: Jacob & Youngs promises to build a mansion for 
Kent according to detailed specifications, including a requirement that the 
154. "He that performeth first, has no assurance the other will perform after; 
because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and 
other passions, without the fear of some coercive Power." THOMAS HOBBES, 
LEVIATHAN 89-90 (Oxford ed. 1955) (first published in 1651). 
155. "Under the American law of contracts, after the other party has fully 
performed his obligation, it is absolutely irrational for you fully to perform yours." 
Arthur Allen Leff, Injury, Ignorance, and Spite - The Dynamics of Coercive 
Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1 (1970). In insurance, the most trenchant statements of the 
point have come from W. David Slawson: 
In reality, an insurer, or any other mass contractor whose obligation 
is to pay money, normally is not liable for any damages for breach 
of contract. All that he is liable for is to perform the contract. If 
criminal law or tort law worked the same way, the only penalty 
imposed on a driver who hit a pedestrian on a crosswalk would be 
to require the driver to back up and drive over the crosswalk again, 
this time without hitting the pedestrian. 
Slawson, supra note 107, at 7. 
156. "An insurance policy is just a lawsuit. You think they just hand over the 
money?" Quoted in Harvey Araton, On Pro Basketball: Choosing the Soft Lift Over 
the Good Life, N.Y. TIMES, Dec 9, 1994, at Bil. 
157. In The Rainmaker, John Grisham imagines an insurer that initially denies 
all claims on the assumption that most claimants will never find their way to a lawyer. 
JOHN GRISHAM, THE RAINMAKER 313-16, 361-62 (1995). For a critical review from 
a legal perspective, see Alan I. Widiss, "Bad Faith" in Fact and Fiction: Ruminations 
on John Grisham's Tale About Insurance Coverages, Punitive Damages, and the 
Great Benefit Life Insurance Company, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1377 (1996). 
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plumbing be built of Reading Pipe; Kent promises to pay. The contract limits 
the occasions for opportunism by providing for a series of progress payments 
conditioned upon successful completion of stages of construction, but this 
simple self-help device cannot solve the "last period problem."158 Kent 
moves into the completed house without much incentive to make the last 
progress payment, and six months after taking possession, his architect 
emerges from the basement with the good news: some of the pipe installed by 
Jacob & Youngs was Cohos Pipe rather than Reading Pipe. "Aha," we 
imagine lawyer Kent thinking to himself, ''under the rule of Kingston v. 
Preston, I need not make the fmal payment because use of Reading Pipe was 
a condition precedent to my duty to pay." 
"Wrong," Judge Cardozo informed Kent and succeeding generations of 
lawyers. 159 Not every breach of a performance obligation will excuse the 
158. For a helpful introduction to "last period" problems, see Muris, supra note 
95, at 528 ("non-contract law solutions to the opportunism problem" less likely to be 
effective when "parties appear unlikely to contract with each other in the future"). 
159. Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). Although contracts 
students often cut their substantial performance eye teeth on Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 
in fact the roots of the doctrine were planted only four years after Kingston v. Preston 
in Boone v. Eyre, 126 Eng. Rep. 160(a) (K.B. 1777). "[W]here a breach may be paid 
for in damages," Lord Mansfield opined, "there the [buyer] has a remedy on his 
covenant, and shall not plead it as a condition precedent." Id. Cardozo covered the 
same ground: 
Some promises are so plainly independent that they can never by 
fair construction be conditions of one another. Others are so plainly 
dependent that they must always be conditions. Others, though 
dependent and thus conditions when there is departure in point of 
substance, will be viewed as independent and collateral when the 
departure is insignificant. Considerations partly of justice and 
partly of presumable intention are to tell us whether this or that 
promise shall be placed in one class or in another .... 
We must weigh the purpose to be served, the desire to be gratified, 
the excuse for deviation from the letter, the cruelty of enforced 
adherence. Then only can we tell whether literal fulfillment is to 
be implied by law as a condition. This is not to say that the parties 
are not free by apt and certain words to effectuate a purpose that 
performance of every term shall be a condition of recovery. That 
question is not here. This is merely to say that the law will be slow 
to impute the purpose, in the silence of the parties, where the 
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other party's obligation to perform. Because the parties had not 
unequivocally made compliance with the Reading pipe specification an 
express condition precedent to Kent's obligation to pay, there was room for 
Cardozo to fill the gap with a constructive condition requiring only 
"substantial performance." Of course, Cardozo was able to assure us: 
The courts never say that one who make a contract fills the 
measure of his duty by less than full performance. They do 
say, however, that an omission, both trivial and innocent, 
will sometimes be atoned for by allowance of the resulting 
damage, and will not always be the breach of a condition to 
be followed by a forfeiture. 160 
Though the parties remain "free by apt and certain words to effectuate a 
purpose that performance of every term shall be a condition of recovery ... 
the law will be slow to impute the purpose, in the silence of the parties, 
where the significance of the default is grievously out of proportion to the 
oppression of the forfeiture." 1 61 Thus, Cardozo was able to conclude, the 
constructive condition precedent to Kent's duty to pay had been satisfied, and 
Kent's remedy for failure to use Reading Pipe was limited to a claim for 
damages. 162 
significance of the default is grievously out of proportion to the 
oppression of the forfeiture. 
Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 890-91 (N.Y. 1921) (citations omitted). See 
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1981) (factor analysis for 
determining when performance is substantial). See also RICHARD DANZIG, THE 
CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW 108-28 (1978) (details of Jacob & Youngs 
litigation); Patterson, supra note 143, at 926-28 (role of constructive conditions in 
avoiding forfeitures and unjust enrichment). 
160. Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. at 890. 
161.Id. at 891. 
162. Goetz and Scott employ a more modem vocabulary to describe the doctrine 
of substantial performance: 
The rule of substantial performance---or material breach-assures 
the breacher of his accrued contractual gains whenever the tender 
is consistent with the overall scheme of the contract, although 
deficient in some particulars. The doctrine expands the duty to 
mitigate in specialized environments by requiring the mitigator to 
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Scenario 3. Employment Contract: Vulnerability Due to Sequential 
Performances Ameliorated by Restitution. A simple employment contract: 
Britton promises to work for Turner for one year; Turner promises to pay 
Britton $120 upon completion of the work. Britton works for nine and a half 
months, but then breaches his obligation to complete the contract. May 
Britton nonetheless recover from Turner? 
Indeed, Judge Parker told us in 1834,163 he may. True, "the law will 
not imply and make a contract different from that which the parties have 
entered into,"I64 completion of the labor was a condition precedent to 
Turner's contractual duty to pay, and "[i]t is clear, then, that he is not entitled 
to recover upon the contract itself."165 But, concluded the Britton court, off 
the contract, in restitution, things could be different: "[I]f ... a party actually 
receives labor ... and thereby derives an advantage, over and above the 
damage which has resulted from the breach of the contract by the other party, 
. .. the law thereupon raises a promise to pay to the extent of such 
excess."166 By beginning performance, the court emphasized, Britton had 
placed himself in "a much worse situation than he who wholly disregards his 
contract"; 167 nine and one-half months into the transaction Turner had 
accept a deficient perfonnance, together with objectively measured 
damages. 
The substantial perfonnance doctrine reduces opportunistic claims 
by softening the breacher-nonbreacher distinction, thereby 
removing opportunities to exploit inadvertent breaches. Such a 
rule is sensible in cases such as construction contracts where the 
circumstances suggest that renegotiation costs will be substantial. 
Once construction is underway, the alternatives for both parties 
become inferior to the existing relationship .... 
Goetz & Scott, supra note 107, at 1009-10. 
163. Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481 (1834). 
164. Id. at 491. 
165.Id. at 486. 
166. Id. at 492. 
167.Id. at 487. 
A party who contracts to perfonn certain specified labor, and who 
breaks his contract in the first instance, without any attempt to 
perfonn it, can only be made liable to pay the damages which the 
other party has sustained by reason of such non perfonnance, 
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already received "nearly five-sixths of the value of a whole year's labor."168 
Any prejudice to Turner caused by Britton's early departure could simply be 
accounted for in the calculation of the amount of Turner's unjust 
enrichment. 169 
which in many instances may be trifling-whereas a party who in 
good faith has entered upon the performance of his contract, and 
nearly completed it, and then abandoned the further performance 
-although the other party has had the full benefit of all that has 
been done, and has purhaps [sic] sustained no actual damage-is 
in fact subjected to a loss of all which has been performed, in the 
nature of damages for the non fulfilment of the remainder .... 
Id. at 486-87. 
168. !d. at 487. As the Vermont court explained a few years later, to deny any 
recovery under such circumstances "operates as a forfeiture and in the nature of a 
penalty" and "[i]t is not the object of the law to punish the party for a violation of his 
contract, but to make the other party good for all damages he may sustain by such 
violation." Gilman v. Hall, 11 Vt. 510 (1839) (following Britton v. Turner). 
169. Of course, not all courts agreed. The traditional contractarian view denying 
restitutio nary recovery emphasized two themes. First, allowing restitution would be 
an attack on fundamental contractual values. Stark v. Parker, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 267 
(1824), sounded the refrain: "It will not admit of the monstrous absurdity, that a man 
may voluntarily and without cause violate his agreement, and make the very breach 
of that agreement the foundation of an action which he could not maintain under it." 
Second, allowing restitutionary recoveries would impose on employers the burden of 
proving the amount of the damages caused by the breach. See generally Edwin 
Patterson, Restitution for Benefits Conferred by Party in Default Under Contract, 
1952 REpORT OF N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N 93 (N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65 (1952». 
The debate has been usefully examined from a variety of perspectives. See, e.g., 
Wythe Holt, Recovery by the Worker Who Quits: A Comparison of the Mainstream, 
Legal Realist, and Critical Legal Studies Approaches to a Problem of Nineteenth 
Century Contract Law, 1986 WIS. L. REv. 677 (emphasizing class-based distinctions 
between treatment of workers in default and other contracting parties in default); 
Herbert Laube, The Defaulting Employee-Britton v. Turner Reviewed, 83 U. PA. L. 
REV. 825 (1935) (concluding, id. at 852: "After a hundred years of controversy, 
Britton v. Turner stands approved by considerations of morality, equality and social 
solidarity. Only the classic doctrine of contracts condemns it."). Of course, even 
where restitution was not permitted, other techniques might produce much the same 
results. Thus, courts could take the sting from the absence of a restitutionary remedy 
by treating the contract as divisible, rather than entire, and legislatures could enact 
periodic payment statutes to assure that latter-day Brittons would not suffer 
forfeitures and latter-day Turners would not retain undeserved windfalls. As 
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This rule, by binding the employer to pay the value of the 
service he actually receives, and the laborer to answer in 
damages where he does not complete the entire contract, will 
leave no temptation to the former to drive the laborer from 
his service, near the close of his term, by ill treatment, in 
order to escape from payment .... 170 
577 
Scenario 4. Insurance Contract: Vulnerability Unameliorated? An 
early insurance contract: DeHahn promises to indemnify Hartley up to policy 
limits for diminutions in the value of his interest in the ship Juno and its 
contents on a voyage from Africa to the West Indies, subject to the condition, 
among others, that the ship "sailed from Liverpool . . . with 50 hands or 
upwards." During the insured voyage, the ship is taken "by certain enemies 
of our lord the now King" and the insured's property "is wholly lost to him." 
DeHahn pays the limits of his contract, then discovers that the Juno had left 
Liverpool for Africa with only 46 hands, and sues to recover the payments 
mistakenly made to Hartley. The insured points out that 6 hours out of 
Liverpool the ship stopped at Anglesea to pick up 6 more hands, and thus had 
a full complement of seamen long before it arrived in Africa and the risk for 
the first time attached; the jury expressly fmds that during the six-hour 
voyage from Liverpool to Anglesea, the ship ''was equally safe as if she had 
had 50 hands on board her for that part of the said voyage." On such facts, 
was the insured entitled to payment from the insurer? 
He was not, Lord Mansfield tells us, for "a warranty in a policy of 
insurance is a condition or a contingency" that "must be strictly complied 
with" without regard for why it was included in the contract, why it was not 
satisfied, or the effects of that failure on the insurer. 171 Thus, Hartley was 
entitled to nothing, even though the failure of condition in no way prejudiced 
Professor Levmore notes in a recent synoptic article, denials of restitution to the 
breaching party, though still sometimes characterized as the traditional view, are rare 
today. Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 105 n.91 (1985). 
See also 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 8.14 (2d ed. 
1998). 
170. Britton, 6 N.H. at 494. 
171. DeHahn v. Hartley, 99 Eng. Rep. 1130, 1131 (K.B. 1786), ajJ'd, 100 Eng. 
Rep. 101 (Ex. 1787). 
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the insurer. I 72 In other settings, substantial perfonnance or restitution would 
be available to ameliorate the potential for forfeiture created by a minor 
defect in the first of two sequential perfonnances. Why not here? 
2. Why Insurance Is Different 
a. Aleatory Contracts and the Fundamental Transfonnation 
The answer, as we have seen, does not depend on niceties of eighteenth-
century British marine insurance law; the black letter rule requiring strict 
compliance with express conditions is by its tenns equally applicable to the 
boilerplate conditions in a modern homeowners policy or a professional's 
claims-made liability policy.173 Rather, the answer lies in the way insurance 
policies of all kinds combine an aleatory promise with express conditions. 
Because insurance contracts are full of express conditions, there is little room 
172. Each of the judges took a stab at articulating the seriousness of the perfect 
compliance principle. Thus, in Lord Mansfield's view, "It is perfectly immaterial for 
what purpose a warranty is introduced; but, being inserted, the contract does not exist 
unless it be literally complied with." Id. at 346, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1131. Ashhurst 
added this emphasis: "The very meaning of a warranty is to preclude all questions 
whether it has been substantially complied with; it must be literally so." Id. And 
Buller concluded his opinion this way: "[T]he whole forms one entire contract, and 
must be complied with throughout." Id. 
173. In this country, the citation of choice often has been Wood v. Hartford Fire 
Insurance Co., 13 Conn. 533 (1840). 
If a house be insured against fire, and the language of the policy is, 
"warranted, during the policy, to be covered with thatch," the 
insurer will be discharged, if, during the insurance, the house 
should be covered with wood or metal, although his risk is 
diminished; for a warranty excludes all argument in regard to its 
reasonableness, or the probable intent of the parties. . .. Parties 
may contract as they please. When a condition precedent is 
adopted, the court cannot enquire as to its wisdom or folly, but 
must exact its strict observance. 
Id. at 544. The opinion is a double-edged sword, for having framed the strict 
common law rule in its most virulent form, the court then promptly demonstrated how 
to avoid its application through the simple expedient of finding that the condition at 
issue has been satisfied. See also EDWIN W. PA TIERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE 
LAW § 61, at 239 (1935) ("[T]he rule came down to this, practically: that the insurer's 
motives for inserting the warranty would not be inquired into."). 
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for creative use of constructive conditions to ameliorate the insured's 
vulnerability. Because the insurer's promise is aleatory, restitution is not 
available as a device for ameliorating that vulnerability. Of course, neither 
feature of insurance contracts alone would be enough to create this 
vulnerability. The stringent effects of strict conditions can, in appropriate 
circumstances, be ameliorated through the use of restitution; Britton v. Turner 
showed us how, and section 374 of the Restatement (Second) o/Contracts 
confinns the continued vitality of that approach.l74 Where necessary, an 
aleatory contract can be fleshed out by constructive conditions crafted to 
avoid forfeitures; much of Professor Corbin's treatment of aleatory contracts 
is devoted to how to do precisely that. I 75 But standard insurance policy 
fonns combine aleatory promises with express conditions, and thus render 
unavailable doctrinal techniques for avoiding forfeiture that routinely would 
be available in other settings. I 76 
174. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 374 (1981). 
175. "A promise in an aleatory contract is constructively conditional on absence 
of action by the promisee that substantially increases the risk that the promisor 
assumed." CORBIN, supra note 145, § 730, at 416. Corbin offers this example of 
application of the principle: "The insurer against fire is discharged from duty to pay 
the loss if the insured himself sets fire to the property." !d. 
176. Thus, it is no accident that so many of the illustrations found in the 
treatment of express conditions by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts are drawn 
from insurance cases. In other settings, the apparent sting of the strict black-letter 
law of express conditions has effectively been drawn by the combination of self-help 
measures and doctrinal devices reviewed in the text. Indeed, outside of insurance, so 
pervasive are the escape mechanisms that Professor Childres has argued that the 
Restatement should acknowledge that the black letter rule had been rendered 
moribund and abandon the rule altogether. See Robert Childres & Bruce Dennis 
Sales, Restatement (Second) and the Law of Conditions in Contracts, 44 MISS. L. 
REV. 591 (1973). See also Robert Childres, Conditions in the Law of Contracts, 45 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 34 (1970) ("[T]he traditional rule is a myth, not entirely 
abandoned verbally, but supplanted sub silentio."). Professors Kessler and Gilmore 
put it this way: 
In most respectable academic literature the idea that express 
conditions [must be literally performed] is introduced only to be 
dismissed as false or misleading. To many, if not most, practicing 
lawyers, however, the idea seems to commend itself as an article of 
faith. Counsel for insurance companies ... have been particularly 
ardent believers in the sanctity of express conditions. 
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Well, might be the response, why not? After all, "aleatory" is a term 
derived from the Latin for "dice"; an "aleator" is a gambler. I77 People do 
wander into casinos and pull the arm and lose their quarters, without 
prompting us to wring our hands about forfeitures. Why should failure of a 
condition in an insurance policy be regarded any differently? 
Such reactions reflect a flawed understanding of what makes an "aleatory 
contract" different. Although the Restatement (Second) o/Contracts says that 
"[a] party may make an aleatory promise, under which his duty to perform is 
conditional on the occurrence of a fortuitous event,"178 the presence of 
conditions to hedge in the obligations undertaken by itself is not enough to 
distinguish aleatory promises from the rest of the world of contracts. Rather, 
what makes an aleatory contract different from the sales, construction, and 
labor contracts is that it is not primarily an exchange of performances. 179 As 
Professor Corbin's treatise summarizes: 
When two parties make a bilateral contract, they are making 
an exchange of promises. Each party accepts the promise of 
the other party as the agreed equivalent of his own. . .. In 
most such cases the parties contemplate not merely an 
exchange of mutual promises, but also an exchange of the 
two performances that are being exchanged .... 
It is upon the facts stated in the foregoing paragraph that the 
rules of law respecting implied and constructive conditions, 
the rules of mutual dependency of exchanged promises, are 
based. It is not regarded as a square deal for one of the 
promisors to be required to render the performance promised 
by him when he has not received and is not going to receive 
the performance that was promised to him in return. Having 
reasonably anticipated an agreed performance in exchange 
for his own, it is not in accordance with prevailing notions of 
justice to give something for nothing. I 80 
FRIEDRICH KESSLER & GRANT GILMORE, CONTRACTS CASES AND MATERIALS 846 
(2d ed. 1970) (citation omitted). 
177. See PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY 
OF RISK 47 (1996). 
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 76, cmt. c (1981). 
179. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 232, 239 (1981). 
180. CORBIN, supra note 145, at 194. See also id. § 728, at 399-400: 
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By contrast, in an aleatory contract, 
The performance that is promised may never be rendered, 
and yet the failure to render it may not be a breach of the 
promise. Both parties to such a promise ... are incurring a 
hazard or taking a chance; and the hazard is so far 
conspicuously incurred that neither party can justly complain 
if the chance goes against him. . .. When such aleatory 
promises are exchanged, it is not necessarily contrary to 
prevailing notion of justice that one of the two parties should 
get something for nothing. This is because he himself took 
a similar chance and might have been compelled to give 
something for nothing. 181 
581 
Thus, in the sales, construction, and labor contracts, the parties sought not 
just an exchange of promises, but an exchange of performances. In the sales 
agreement, the seller preferred the money to the horse and the buyer preferred 
the horse to the money; we do not understand either party to be assuming the 
risk of ending up with neither horse nor money. In Jacob & Youngs v. Kent 
In the great majority of bilateral contracts, the legal duty of each 
promisor is either expressly or constructively conditional upon 
substantial performance by the other contractor. . .. The fact that 
these promises are conditional in their legal operation does not 
make them aleatory, however. The performance of the condition 
in these cases may be uncertain; and a promisor may, therefore, 
never come under a duty of rendering the promised performance. 
In these cases, however, the condition precedent to a promisor's 
duty is concerned with the very return performance for which he 
has promised to give his own performance in exchange. . . . A 
contract is aleatory only when the parties contemplate that one of 
them may have to perform even though the other does not have to, 
even though the other party does not perform at all. The legal 
result of this is that in case of an aleatory contract one of the parties 
may come under a legal duty of rendering immediate performance 
even though the other party does not and never will come under 
such a duty. 
181. Id. § 728, at 401. 
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and Britton v. Turner a similar understanding of the relationship between the 
promised performances was crucial to the decisions to use substantial 
performance or restitution to prevent the threatened forfeitures. By contrast, 
in the insurance contract, we may assume that both Hartley and the DeHahn 
devoutly hoped that no performance by the insurer would be necessary; there 
the parties may have regarded the premium as the agreed equivalent for the 
expected value of the insurer's conditional promise to perform, but that is not 
the same as saying they regarded the premium as the agreed equivalent for the 
insurer's payment ofa covered claim. In 1998, in Lincoln, Nebraska, $210 
buys an umbrella insurer's promise to pay up to $700,000 to settle liability 
claims exceeding my primary coverages, and I am content to believe that-
properly discounted to reflect probabilities and expense loadings-the value 
of the insurer's promise is at least a rough actuarial equivalent for my 
premium. But that does not make the performances equivalent. 
Much of the law of implied and constructive conditions is designed for 
non-aleatory contracts and has as its object vindication of the intuition that 
parties to most contracts will seek to avoid situations which put one party at 
risk of having given something for nothing. If the seller still has his horse, 
he can go back into the market; if the buyer still has his money, he can seek 
out other horse traders. But it is not always possible to structure a 
relationship to completely avoid rendering one party vulnerable to the 
opportunism by the other. The traditional understanding of the conditions 
under which opportunism is likely to thrive emphasizes both bounded 
rationality that prevents perfect ex ante contractual control of opportunism 
and "asset specificity"-"sunk investments that are undertaken in support of 
particular transactions, the opportunity cost of which investments is much 
lower in best alternative uses or by alternative users should the original 
transaction be prematurely terminated."182 The pipe buried in Kent's 
182. WILLIAMSON, supra note 95, at 55. See also Furubotn & Richter, supra 
note 91, at 21 (characterizing "transaction-specific expenditures" as those that "are 
irreversible in the sense that the principal cannot be regained through the market (i.e., 
by sale) if the original business relations are discontinued"). For an excellent survey 
of the economic literature, see Shelanski & Klein, supra note lOO, at 340 
(emphasizing the spectrum of governance structures that can be used to deal with the 
bilateral monopoly potential). For application to contract modification and mitigation 
problems, see, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note lO7, at 969 (chief variable for 
application of mitigation principle is whether there is a market for substitute 
performance); Jason Scott Johnson, Default Rules/Mandatory Principles: A Game 
Theoretic Analysis o/Good Faith and the Contract Modification Problem, 3 S. CAL. 
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basement is one concrete example of a "sunk investment"; so too is Britton's 
nine months of labor. Neither could be readily recaptured and put to other 
uses. The result is, in Williamson's evocative formulation, a "fundamental 
transformation" I 83 that moves the parties from a "thick or competitive market 
ex ante to a thin market or bilateral monopoly ex post." I 84 Because insurance 
contracts are aleatory, the insured is rendered vulnerable by a form of "asset 
specificity" that makes other examples pale by comparison. 185 Hartley's 
INTERDISC. L.J. 335, 343 (1993) ("[M]arket for substitute perfonnance and 
effectiveness of the legal remedy for breach combine to detennine a party's 
vulnerability to modification holdup games."). 
183. WILLIAMSON, supra note 95, at 61-63. 
184. Cohen, supra note 95, at 955 . 
. . . [W]hat was a large numbers bidding condition at the outset is 
effectively transformed into one of bilateral supply thereafter. The 
reason why significant reliance investments in durable, transaction 
specific assets introduces contractual asymmetry between the 
winning bidder on the one hand and nonwinners on the other is 
because economic values would be sacrificed if the ongoing supply 
relation were to be tenninated. 
Faceless contracting is thereby supplanted by contracting in which 
the pairwise identity of the parties matters. Not only is the supplier 
unable to realize equivalent value were the specialized assets to be 
redeployed to other uses, but the buyer must induce potential 
suppliers to make the same specialized investments were he to turn 
to an outsider. The incentives of the parties to work things out 
rather than tenninate are thus apparent. This has massive 
ramifications for the organization of economic activity. 
Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Governance: Framework and Implications, 
140 J. INST'L & THEORETICAL ECON. 195,208 (1984) (emphasis in original). 
185. The Supreme Court of Delaware recently made the point explicitly: 
Insurance is different. . .. Unlike other contracts, the insured has 
no ability to "cover" if the insurer refuses without justification to 
pay a claim. Insurance contracts are like many other contracts in 
that one party (the insured) renders perfonnance first (by paying 
premiums) and then awaits the counter-perfonnance in the event 
of a claim. Insurance is different, however, ifthe insurer breaches 
by refusing to render the counter-perfonnance. In a typical 
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"investment" in his insurance contract includes not just the few pounds of 
premium, but the opportunity costs of forgoing other ways of dealing with his 
exposure, including at the extreme deciding to get out of the shipping game 
completely.186 
contract, the non-breaching party can replace the performance of 
the breaching party by paying the then-prevailing market price for 
the counter-performance. With insurance this is simply not 
possible. This feature of insurance contracts distinguishes them 
from other contracts. 
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 447 (Del. 1996). See also 
Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 570 (Ariz. 1986) (in "both first- and third-party 
situations the contract and the nature of the relationship give the insurer an almost 
adjudicatory responsibility"). Unfortunately, old habits die hard. Most insurance 
lawyers, when confronted with an insurance opinion or commentary tying the 
obligation of good faith to the "unique relationship," or disparities in bargaining 
power, are more likely to understand those assertions as an invocation of ex ante 
disparities in bargaining power than as concern about the bilateral monopoly that can 
result from transaction-specific investments. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 131, at 
239: "Courts imagine that standardization carries with it an element of coercive force 
that no contract should contain. So they take upon themselves the unwise task of 
neutralizing that power." 
186. Thus, conventional variations on the theme that "an applicant for insurance 
stakes his premium payment on the chance that there will be a loss," e.g., State Farm 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 112 So. 2d 366, 372 (Miss. 1959), are fundamentally 
misleading, for costs of relying on a promise to provide insurance protection include 
more than a premium. The point is not just that, in an important sense, all costs are 
opportunity costs, see generally ARMEN A. ALCHIAN, ECONOMIC FORCES AT WORK 
301 (1977), but that the opportunities forsaken by reliance on a promise to provide 
insurance can prove much different than the opportunities forsaken by reliance on a 
promise that is part of a nonaleatory exchange. If the paint doesn't arrive on time, 
there will be other days and other paint dealers. But once the boat has sunk or the 
c 'est tui que vie has expired, it is too late to seek alternative sources of insurance 
coverage. The law reacts to the special character of reliance on aleatory contracts in 
many ways. For one example, promises to procure insurance provide one of the 
classic occasions for application of promissory estoppel. See generally RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90, cmt. e (1981); 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 169, § 
2.119, at 169. The same concerns have prompted the development of special rules 
to police negligent handling of life insurance applications. See, e.g., Duffie v. 
Bankers' Life Ass'n, 139 N.W. 1087 (Iowa 1913); Robinson v. United States 
Benevolent Soc'y, 94 N.W. 211 (Mich. 1903). See generally M.D. Regensteiner, 
Annotation, Rights and Remedies Arising Out o/Delay in Passing Upon Application 
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Why does equity fmd a way to protect the breaching Britton against a 
forfeiture of his labors but leave Hartley to contemplate an empty pier with 
neither his premium nor the policy proceeds? The answer, of course, is that 
restitution at root is a way of forcing the defendant to disgorge what 
otherwise would be unjust enrichment. I 87 Turner's restitutionary liability is 
limited to the value of the benefit he received from Britton's labors. Because 
insurance is aleatory, the rough equivalence between loss and benefit 
necessary for restitution to be an effective protection against forfeiture simply 
will not be present. Hartley will not be protected from forfeiture by getting 
his premium back.188 The ship is gone and so is the opportunity to avoid or 
to transfer the risk of its loss. 
If restitution cannot help Hartley, then what about substantial 
performance? After all, leaving Liverpool four men short no more prejudiced 
DeHahn than the substitution of Cohos for Reading pipe redounded to Kent's 
detriment. Why not conclude that too was only an immaterial breach, and 
allow the court to construct a condition of substantial performance that was 
satisfied because the changes in no way enlarged the insurer's obligation? 
The answer, of course, is that the substantial performance route charted by 
Cardozo does not run through insurance law. 
In Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, Cardozo interpreted the Reading Pipe 
specification as a promise by the construction company to employ Reading 
Pipe, but did not interpret that provision as making provision of Reading Pipe 
for Insurance, 32 A.L.R.2d 487 (1953) (cataloging decisions based on both 
contractual and tort theories). 
187. See generally I GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LA W OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1978); 
Levmore, supra note 169. 
188. Of course, we could conclude that the measure of DeHahn's unjust 
enrichment is not the premium paid by Hartley, but rather the claim payment it would 
have had to make to Hartley but for the happy and immaterial coincidence that 
Hartley's crew was four men short; in this view, DeHahn hoped that he had gotten 
lucky in the same way that Turner and Kent hoped that they had gotten lucky. This 
gambit finds occasional support. See, e.g., Jones v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 321 S.W.2d 
798, 802 (Ky. 1991) (notice-prejudice rule based on recognition that "in the absence 
of prejudice a strict forfeiture clause simply provides the insurance company with a 
windfall"). But invocation of the restitutionary rationale seems a rhetorical flourish 
that is junior to the conclusion that the purpose of the notice provision is to protect the 
insurer against prejudice in claims adjustment activities. See generally Levmore, 
supra note 169, at 107 (courts that deny restitution for partial performers may be 
interpreting contract as designed to create super incentives to performance, so that pro 
rata restitution would not be appropriate). 
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an express condition precedent to Kent's obligation to pay. The dissent did 
not agree with that critical move,189 and most of the admiration for Cardozo's 
opinion ultimately rests on the skill with which he was able to allow the 
consequences of treating the provision as a strict condition to inform his sense 
of what the parties must have intended. 190 But in insurance law, as usually 
understood, there is no such room to wiggle. 191 According to the 
Restatement, the "preference for an interpretation that merely imposes a duty 
on the obligee to do the act and does not make the doing of the act a condition 
of the obligor's duty" just "does not apply when the contract is of a type 
under which only the obligor generally undertakes duties": 192 
It therefore does not apply to the typical insurance contract 
under which only the insurer generally undertakes duties, 
and a term requiring an act to be done by the insured is not 
subject to this standard of preference. In view of the general 
. understanding that only the insurer undertakes duties, the 
term will be interpreted as making the event a condition of 
the insurer's duty rather than as imposing a duty on the 
insured. 193 
In insurance, then, if a provision makes it into the contract, no matter 
what its label, it almost always will be understood to have created an express 
189. See Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 892 (N.Y. 1921) (Mclaughlin, 
J., dissenting). 
190. See, e.g., Arthur L. Corbin, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law o/Contracts, 
48 YALE L.J. 426 (1938) ("Probably no other case can be found in which the question 
of dependency of promises and of implied conditions of an owner's duty to pay is 
discussed with as much enlightened intelligence and charm of expression as we find 
in Cardozo's opinion."); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study 
in Contracts, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1379, 1381 (1995) (contributions of Cardozo 
in Jacob & Youngs "were achieved using a thickly textured doctrinal ism involving 
conscious mediation amongst the competing values at stake in the law of contracts."); 
Patterson, supra note 23, at 282 (celebrating Cardozo's opinion as a "clash ... 
between two classic argumentative forms ... the textual and the prudential."). 
191. "No satisfactory counterparts to the penalty and mitigation doctrines exist 
when contract enforcement is accomplished by express conditions that do not operate 
directly through a liquidated payment obligation." Andersen, supra note 139, at 311. 
Andersen's answer, of course, is rigorous use of "good faith in enforcement." Id. 
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227 cmt. d (1981). 
193. !d. 
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condition to the insurer's duties, and there simply will be no room for a gap--
filling constructive condition of substantial perfonnance. And if that express 
condition has not been completely satisfied, the black letter common law rule 
tells us, the insurer has no duty to perfonn. 
For most failure of condition defenses, the results produced by the strict 
common law rule seem perfectly appropriate. Clearly we do not want to 
require a life insurer to start paying off for near death experiences or a hole-
in-one insurer to start fending off claims based on truly remarkable double 
eagles. We know that the insured who opted for collision but not 
comprehensive coverage should not get any help from her auto insurer in 
repairing chips in her windshield even if they were caused by rocks thrown 
up in a near-collision. And we are confident that an insurer that promises to 
pay $1,000,000 if it snows four or more inches in Central Park on January 8 
between 10 a.m. and 10 p.m. should not have to respond to the contention that 
three and three-tenths inches is close enough.194 
Why do we know instinctively that to excuse less than full compliance 
with those conditions would be to do what Cardozo and Parker refused to do: 
to remake the contract of the parties? The answer may seem obvious: with 
an aleatory contract, Corbin tells us, the possibility that one party will give 
up something for nothing is a chance that "is so far conspicuously incurred 
that ... [he cannot] justly complain if the chance goes against him."195 That 
characterization fits conventional egoistic gambles-no one is likely to have 
much sympathy for the "Pick Six" lottery player who picks only five-and 
it fits some insurance policy provisions as well. Had Hartley's ship been lost 
after the term of the insurance had expired, we would be unlikely to waste 
time wondering if the insurer nonetheless should pay. 
However, that explanation does not take us as far as we need to go for, as 
we have seen, most of the provisions that lurk in standard insurance policy 
forms hardly can claim that kind of validation. Must we nonetheless insist 
194. See Gavin Souter, Snow Promotion a Near Miss; Less than an Inch More 
Snow Would Have Translated into a $1 Million Claim, Bus. INS., Jan. 15, 1996, at 46 
(insurer's obligation on $1 million policy covering insured's exposure on lease 
payments forgiveness promotion conditioned on 4 inches of snow in Central Park on 
January 8 between 10 a.m. and 10 p.m.). For a more commercially-significant version 
of snow insurance, see Michael Prince, Interest in Snow Insurance Is Accumulating, 
Bus. INS., Jan 6, 1997, at 31 (airport authority pays $35,000 premium for insurer's 
promise to pay $25,000 for each inch of snow above 40 inches that falls on Dulles, 
up to $1 million). 
195. CORBIN, supra note 145, at 401. 
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that modem Hartleys are chargeable with having assumed the risk of failure 
to comply with each and every policy provision? Or should we be prepared 
to distinguish some risks of getting nothing that are part of the aleatory 
contract's gamble from some that are not? Why should it be impennissible 
opportunism for Kent to send his architect to the basement with a flashlight 
to look for immaterial departures from contract specifications but 
unremarkable business-as-usual for an insurer to instruct its claims 
department to deny a claim because of an immaterial, non-prejudicial failure 
of a boilerplate insurance policy condition? 
b. Traditional Ameliorating Techniques for Insurance 
Contracts 
The better response is that opportunism is opportunism, whether it 
appears authorized by the structure of a construction contract or by insurance 
policy boilerplate, and that insurance law, despite its formal fidelity to the 
strict common law rule, only sometimes has been blind to the potential for 
disproportionate forfeitures worked by the combination of aleatory promises 
with insurance policy fonns full of express contractual conditions. True, 
insurance law continues to defend the proposition that - absent legislatively 
mandated benefits, of course-the insurer is free to decide what risks it is 
willing to assume, for courts will not make a contract for the parties. 
However, that underwriting discretion does not necessarily include discretion 
to use methods of avoiding unwanted risks that visit a disproportionate 
forfeiture on the insured. With "substantial performance" and "restitution" 
unavailable in insurance, the instinct to prevent inappropriate forfeitures has 
had to manifest itself in other ways. But quietly, sporadically, often 
atheoretically, insurance law manages to fmd ways to put limits on the ability 
of insurers to invoke failure of condition defenses when permitting the 
defense would create a disproportionate forfeiture. 
Sometimes the limits are statutory. Many jurisdictions have tum--of-the-
century statutes restricting insurer efforts to convert application 
representations into conditions in order to avoid the materiality constraints of 
misrepresentation law,196 and standard policy statutes sometimes have 
converted broadly-framed conditions into more-narrowly-framed exceptions 
196. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 186 (West 1987). Such 
statutes apply only to representations and affirmative warranties applicable to 
circumstances at the inception of the contract; they thus do not apply to "continuing" 
warranties and conditions that seek to control post-inception changes in the risk. 
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that do not pose the same potential for disproportionate forfeitures. 197 
Legislation in a few states denies the insurer a defense based on failure to 
satisfy a post-loss notice condition unless that failure prejudiced the 
insurer,198 and an occasional statute denies the insurer a defense based on 
post-inception, pre-loss failures of some conditions unless the failure 
"increased the risk ofloss"199 or "contributed to the 10ss."200 In Australia, 
a 1984 statute implementing the recommendations of a Crown Commission 
attempts to mirror Jacob & Youngs v. Kent by giving the insurer an offset in 
the amount of any injury to the insurer caused by certain failures of 
condition.201 Such statutory alterations of the strict common law rule are 
few, and determining what policy provisions are governed by them is a 
continuing source of difficulty.202 Consequently, when the sensibilities on 
197. See generally Thomas L. Wenck, The Historical Development of Standard 
Policies, 35 J. RISK & INS. 537, 544-45 (1968). This effect was especially 
pronounced in life insurance. See generally Robert Works, Coverage Clauses and 
Incontestable Statutes: The Regulation of Post-Claim Underwriting, 1979 U. ILL. 
L.F.809. 856-57. 
198. See, e.g., WISC. STAT. ANN. § 631.81 (West 1995). 
199. In New York, for example, a "warranty statute" drafted by Professor 
Patterson in the 1940's provides: "No breach of warranty shall avoid an insurance 
contract or defeat recovery thereunder unless such breach materially increased the risk 
ofloss, damage or injury within the the coverage of the contract." N.Y. INS. LAW 
§ 150(2) (McKinney 1985). For Patterson's explanation, see PATTERSON, supra note 
173, § 74. 
200. In Nebraska, a statute in effect since the Progressive Era makes certain 
post-inception, pre-loss failures of condition defenses available only if the failure of 
condition "was in existence at the time of loss and contributed to the loss." NEB. REv. 
STAT. § 44-358 (REISSUE 1993). See generally Robert Works, Insurance Policy 
Conditions and the Nebraska Contribute to the Loss Statute: A Primer and a Partial 
Critique, 61 NEB. L. REv. 209 (1982). New Zealand has a similar statute. Insurance 
Law Reform Act of 1977, § 11 (N.z.), adopted on the recommendation of the 
Contracts and Law Reform Committee. See N.Z. LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, 
ASPECTS OF INSURANCE LAW ,-r,-r 28-30 (1975). For Patterson's criticisms of 
"contribute-to-the-Ioss standards," see PATTERSON, supra note 173, § 73. 
201. See Insurance CONTRACTS ACT, 1984, § 54 (Austl.). The approach is 
rationalized in AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM'N, REPORT ON INSURANCE 
CONTRACTS, No. 20 (1982). Apparently both New Hampshire and Washington long 
ago flirted with similar statutory requirements that the insured's recovery sometimes 
be reduced in lieu offorfeiture. See generally PATTERSON, supra note 173, § 75. 
202. In 1935, Patterson put it this way: 
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display in Jacob & Youngs v. Kent and Britton v. Turner manage to find 
expression in insurance law, it usually is because a court has found a way to 
skirt the strict common law rule without denying it. 
Judicial techniques for avoiding the strict common law rule come in 
several familiar forms. An insurer may be estopped to rely on a failure of 
condition defense if the court is able to conclude that a representation 
chargeable to the insurer has produced reasonable detrimental reliance by the 
insured.203 Noncompliance with a condition may be excused because 
compliance was "impracticable,"204 because the insurer had already 
materially breached its obligations under the contract,205 or because the 
insurer can be said to have ''waived'' compliance.206 All these techniques are 
notoriously fact-dependent, all are said to be ineffective against a "coverage 
clause," and the decisions they generate do not travel well. The result is a 
"mushy body of case law"207 in which courts sometimes appear to adhere to 
If one merely lists the states in which a statutory modification of 
the common-law doctrine is now in force, the list would embrace 
a majority of the states of the Union, and one might rashly 
conclude that the common law rules had been entirely swept away. 
A closer scrutiny of the statutes reveals that this conclusion is far 
from being correct. Many of the statutes have avowedly only a 
limited application, and judicial interpretation has further limited 
their scope. 
PATTERSON, supra note 173, at 309. Patterson's conclusion remains apt, as does his 
characterization of the difficulties posed by such statutes: "Many of the statutes just 
referred to were drawn by amateurs, and it is often well-nigh impossible to determine 
their meaning." Id. at 311. 
203. See Clarence Morris, Waiver & Estoppel in Insurance Litigation, 105 U. PA. 
L. REV. 925 (1957). 
204. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 271 (1981). See also 
Annotation, Beneficiary's Ignorance of Existence of Life or Accident Policy as 
Excusing Failure to Give Notice, Make Prooft of Loss, or Bring Action within Time 
Limited by Policy or Statute, 28 A.L.R.3d 292 (1969); C.T. Drechsler, Property 
Insurance: Insured's Ignorance of Loss or Casualty, Cause of Damage, Coverage or 
Existence of Policy, or Identity of Insurer, as Affecting or Excusing Compliance with 
Requirements as to Time for Giving Notice, Making Proof of Loss, or Bringing Action 
Against Insurer, 24 A.L.R.3d 1007 (1969). 
205. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 255 (1981). 
206. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84 (1981). 
207. The characterization is drawn from PATTERSON, supra note 173, § 94, at 
278. 
1999] CLAIMS MADE FORMATS 591 
the black letter of the equitable doctrines they apply, and sometimes seem to 
allow the potential for forfeiture an unannounced place in the calculus of 
decision. 
But the technique that most clearly mimics Jacob & Youngs v. Kent in 
evading the strict common law rule employs purposive interpretation to 
permit the conclusion that-fIrst appearances sometimes to the contrary-no 
failure of condition occurred. We have seen how Cardozo allowed his 
appreciation of the consequences of a failure of condition to inform his 
interpretation of the purpose of the Reading Pipe provision. For Cardozo, 
"intention not otherwise revealed may be presumed to hold in contemplation 
the reasonable and the probable,"208 and he thought it neither reasonable nor 
probable that the parties to that construction agreement would use a strict 
contractual condition in order to bet progress payments on whether Kent 
could discover an immaterial, not-readily-cured, departure from the 
specifications. 
[T]his is not to say that the parties are not free by apt and 
certain words to effectuate a purpose that performance of 
every term shall be a condition of recovery. . .. This is 
merely to say that the law will be slow to impute the 
purpose, in the silence of the parties, where the signifIcance 
of the default is grievously out of proportion to the 
oppression of the forfeiture.209 
Once Kent had conceded the insignifIcance of the substitution of Cohoes 
pipe for Reading Pipe, Cardozo had no difficulty discerning the disproportion 
between the harm done to Kent by the breach and the harm that would be 
done to the construction company if the provision were treated as an express 
condition. Interpreting the Reading Pipe provision as a promise, and 
constructing a condition of "substantial performance," permitted Cardozo to 
prevent "the oppression of the forfeiture." 
Of course, a court confronting an immaterial failure to satisfy a provision 
in an insurance policy usually will not be free to follow Cardozo to the 
conclusion that the policy provision should be interpreted as a promise rather 
208. Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. at 891. Professor Dennis Patterson calls 
this "perhaps the most important sentence in the entire opinion." Patterson, supra 
note 116, at 284, n.183. 
209. Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. at 891. 
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than a condition.210 But it can follow Cardozo in rejecting the positivist 
conceit that the meaning of a provision can be determined without 
considering its effects, and it can allow its appreciation of the consequences 
of a failure of condition to inform its understanding of whether the provision 
was satisfied. Thus, no special creativity was required for courts to decide 
that the insurer's purpose for including an "increase in hazard" warranty in 
the standard fire policy could be satisfied without forfeiting coverage every 
time mom started the morning oatmeal or dad fired up his pipe,211 and from 
such mine-run efforts to ascribe appropriate purposes to insurance policy 
conditions it is but a short move to the conclusion that less-than-literal 
compliance may still satisfy a wide variety of policy provisions.2 12 In this 
210. Of course, in the heat of advocacy, the distinction sometimes is ignored. 
Occasionally an opinion will treat a policy provision as a promise rather than as an 
express condition. See, e.g., Howard v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 540 F.2d 695, 697 
(4th Cir. 1975) (loss adjustment condition construed as "promise" rather than 
"condition" because it involved "something to be done" rather than "something not 
to be done)"; Anderson et aI., infra note 232, at 857 (urging use of "doctrine of 
'substantial performance'" to ~sure that "[a] policyholder's breach of a policy 
condition should result, at most, in recoupment or damages to the insurance 
company."). Of course, that approach is impossible to square with the Restatement. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 IIIus. 2 & 3 (1981). 
211. See generally JERRY, supra note 48, at 295-96; PATTERSON, supra note 173, 
at 325-27; F.V. Lapine, Annotation, Change in Purposes for Which Premises Are 
Occupied or Used as Increase of Hazard Voiding Coverage, 19 A.L.R.3d 1336 
(1968); M.T. Brunner, Annotation, Casual or Temporary Repairs, and the Like, as 
Constituting Increase of Hazard So As to Avoid Fire or Other Property Insurance, 28 
A.L.R.2d 757 (1953). 
212. Failure to satisfy the "iron safe clause" provided grist for both judicial and 
academic mills. See, e.g., E. Le Fevre, Annot., Insurance: Waiver of, or Estoppel to 
Assert, Iron Safe Clause, 33 A.L.R.2d 615 (1954). As Williston somewhat 
grudgingly acknowledged, with iron safe conditions "the meaning of the words is 
perfectly plain. What influences the court is the fact that it is so unfair and harsh to 
make the condition applicable in view of the situation which has arisen." 5 SAMUEL 
WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 806, 
at 859 (3d ed. 1961). 
Nothing is commoner than for a promisor who wishes to protect 
himself by a condition to impose one which will certainly have that 
effect even though in some cases the condition may work 
undeserved hardship. On the natural construction of the policy in 
question it would seem that the insurer did not care to take the risk 
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fashion, "vacancy and unoccupancy" clauses can be read to speak only at the 
inception of the contract.2 I3 A provision excluding from coverage death 
''while. .. serving as a member ofthe crew of any aircraft" can be construed 
to apply only during portions of the flight when the individual actually is 
helping to fly the plane.214 A warranty limiting the values a jeweler is to 
display in show windows can be said to be relevant only to smash-and-grab 
thefts from the window, and thus to be no bar to recovery for armed robbery 
losses.215 With history like that to draw upon, we should not be surprised to 
find that modern courts, faced with a choice between interpreting a notice 
provision to say "I will pay, but not if your notice is late regardless of 
whether its untimeliness in any way prejudices my claims adjustment efforts" 
and "I will pay, but not if your notice is late and its untimeliness prejudices 
my claims adjustment efforts," often follow the counsel crystalized in the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts216 and choose the interpretation that 
avoids a forfeiture.217 Over time some such interpretive moves can become 
so familiar that they acquire their own short-hand labels: "affirmative 
of discussing reasons alleged for the nonproduction of the books, 
preferring instead to throw on the insured the duty of producing 
them at his peril. This construction works such hardship, however, 
that the court declines to give the words their natural meaning. 
Id. at 861-62. 
213. See, e.g., Stout v. City Fire Ins. Co., 12 Iowa 371 (1861). See generally 
PAlTERSON, supra note 173, at 310-14; Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, What 
Constitutes "Vacant" or "Unoccupied" Dwelling within Exclusionary Provision of 
Fire Insurance Policy, 47 A.L.R.3d 398 (1973); Joseph E. Edwards, Annot., What 
Constitutes "Vacancy" or "Unoccupancy" within Fire Insurance Policy on Building 
Other Than Dwelling, 36 A.L.R.3d 505 (1971). 
214. See, e.g., Alliance Life Ins. Co. v. Ulyssses Volunteeer Fireman's Relief 
Ass'n, 529 P.2d 171 (Kan. 1974); Vander Laan v. Educators Mutual Ins. Co., 97 
N.W.2d 6 (Mich. 1959). 
215. See, e.g., Diesinger v. American & Foreign Ins. Co., 138 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 
1943). See generally Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Construction and Effect of 
"Jeweler's Block" Policies or Provisions Contained Therein, 22 A.L.R.5th 579 
(1994). 
216. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227 (1981). 
217. See, e.g., Iowa Ins. Co. v. Meckna, 144 N.W.2d 73 (Neb. 1966) (notice 
provision satisfied because insurer's purpose in requiring notice not impeded by 
insured's failure to give notice). 
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warranty,"218 "temporary breach,"219 "divisibility"220 - and, most notably 
in recent years-the "notice-prejudice rule. "221 
But most do not. As Llewellyn wryly noted, and as generations of 
lawyers picking through appellate opinions from half-:-a-hundred jurisdictions 
can confirm, "the effect of such work on 'Words and Phrases' and the like 
can be pretty awful."222 Reliance on equitable preclusions and purposive 
interpretation to ameliorate the harshness of the strict common law rule 
means lawyers for insureds, who come to the task only infrequently and often 
one policy provision at a time, are likely to find that each example of 
equitable and interpretive techniques being used to overcome a failure of 
condition defense seems to come with its own built-in counter example; 
efforts by commentators to generalize judicial techniques often get no further 
than a listing of the doctrinal tools or taxonomic efforts to classify provisions 
that seem especially vulnerable to judicial efforts to ameliorate the effects of 
the strict common law rule. We miss a lot when we view these cases 
individually. Without the perspective necessary to appreciate that sometimes 
they may be manifestations of the larger contractual program for controlling 
disproportionate forfeitures, we may celebrate judicial technique without 
understanding when and why it should be applied, and leave its 
manifestations vulnerable to the claim that they are ad hoc, perhaps 
218. See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 173, at 310-14; JERRY, supra note 48, at 
515-16. 
219. See generally PATTERSON, supra note 173, at 317-23. 
220. See generally id. at 342-46; Jerald H. Sklar, The Divisibilty o/Warranties 
in Insurance Policies, 18 VAND. L. REV. 719 (1965). 
221. See generally authorities cited supra note 49. 
222. LLEWELLYN, supra note 118, at 365. The result, Llewellyn complained, is 
that "the sound impulse for fairness - better, against outrage - fails to cumulate into 
any effective or standard techniques, except in a very few areas such as life and fire 
insurance." Id. Llewellyn's rosy characterization of the situation in life and fire 
insurance may well have been apt at the time, for constructing taxonomies of 
insurance policy provisions and the judicial reactions they provoked once was at the 
core of academic work in insurance law. Thus, for example, Williston's contracts 
treatise devoted twenty-four sections to "Excuses for Non-Performance of Conditions 
in Insurance Policies." WILLISTON & JAEGER, supra note 212, at §§ 745-68. Today, 
however, Llewellyn'S complaint seems especially applicable to insurance contracts. 
For an examination of the difference in the rhetorical and legal tools on display in 
insurance coverage litigation a century ago, see Robert Works, Back to the Future of 
Post-Loss Insurance Conditions in Nebraska, 70 NEB. L. REV. 229 (1991). 
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unprincipled, expressions of anti-insurer animus or the search for a deep 
pocket. 
But these phenomena need not and should not be seen that way. Despite 
their diversity and the sporadic nature of their appearances, they are reactions 
to a common problem, and they should be seen as specific applications of the 
generic principle that nonoccurrence of some conditions should be excused 
under the "principle of special scrutiny"223 articulated in Section 229 of the 
Restatement (Second) oJContracts: "To the extent that the non-occurrence 
of a condition would cause disproportionate forfeiture, a court may excuse the 
nonoccurrence of that condition unless its occurrence was a material part of 
the agreed exchange. "224 
Unfortunately, in recent years these connections only occasionally have 
been made explicit. When Connecticut first confronted whether to align itself 
with jurisdictions that had proclaimed a prejudice requirement for failure of 
notice condition defenses, the opinion was crafted by Justice Peters, fresh 
from the Yale Law School faculty and ready to locate both the "notice-
prejudice rule" and section 229 within the same intellectual tradition as Jacob 
& Youngs v. Kent. In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co v. Murphy,225 Justice 
Peters began with a quick survey of the legal landscape: 
We are confronted, in this case, by a conflict between two 
competing principles in the law of contracts. On the one 
hand, the law of contracts supports the principle that 
contracts should be enforced as written, and that contracting 
parties are bound by the contractual provisions to which they 
have given their assent. Among the provision for which the 
parties may bargain are clauses that impose conditions upon 
contractual liability. "If the occurrence of a condition is 
required by the agreement of the parties, rather than as a 
matter of law, a rule of strict compliance traditionally 
applies." ... On the other hand, the rigor of this traditional 
principle of strict compliance has increasingly been 
tempered by the recognition that the occurrence of a 
condition may, in appropriate circumstances, be excused in 
223. The phrase is drawn from Eisenberg, supra note 93, at 236. 
224. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 (1981). See generally 
Eisenberg, supra note 93, at 236-240; BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 128, at 
§5.5.4; II FARNSWORTH, supra note 169, at § 8.7. 
225.538 A.2d 219 (Conn. 1988). 
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order to avoid a 'disproportionate forfeiture.' See, e.g., 2 
Restatement (Second) Contracts (1981), § 229.226 
Justice Peters acknowledged that section 229 and Jacob & Youngs v. Kent 
and the notice-prejudice rule in insurance shared a common intellectual 
lineage,227 and then applied the standards of section 229 to determine 
whether nonoccurrence of the notice condition in the occurrence-triggered 
comprehensive general liability policy should be excused: 
In the setting of this case, three considerations are central. 
First, the contractual provisions presently at issue are 
contained in an insurance policy that is a "contract of 
adhesion," the parties to this form contract having had no 
occasion to bargain about the consequences of delayed 
notice. Second, enforcement of these notice provisions will 
operate as a forfeiture because the insured will lose his 
insurance coverage without regard to his dutiful payment of 
insurance premiums. Third, the insurer's legitimate purpose 
of guaranteeing itself a fair opportunity to investigate 
accidents and claims can be protected without the forfeiture 
that results from presuming, irrebuttably, that late notice 
invariably prejudices the insurer.228 
Thus, failure to satisfy the notice condition should be excused. "Literal 
enforcement of notice provisions when there is no prejudice is no more 
appropriate than literal enforcement ofliquidated damages clauses when there 
are no damages."229 
Justice Peters' assimilation of strict conditions and penalty clauses was 
neither original or strained. The first Restatement confirmed the long-
standing recognition that express conditions can present the same 
opportunities and concerns as do more familiar forms of penalty provision: 
A contract may be framed so that what is in form a condition 
will, if given effect, involve the consequences of a collateral 
agreement for a penalty in case of breach. Enforcement of 
226. Id. at 221. 
227. /d. at 221-22. 
228. Id. at 222. 
229. /d. at 223. 
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such a collateral agreement is confessedly opposed to public 
policy and provisions creating a condition that would 
produce the same result should be no more operative because 
put in the fonn of a condition.230 
597 
230. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 302, cmt. a (1932). See also WILLISTON & 
JAEGER, supra note 212, at § 739 ("A condition may be as penal in its effects as a 
promise to pay a penalty .... The substance of the two bargains is the same; it is only 
the fonn that differs, and relief against the effect of penalties should depend as little 
as possible upon fonn."); William Loyd, Penalties and Forfeitures, 29 HARV. L. REv. 
117, 135 (1915): 
To habitually remake agreements on the strength of circumstances 
that have subsequently transpired would add an element of 
uncertainty to bargaining dangerous to freedom of contract and the 
extension of credit. To refuse to take account of the disproportion 
between the stipulated consequences of breach and the actual risk 
of loss would tum such transactions into a speculation. The 
function of jurisprudence, in the furtherance of progress, is to 
reduce to a minimum the purely fortuitous elements in the law of 
obligations . . . until through economic invention, perhaps 
insurance, perhaps the development of ideas still unknown to us, 
the problem itself becomes obsolete. 
Id. at 135. See also BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 128, at § 5.2.3 (characterizing 
liquidated damages provisions and express conditions as alternative ways of 
protecting "perfonnance interests," and, as such, subject to this "central" principle: 
"[C]osts to the party in breach unnecessary to the protection of the other's 
performance interests should be eliminated."). Eisenberg, supra note 93, at 238, puts 
it this way: 
The principle that governs the review of express conditions is very 
similar to the principle that governs the review of liquidated 
damages provisions. Both principles concern sanctions. Both 
principles allow the courts to override bargained-for provisions 
even in the absence of unconscionability. Both principles tum on 
a second look. And just as the special principle concerning 
liquidated damages is traditionally supported by a rhetoric that 
centers on the idea of penalty, the principle governing the excuse 
of express conditions is traditionally supported by a rhetoric that 
centers on the idea of forfeiture. 
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And the fIrst Restatement's precursor to section 229 provided: "A condition 
may be excused without other reason if its requirement (a) will involve 
extreme forfeiture or penalty, and (b) its existence or occurrence forms no 
essential part of the exchange for the promisor's performance"231 
Unfortunately, though the rules governing when a liquidated damage 
provision should not be enforced because it will operate as a penalty are 
familiar to most modern lawyers, the cognate provisions for policing against 
forfeitures caused by the application of strict conditions seem to go mostly 
unnoticed outside the academy. The possibility that a failure to satisfy a 
notice condition might be excused under section 229, let alone that section 
229 might have a wider range of application to some other failure of 
condition defenses, would appear to be news to most insurance practitioners, 
even though they labor in the most fruitful of forfeiture vineyards.232 And 
More importantly, the principle that governs the excuse of express 
conditions, like the principle that governs the review of liquidated 
damages provisions, is best explained not by the traditional 
rhetoric, but by the limits of cognition. 
Id. at 238. 
231. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1932). 
232. See, e.g., Eugene R. Anderson et aI., Draconian Forfeitures of Insurance: 
Commonplace, Indefensible, and Unnecessary, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 825 (1996) 
(despite title and subject, fails to mention § 229) [hereinafter Anderson, Draconian 
F01ftitures]; Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, The Reasonable Expectations 
Doctrine: Understanding the Law and the Lore Behind Upholding the Reasonable 
Expectations of Insurance Policyholders, RISK MGMT. & INS. REv., Vol. 1, No.2, p. 
72, 84-88 (1997) (arguing that the "Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations" in part is 
an effort to police against opportunistic breach); Suter, supra note 88, at 235 
(suggesting that "notice-prejudice rule" is application of § 229, but acknowledging 
that connections are "not generally recognized in the case law"). Of course, there are 
exceptions. In Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 344 A.2d 555 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975), 
perhaps the most influential early "notice-prejudice rule" decision, Judge Cercone's 
concurring opinion made the connections to § 229's predecessor. ("The two criteria, 
which must be weighed together, are the extremity of the forfeiture to the obligee 
(insured) and the materiality of the nonoccurrence of the condition to the obligor 
(insurer)."). See id. at 560. See also American Ins. Co. v. C.S. McCrossan, Inc., 829 
F.2d 702, 705 (8th Cir. 1986) (dicta that § 229 would excuse noncompliance with 
authorization condition in retrospective rating terms of policy); Cessna Aircraft Co. 
v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 900 F. Supp. 1489 (D. Kan. 1995) (tying "notice-
prejudice rule" to § 229); American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Collura, 163 So.2d 784 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (predecessor to § 229 applicable to failure to satisfy notice 
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that is unfortunate, for as Justice Peters was at pains to point out, the same 
concern to prevent disproportionate forfeitures that produced such contracts 
landmarks as Jacobs & Youngs v. Kent and Britton v. Turner is operative in 
insurance litigation, even though neither the doctrine of substantial 
performance nor restitutionary efforts to force disgorgement of unjust 
enrichment fit the insurance situation. 
C. Excusing Failures o/Condition under Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 229? 
What if we were to take section 229 seriously as a source of guidance 
about how to treat insurance policy conditions? Would section 229 help us 
to understand the instinct to treat a notice condition differently than a rodent 
exclusion? Would it provide us with better tools for isolating just how a 
claims-made format may be inferior to an occurrence format? And what 
would it have to say about the application of a "notice-prejudice rule" to 
failures to satisfy a reporting clause in a claims-made policy? 
Section 229 forces us to ask and answer three questions: 1) Was 
satisfaction of the condition a "material part of the agreed exchange?" 2) 
What will be "the extent of the forfeiture" suffered by the insured if the 
condition is not excused? and 3) Will that forfeiture be disproportionate to 
the "protection that will be lost [by the insurer] if the non-occurrence of the 
condition is excused to the extent required to prevent forfeiture?" 
1. Was Satisfaction of the Condition a "Material Part of the 
Agreed Exchange?" 
In many contractual settings, whether occurrence of the condition was "a 
material part of the agreed exchange" may be among the most difficult parts 
of the section 229 inquiry. But in insurance, this first question need not 
detain us for long. Because insurance contracts are aleatory, the exchange 
condition in auto policy); Roberts Oil Co. v. Iransamerica Ins. Co., 833 P.2d 222 
(N.M. 1992) (same); Duerler v. Community Mut. Ins., No. 90AP-1337, 1991 WL 
60660 at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 18, 1991) (excuse of failure to satisfy cost 
management provision in medical expense coverage governed by § 229, but not 
available because provision was "material part of the agreed exchange"); Ashburn v. 
Safeco Ins. Co., 713 P.2d 742, 745 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (failure to satisfy one year 
suit clause not subject to excuse under § 229 because not a "condition precedent"); 
Mistler v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 2 Mass. L. Rptr. 619 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1994) (failure 
to satisfy cooperation clause said to pose question whether "loss of coverage is 
'disproportionate' to 'loss' caused the insurer" by the failure of condition). 
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that takes place is an exchange of the insured's premiums for the insurer's 
contingent promise to pay.233 Compliance with any condition other than 
payment of premiums usually will not be, in the sense in which the 
Restatement uses the term, a material part of the agreed exchange.234 All the 
policy conditions may be material in the sense that they provide protection to 
the insurer against potential costs, and some failures of condition will 
certainly be material in the sense that the facts depart in significant ways from 
the assumptions under which the insurance was written. But that does not 
make every insurance condition-indeed any insurance condition qua 
condition-a material part of the agreed exchange.235 
233. See Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 900 F. Supp. 1489, 
1517 (D. Kan. 1995); Roberts Oil Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 833 P.2d 222,230-31 
(N.M. 1992). But see Duerler v. Community Mut. Ins., No. 90AP-1337, 1991 WL 
60660, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 18, 1991) (policy condition that medical treatment 
be obtained from approved provider said to be "material part of the agreed 
exchange"). 
234. "Where the promises of either or both parties to a bilateral contract are 
wholly or substantially aleatory, the promises are not for an agreed exchange of 
performances unless the promise of each party is conditional on the same fortuitous 
event." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 292 (1932). 
235. The analysis in the text is quite different from that proposed by Professors 
Burton and Andersen. In their view, "§ 229's requirement that the condition not be 
a material part of the agreed exchange" becomes "the materiality requirement of § 
229," and that requirement "turns on the importance of the term to the parties at the 
time the contract was made." BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 128, at 194-95. 
There are two objections to that reading. First, it ignores the Restatement's 
distinction between conditions that cannot be excused because "a material part of the 
agreed exchange" and conditions that cannot be excused because "uncertainty of the 
occurrence of the condition was an element of the risk assumed .... " RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84 (1981) (waiver); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 271 (impracticability). In non-aleatory contracts, the two categories 
of immune conditions may involve substantial overlap, but with insurance contracts 
most immune conditions will be so because "uncertainty of the occurrence was an 
element of the risk assumed" by the insured. "Waiver ... of the fire required by an 
insurance policy is not within this Section" not because having a fire was part of the 
agreed exchange, but because the risk of loss from a peril other than fire was "an 
element of the risk assumed" by the insured. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 84, cmt. c (1981) 
The second objection is even more important. In the Burton and Andersen 
approach, whether a particular policy provision is immune from excuse arguments 
under § 229 turns on a traditional ex ante inquiry into the importance of the policy 
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Consequently, in insurance we are free to go directly to the weighing of 
the consequences of excusing or not excusing the condition prescribed by 
section 229: 
In determining whether the forfeiture is disproportionate, a 
court must weigh the extent of the forfeiture by the obligee 
against the importance to the obligor of the risk from which 
he sought to be protected and the degree to which that 
protection will be lost if the non-{)ccurrence of the condition 
is excused to the extent required to prevent forfeiture.236 
2. What Will Be "The Extent of Forfeiture" Suffered by the 
Insured if the Condition Is Not Excused? 
According to the Restatement: 
"forfeiture" is used to refer to the denial of compensation 
that results when the obligee loses his right to the agreed 
condition to the insurer considering the entire array of different uses to which that 
condition might be put. But § 229 assumes that each policy condition is material in 
the sense that it will sometimes operate to protect the insurer from real costs the 
insurer wants to avoid. § 229 instead asks how the condition is being employed in the 
particular case. See id. at § 229 cmt. a. ("[T]his Section is concerned with forfeiture 
that would actually result if the condition was not excused."). Eisenberg refers to this 
as the "second look approach": 
If, in the scenario of imperfect fulfillment that actually occurred, a 
requirement of perfect fulfillment would result in a substantial loss 
to one party that is significantly out of proportion to the interest of 
the other in perfect fulfillment, and if the requirement of perfect 
fulfillment under that scenario appears to be one to which the 
parties would not have agreed if they has specifically adverted to 
the actual scenario, courts should not require perfect fulfillment 
unless it is established that the parties had a specific and well-
thought-through intention that perfect fulfillment be required in a 
scenario like the one that actually occurred. 
Eisenberg, supra note 93, at 240. 
236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 cmt. b (1981). 
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exchange after he has relied substantially, as by preparation 
or performance on the expectation of that exchange. The 
extent of the forfeiture in any particular case will depend on 
the extent of that denial of compensation)37 
What does that mean for an insurance case? It means that the "extent of 
the forfeiture" to be placed in the section 229 balance is the amount of 
recovery from the insurer that will not be available because of the failure of 
condition. If insured property is damaged, and the insurer refuses to pay 
because of a failure of condition, the insured suffers a forfeiture regardless of 
whether the claim is denied because the insurance had lapsed, the cause of 
loss was an excepted cause, a warranty was breached, or the notice was late. 
The second prong of the section 229 inquiry is not concerned with the reasons 
for the denial. It keeps our attention focused squarely on the impact of the 
failure of condition on the insured. And from that perspective, a "no" is still 
a "no," no matter how it is justified. The "extent of the forfeiture" is the 
extent of the compensation denied. 
At first blush, the conclusion that a forfeiture results whenever a failure 
of condition prevents recovery may seem less than obvious. After all, the 
Restatement does say that the insured suffers a forfeiture when he "loses his 
right to the agreed exchange after he has relied substantially,"238 and that 
language might appear to invite insurers and insureds to offer their competing 
understandings of the essential core of the agreed exchange. Insurers can dust 
off the standard-issue argument that an insurer has no present active duty to 
pay on a loss unless all conditions have been satisfied, and that a failure of 
condition therefore can not cause an insured to lose a "right" she never had. 
Insureds, attempting to adapt the same language and logic to their own ends, 
might be tempted to concede that the insurer's refusal to perform because the 
loss occurred outside the policy period or because it was caused by an 
excluded peril involves no forfeiture, because those conditions are "coverage-
defming," but to argue that a "technical only" nonprejudicial failure to satisfy 
a post-loss notice condition produces a forfeiture. 
The question thus exposed is whether we should rationalize our intuition 
that section 229 does not authorize us to excuse failure to satisfy a rodent 
exception by saying that the insured did not suffer a forfeiture of the agreed 
exchange, or by saying that, though the failure of condition created a 
forfeiture, we are unprepared to excuse that failure because the forfeiture was 
237.Id. (cross reference to § 227 cmt. b omitted). 
238.Id. (emphasis added). 
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not disproportionate to the protections thereby provided the insurer. The ftrst 
fonnulation would say that the insured did not lose what he bargained for: 
indemnification-for-loss-to-property-caused-by-jire-unless-jire-was-
caused-by-rodents. The second would say that the insured lost not only his 
house but also his claim to be indemnifted by the insurer, and thus suffered 
a forfeiture, but that we are not prepared to excuse that failure because the 
forfeiture was not disproportionate because applying the condition strictly 
shields the insurer from the risk "from which he sought to be protected" by 
including the rodent exception. 
The two-step approach is preferable, for several reasons. First, it is more 
consistent with the language of the Restatement, which elsewhere insists that 
most insurance policy conditions are not part of the agreed exchange239 and 
which clearly contemplates an inquiry both into whether the insured suffered 
a forfeiture and, if so, into whether its effect on the insured was 
disproportionate to hanns to the insurer that could have been avoided by 
compliance with the provision. Second, the alternative, to ask in each case 
whether the failure of condition caused the insured to lose "the agreed 
exchange," would condemn lawyers and judges to endless essentialist debates 
of the sort that in this country enervate efforts to apply the "Doctrine of 
Reasonable Expectations" and that in Britain and some former 
Commonwealth countries have condemned their counterparts to a gerbil-cage 
pursuit of the "core" or "essence" of a contractual undertaking hedged in by 
conditions.240 Anyone who has reviewed the claims-made litigation of the 
past decade, contemplated whether a failure to satisfy an exception clause 
should be treated as a "fundamental breach,"241 or has puzzled over the 
239. See supra note 235. 
240. See, e.g., Dafydd Jenkins, The Essence of the Contract, 27 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 
251 (1969). Much of the debate has swirled around the work of Professor Coote. See 
BRIAN COOTE, EXCEPTION CLAUSES (1964); Nyuk Chin, The Problem of Exception 
Clauses: A Theory of Performance Related Risks, 15 U. WEST. AUST. L. REV. 347 
(1983). 
241. In Karsales Ltd. v. Wallis, 1 W.L.R. 936 (C.A. 1956), Lord Denning gave 
the doctrine of fundamental breach its modem incarnation: "exempting clauses ... 
no matter how widely they are expressed, only avail the party when he is carrying out 
his contract in its essential respects." Id. at 940. The decision set off a world-wide 
hunt for a way to identify the "core" duties of contracts. As Professor Meyer 
explained: 
"fundamental obligation" would better express the doctrine's 
notion of an irreducible core duty, a duty which arises from the 
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implicit immunity of "coverage clauses" from warranty statutes,242 
incontestable c1auses,243 and equitable doctrines of waiver and estoppe1244 
will recognize the difficulties of a search for the "essence" of a contractual 
obligation.245 Consider, for example, the essentialist metaphysics required 
relationship created by the contract rather than from the specific 
terms. As an irreducible duty, it limits party autonomy to 
provisions outside the core and invalidates attempts to exempt or 
exculpate within the core. 
Alfred W. Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach, 
50 VA. L. REV. 1178, 1188-89 (1964). As the difficulties of that project became 
clear, the doctrine fell on hard times. In Suisse Atlantique Societe d 'Arment Maritime 
S.A. v. N. V. Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale, [1967] 1 AC. 361, the House of Lords 
rejected the principle and declared that courts had no general power to invalidate 
exemption clauses; it did, however, declare that the rule of construction that prima 
facie parties do not intend exemption clauses to protect against fundamental breaches 
retained its vitality. In Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transp. Ltd. [1980] A.C. 
827(H.L.}, the House of Lords confirmed that fundamental breach as a rule of law 
was dead, and indicated that the adoption of the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977 
relieved much of the pressure for judicial tools to police exemption clauses. Similar 
histories were written in former Commonwealth nations. Nevertheless, the habits of 
thought that gave rise to the project survive. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 117 (2d ed. 1971) ("Every contract 
contains some fundamental obligation which is the primary object of the whole 
contract."). For a sustained criticism of the project, see COOTE, supra note 240. 
242. See, e.g., JERRY, supra note 48, § 101 at 523-26 (describing difficulties in 
distinguishing regulated "warranties" from "coverage provisions"); Works, supra note 
200, at 232-50 (offering functional approach to classification of policy provisions 
subject to warranty statute). 
243. See, e.g., Works, supra note 197; William F. Young, "Incontestable" - As 
to What?, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 323. 
244. The difficulties of trying to distinguish between defensive and offensive use 
of waiver and estoppel in an insurance setting are summarized in Works, supra note 
197, at 820-23. See also PATTERSON, supra note 173, § 94; W.C. Crais III, 
Annotation, Comment Note: Doctrine of Estoppel or Waiver as Available to Bring 
Within Coverage of Insurance Policy Risks Not Covered by Its Terms or Expressly 
Excluded Therefrom, 1 AL.R.3d 1139 (1965). 
245. Professors Burton and Andersen provide a good demonstration of the 
difficulties. In their view, "confusion about when and why express conditions should 
be enforced" can be "eased by recognizing that many conditions serve to enforce the 
agreement, not to define the required performance." BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra 
note 128, at 8. "If the condition is an enforcement term, good faith allows it to be 
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for any dispute about whether a notice condition in an ordinary homeowners' 
policy should be treated as part of the agreed exchange. Ifwe defme whether 
there is a forfeiture by whether the insured will get "the agreed exchange," 
that means that for notice provisions we must be willing to say that the agreed 
exchange should be interpreted to be "indemnijication-Jor-loss-to-property-
caused-by-fire-unless-fire-was-caused-by-rodents-but-not-if-notice-is-
not-given-within-l 0 days-and-the-insured-can-prove-that-the-insurer-
was-prejudiced" rather than "indemnijication-Jor-loss-to-property-caused-
by-fire-unless-fire-was-caused-by-rodents-but-not-if-notice-is-not-
given-within-10 days." Such a conceptualist effort to imagine answers to all 
questions ex ante is consistent with habits of contractual thought that imagine 
that all questions of application were presentiatated, explicitly or implicitly, 
at the time of contracting. But that is not the focus of Jacob & Youngs v. 
Kent, nor of the subterranean insurance traditions we have been exhuming, 
and it not the focus of section 229. Those traditions are self-consciously and 
aggressively ex post.246 
invoked only when doing so advances the purpose for which it was included in the 
agreement, without unnecessary cost to the party against whom enforcement is 
sought."!d. However, when "the purpose of the express condition is to qualify or 
describe performance, or to limit the circumstances under which it is due, rather than 
to provide incentives for its completion or compensation for its breach," id. at 305, 
the condition should be treated as a performance term which cannot be excused. 
Whatever the merits of this approach for non-aleatory contracts, in the insurance 
context the distinction between performance and enforcement terms does not advance 
us beyond the more familiar distinction between "coverage" and "noncoverage" 
provisions. Just as every insurance policy condition plausibly can be said to help 
establish what "coverage" the policy provides, so every insurance policy condition 
plausibly can be said to "qualify or describe [the insurer's] performance, or to limit 
the circumstances under which it is due." To make the distinctions necessary in the 
insurance context, we need a more robust version of what an insurer is trying to 
accomplish, and that requires a fuller appreciation of what sorts of risks the insurance 
contract is seeking to allocate. See generally infra section II.C.3. 
246. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 cmt. a (1981) provides in 
pertinent part: 
Although both this section and § 208, on unconscionable contract 
or term, limit freedom of contract, they are designed to reach 
different types of situations. While § 208 speaks of 
unconscionability "at the time the contact is made," this Section is 
concerned with forfeiture that would actually result if the condition 
were not excused. It is intended to deal with a term that does not 
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But there is a third reason as well. By treating every failure of condition 
as creating a forfeiture, and then asking if the forfeiture was disproportionate, 
we force ourselves to look where we should-at the impact of the failure of 
condition on the insurer. Much of modem insurance law reacts to the 
realities of insurance policy boilerplate by treating the insurer's purpose in 
employing the provision as less important than the insured's real or 
hypothetical purposes in purchasing the coverage. Under the Doctrine of 
Reasonable Expectations, the objective reasonable expectations of insureds 
-but not insurers-are determinative of coverage; under construction contra 
proferentem, if any meaning contrary to that intended by the insurer can be 
wrung from policy language, it can be declared ambiguous and given the 
meaning the insurer does not want. But under section 229, the insurer's 
purpose in employing the condition returns to center stage. If every failure 
of condition defense creates a forfeiture, then the proper question is whether 
the extent of that forfeiture is disproportionate to the harms to the insurer that 
could have been avoided by compliance with the condition. Sometimes 
compliance with a condition buys freedom for the insurer from costs that are 
commensurate with the costs imposed on the insured by failure of a that 
condition, and sometimes it does not. Sometimes the forfeiture is 
proportionate, and sometimes it is not. 
But when is a forfeiture "disproportionate?" Unless we can answer that 
question, we have accomplished nothing,247 
appear to be unconscionable at the time the contract is made but 
that would, because of ensuing events, cause forfeiture. 
See also Eisenberg, supra note 93 (emphasizing "second look" function of § 229). 
247. A preliminary draft of what became § 229 would have set a different 
standard. Rather than excusing failures of condition "to the extent that non-
occurrence of a condition would cause disproportionate forfeiture," RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) Of CONTRACTS § 255 (Tentative draft # 7, 1972), would have excused 
conditions "[t]o the extent that non-occurrence of a condition would cause extreme 
forfeiture." As Professor Murray noted at the time, "the difficulties in determining 
whether the non-occurrence of the condition is 'relatively unimportant' to the obligor 
and whether the forfeiture is 'extreme' should not be underestimated." JOHN E. 
MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 168, at 331 (2d ed. 1974). See also infra notes 
274-288 and accompanying text. 
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3. When Is a Forfeiture Disproportionate? 
We begin our search for a way to distinguish disproportionate from other 
forfeitures by returning yet again to the deceptively simple question: What 
do we mean when we say that the coverage provided by an insurance policy 
is "less?" Ignoring for the moment whether we mean less than would be 
provided by another policy, or less than the insured wanted, less than is 
warranted by the price, or less than something else,248 we usually mean that 
the insurer is assuming less risk, and the insured is retaining more risk, than 
would be the case under some other alternative.249 That is consistent with the 
conventional understanding that an insurance contract is one choice among 
the classic alternatives for dealing with risk. In the usual telling, a person 
facing a risk of, for example, fire loss can choose to retain that risk, can take 
steps to eliminate or to reduce that risk, or can transfer that risk.250 Insurance 
contracts involve a transfer of risks from insured to insurer: the insured takes 
on a certain present cost in order to avoid an uncertain future cost; the insurer 
takes on an uncertain future liability in order to obtain a present premium. 
We often fmd it convenient to think and talk as though it really were that 
simple. Absent the fire insurance contract, we say, the risk of a fire loss 
would have been borne by the insured; with the insurance contract to transfer 
that risk, the burden of the loss will be borne by the insurer. Because the 
collision coverage was subject to a $250 deductible, we say, the collision 
insurer will pay $350 of the $600 repair bill; had there been no deductible, the 
risk of the entire $600 loss would have been transferred to the insurer. In 
248. For thoughtful treatments of the difficulties if we try to move beyond the 
assumption that value is measured by the price willingly paid by informed buyers and 
willingly taken by informed sellers, see ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS 
AND ECONOMICS (1993); HENRY WOO, COGNITION, VALUE & PRICE: A GENERAL 
THEORY OF VALUE (1992). 
249. Of course, the characterization is not limited to insurance contracts; we are 
all accustomed to thinking of contracts of all kinds as ways of allocating risks 
between the contracting parties. See, e.g., OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LA W 
239 (1881) (characterizing contracts as a "wager" on uncertain future events); 
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 92-93 (3d ed. 1986) (contracts as 
device for allocating future uncertainties). But see Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of 
Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933) (emphasizing role of contract law in 
distributing unallocated risks). 
250. One near--canonical statement of the choices, drawing on early theoreticians 
of risk in this country and Europe, is ALAN WILLETT, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF 
RISK AND INSURANCE 71-89 (1951). 
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such casual modeling, we assume that the expected value of the risk will 
remain the same whether it is borne by the insured or by the insurer or is 
carved up between them.251 If pressed, we may point to different risk 
preferences, or the insurer's superior ability to diversify, to explain why an 
insured sometimes will be willing to pay a premium in order to be relieved 
of a risk and an insurer sometimes will be willing to assume a risk that the 
insured is willing to pay to avoid.252 
But, of course, it really is not that simple. Insurance involves the 
combination as well as the transfer of risks, and with increased numbers 
comes a reduction in uncertainty; as a result, "[t)he risk that an insurance 
company carries is far less than the sum of the risks of the insured[s)."253 
Moreover, when we separate control of an activity from responsibility for the 
costs of that activity,254 we create moral hazard.255 The fire insurance 
251. This way of thinking is bred in the bones. Thus, Professor Chirelstein: 
In general, the function of a contractual condition is to place the 
risk of the non-occurrence of the critical event on one party rather 
than the other. One speaks of "risk" in this connection because the 
failure of a condition would often entail a loss, or at least a 
disadvantage, to one of the parties, with some corresponding 
advantage or immunity to the other. 
MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS 99 (3d ed. 1998). 
252. See, e.g., CHARLES 1. GOETZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW & 
ECONOMICS (1984). "Risk transferral thus reduces risk costs when an otherwise 
unchanged risk is reallocated to a person who, merely for psychological reasons, 
attaches a lower certainty equivalent to the risk." Id. at 123. Of course, the 
willingness of a commercial insurer to assume a risk that the insurer will pay to avoid 
has less to do with differences in psychological attitudes toward risk than with the 
insurer's superior ability to diversify by pooling the risk with other independent risks. 
Pooling permits the insurer to reduce the variance around the mean, and that reduction 
in uncertainty makes the expected value of the aggregated risks less than the sum of 
the individual risks being pooled. 
253. WILLETT, supra note 250, at 73. 
254. See NEIL DOHERTY, INSURANCE PRICING AND Loss PREVENTION 6 (1976). 
255. The classic economic treatments of moral hazard include Kenneth 1. Arrow, 
Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 
(1963); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL 1. ECON. 74 
(1979); Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. 
REV. 531 (1968); Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and 
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contract may cause the risk of loss by fire to "mutate"~256 the insured, by 
virtue of the fire insurance contract, may have less-or more257 -incentive 
Agent Relationship, 10 BELL 1. ECON. 55 (1979); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Risk, Incentives, 
and Insurance: The Pure Theory of Moral Hazard, 8 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 
4 (1983). For important recent contributions, see HEIMER, supra note 129; Tom 
Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEx. L. REV. 237 (1996); Ralph A. 
Winter, Moral Hazard and Insurance Contracts, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO INSURANCE 
ECONOMICS 61 (Georges Dionne ed., 1992). 
256. See DOHERTY, supra note 254, at l. As Doherty notes, "moral hazard" is 
used in at least two senses: 
In one sense, moral hazard refers to abuses of insurance protection 
which relate to deficiency of character on the part of the insured, 
for example, faking a claim or exaggerating its amount or even 
deliberate destruction of property in order to claim the insurance 
money. . .. A broader interpretation, sometimes called morale 
hazard, refers to factors such as carelessness and indifference 
which may not suggest moral deficiency but still refer to 
personality traits which react with the security of insurance 
protection. 
!d. at 2. But that "narrow and emotive" focus distracts from the more important sense 
in which insurance contracts create moral hazard: 
!d. at 3. 
Whilst the contract of insurance transfers incentives for loss 
prevention to the insurer, it is rarely accompanied by a 
corresponding right to interfere with the insured's life, activity or 
property. There is a separation of incentive and control. 
Nevertheless, the insurer is not without bargaining power since he 
may vary the terms and conditions on which he goes on cover. 
There may be a system of premium reductions and lor extensions 
of cover if the insured does specific things to reduce the risk. 
Alternatively, there may be premium penalties, exclusions of cover 
or threatened withdrawal of cover altogether in the face of adverse 
features of the risk. A third possibility is that insurance premiums 
may be directly related to claims experience such that bad risks 
will, on average, pay more for their insurance than good risks. It 
is therefore clear that the pricing of insurance and the conditions of 
cover may create a system of secondary incentives for loss 
prevention .... 
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to install sprinklers, to avoid smoking in bed, or to preserve damaged 
property after a fire,258 Insurance, thus, not only transfers risks and reduces 
risks; it also may change risks by affecting the likelihood that a loss will 
occur and by affecting the likely magnitude of any loss that does occur. 
Though we are correct in thinking that an insurance contract transfers a 
quantum of risk from insured to insurer, if we are careful we will 
acknowledge that the effects of diversification and of moral hazard may make 
the expected value of the risk borne by the insurer different than would be the 
expected value of the risk if it were retained by the insured. 
And it gets more complicated in less familiar ways. Insurance contracts 
are not self-executing. Even a simple insured fire loss must be adjusted to 
determine the fact and amount of the insurer's obligation. Often there will be 
uncertainties about the contract, the law, the facts, and how the law and 
contract will be applied to the facts,259 Answering such questions involves 
loss adjustment costs and uncertainty costs for both insurer and insured. 
Economists, when they do not assume such costs away, speak generically of 
"transaction costs," or more specifically of "decision costs," "probable error 
costs," "implementation costs," "enforcement costs," or the risk that the 
contract will prove "unverifiable"; in the language of insurance law 
associated with Edwin Patterson, these are costs attributable to "juridical 
257. See Isaac Ehrlich & Gary Becker, Market Insurance, Self Insurance, and 
Self-Protection, 80 J. POL. ECON. 623 (1972), who argue that if insurance is 
structured to provide price or other incentives for increased prevention activities, 
increases in insurance protection may actually lead to increases in prevention 
activities - a phenomenon that has been dubbed "moral imperative." See Chunchi 
Wu & Peter Colwell, Moral Hazard and Moral Imperative 55 J. RISK & INS. 10 1 
(1988). 
258. Insurance texts emphasize that moral hazard has both an ex ante and an ex 
post character. The first deals with the insured's altered incentives to avoid loss; the 
second deals with the insured's altered incentives to mitigate losses after they have 
occurred. Deductibles are widely regarded as the insurer's chief practical technique 
for controlling moral hazard; however, a deductible perversely may enhance moral 
hazard by creating incentives to inflate claims to get above the deductible. See 
Richard J. Butler & John D. Worrrall, Claims Reporting and Risk Bearing Moral 
Hazard in Workers' Compensation, 57 J. RISK & INS. 191 (1991). 
259. "Law must be applied, and it is applied by a system of courts and 
administrative agencies in which the human element is all too apparent." Spencer 
Kimball, Nature of the Liability Hazard, PROPERTY & LIABILITY INSURANCE 
HANDBOOK 447, 457 (J. Long & D. Gregg eds., 1965). 
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hazards."260 Though introductory insurance texts-perhaps because they 
tend to focus on potential causes of "loss" rather than potential causes of 
"costs"-do not give "juridical hazard" the same prominence as "physical 
hazard" and "moral hazard" as potential sources of burdens insurers assume 
by underwriting an insurance contract, the real-world importance of 
"juridical hazard" clearly is reflected in a variety of insurance practices and 
institutions, not the least of which is the accounting prac,tice that expresses 
the insurer's burden as the sum of "loss costs" and "loss adjustment 
expenses." 
How does this venture into bargain-basement scholasticism help us to 
understand the role of conditions in insurance contracts and insurance law? 
At the least, it offers a vocabulary that will permit us to be more precise about 
just what costs will be borne by whom when an insurer and an insured include 
various kinds of provisions in an insurance contract, and it provides a warning 
that the casual conventions that treat policy provisions as allocating discrete 
and immutable risks to either the insured or the insurer must be approached 
with some caution. Risk, after all, is in this setting a probability statement 
about the likely incidence and magnitude of costs; potential and actual 
costs-whether they are occasioned by physical, moral, or juridical hazards-
should be the focus of our attention. 
Of course, we know that an insurer need not take on responsibility for all 
of these potential costs. It can use marketing strategies and underwriting 
rules and price to make sure that some risks are not added to its portfolio, and 
it can use insurance policy provisions to identify conditions that must be 
satisfied if the insurer is to become obligated to perform. And therein lies the 
260. PATIERSON, supra note 173, §§ 66-69 at 272-98. As Patterson explained: 
If the elements of coverage were unambiguously defined and if the 
insured fully understood and honestly abided by them, or even if 
all the facts were indisputably ascertained and the terms of the 
contract infallibly applied by court and jury, insurers could get 
along with fewer conditions. These "ifs" are violent assumptions. 
!d. at 200. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts 0/ Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom 
o/Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 631 (1943), employed the term more as it is 
used among members of the lay insurance community: "The insurance business 
probably deserves credit also for having first realized the full importance of the so-
called 'juridical risk,' the danger that a court or jury will be swayed by 'irrational 
factors' to decide against a powerful defendant." 
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second set of complications: as we have seen, express conditions can be very 
blunt instruments for limiting the risks to which the insurer is subject. 
A few simple examples will help to explain why some express conditions 
carry the potential for disproportionate forfeitures and some do not. Consider 
first the way an auto insurance policy allocates the costs of an ordinary 
insured fender-bender: the policy provides that, if damage to the insured 
automobile is caused by collision, the insurer will pay repair costs in excess 
of a $250 deductible. If the cost to repair the automobile to its pre-collision 
value is $600, we expect $350 of those costs to be borne by the insurer and 
$250 of those costs to be borne by the insured, and we feel comfortable 
saying that the insured retained the risk of the first $250 in collision damage 
and transferred the risk of damage above that deductible to the insurer. Of 
course, when we think and talk that way we are ignoring other costs of the 
collision that go unmentioned in the policy language. The insured must miss 
a couple of hours of work to secure appraisals of the damage; he may have 
transportation costs while the car is being repaired; he certainly will regard 
the whole process as an unfortunate aggravation. And the insurer's costs 
attributable to the accident are not limited to $350; at the least there will be 
loss adjustment costs that can be allocated to this collision claim. But though 
a fully-specified, fully-nuanced risk-allocating contract would spell out who 
will bear the burden of each of these costs, the insurance policy's bar€}-bones 
conditional promise to pay repair costs in excess of $250 accomplishes the 
same results by maintaining an eloquent silence about these additional costs. 
If there is no mention of lost wages or rental car costs or loss adjustment 
costs, those costs will remain where they fall. 
But what if we complicate things a little more by asking how we should 
understand the risk allocation worked by the deductible applicable to the 
collision coverage? We felt comfortable saying that the risk of collision 
damage of less than $250 was not among the risks transferred to the insurer; 
therefore that risk was retained by the insured. But is the quantum of risk 
avoided by the insurer by virtue of the deductible really equivalent to the 
quantum of risk retained by the insured as a result of the deductible? Not 
exactly, for risk is a compound of physical, moral, and juridical hazards, and 
the net expected value of a risk may differ depending upon which party is 
being asked to bear it. Making the collision coverage subject to a deductible, 
insurers hope, will give the insured additional incentives to forgo the extra 
trip to the store in freezing rain, and make it more likely that minor bumps 
will go unreported and unfixed and unadjusted and unpaid. Here the language 
of risk allocation fits less well, for adding the deductible to the auto policy 
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does not simply allocate a discrete, fixed, and fmite risk to the insured; it 
actually makes the total quantum of risk to be divided up between the parties 
less than if would be if there were no deductible. And this sort of inevitable 
mismatch between the quantum of risk avoided by the insurer and the 
quantum of risk retained by the insured as a result of policy conditions is not 
limited to deductibles and other policy provisions explicitly aimed at 
controlling moral and juridical hazards. Even a provision apparently intended 
to eliminate a physical hazard from the insurer's calculus of concerns-for 
example, the homeowners policy provision excepting from coverage "loss ... 
caused by rodents"-will affect moral and juridical hazard as well, so that the 
net expected value of the risks allocated by that provision also may differ 
depending upon which party is being asked to bear them. 
Still, such academic quibbles should not prevent us from taking 
advantage of the simplifying verbal shorthand of "risk allocation." Insurance 
policy provisions like deductibles and rodent exceptions do function as 
devices for allocating risks between insurer and insured. Liability limits, 
deductibles, coinsurance provisions, and terms defming the duration of the 
contract, covered and excluded kinds of loss, and covered and excluded 
causes of loss all usefully can be regarded as techniques by which the insurer, 
in the language of the Restatement, "makes an event a condition of his duty 
in order to shift to the obligee the risk of its nonoccurrence."261 Such 
"coverage provisions" share an intrinsic complementarity that allows us to 
equate what the coverage is with the insurer's burden and what the coverage 
is not with the insured's burden. If the condition has been satisfied, then the 
insurer must bear some costs that otherwise would have fallen on the insured; 
nonoccurrence of a condition means that the insured will bear some costs that 
otherwise would have been shifted to the insurer. In that sense, policy 
conditions allocate risks between insurer and insured, and usually we need not 
pause to point out that the risks avoided by virtue of the provision may not 
have exactly the same expected value as the risks thereby retained. 
But for some kinds of insurance policy conditions, most visibly notice 
and other loss-adjustment conditions, continuing warranties, and evidentiary 
conditions, the potential mismatch is fundamentally different. For example, 
when a personal automobile insurer makes prompt notice of loss a condition 
of its duty to perform, we understand that the insurer is trying to avoid costs 
associated with late notice--costs that we would classify as the product of 
26l. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § X (TopiC 5. Conditions and 
Similar Events. Introductory Note) (1981). 
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juridical hazard.262 But is it helpful to say that the insurer is using the notice 
condition to allocate to the insured the risk of having to bear those costs? We 
can imagine a policy provision that unambiguously would do exactly that, by 
providing that the insured rather than the insurer shall bear any costs caused 
by untimely notice; under such a nuanced risk-allocation provision, if the 
insurer were forced by the delay in the notice to conduct a more expensive 
investigation, the extra costs of that investigation would be paid by the 
insured. But insurers typically do not include such narrowly-tailored 
provisions to shift the costs of noncompliance with the notice provision from 
insurer to insured.263 Instead, they employ an express condition that operates 
262. The classic ascription of purpose to notice conditions was provided in 
Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 371 A.2d 193, 197 (pa. 1977): 
[A] reasonable notice clause is designed to protect the insurance 
company from being placed in a substantially less favorable 
position than it would have been in had timely notice been 
provided, e.g., being forced to pay a claim against which it has not 
had an opportunity to defend effectively. In short, the function of 
a notice requirement is to protect the insurance company's interests 
from being prejudiced. 
See generally WINDT, supra note 21, § 1.04. 
263. 
In the absence of transaction costs, an ideal insurance arrangement 
would address these contingencies, specifying the exact proof 
required to "establish" essential facts, the circumstances under 
which the insurer must respond to doubt about the facts by 
incurring additional costs of investigation, and the disposition of 
the claim pending the outcome of additional investigation or 
litigation. It would be attentive to the relative burden of 
establishing the facts, placing the costs of establishing them on the 
party that can bear them most cheaply ... 
Given the range of contractual provisions in play and the way in 
which the optimal bargain may depend on particular facts and 
circumstances, however, we might anticipate that the transaction 
costs of addressing these matters expressly wiII often exceed the 
benefits ex ante and that insurance contracts will then fail to 
provide much guidance as to the appropriate treatment of factual 
uncertainties. Indeed, express attention to the treatment of factual 
uncertainties in insurance agreements appears to be fairly rare. 
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quite differently: when notice is late, the condition shields the insurer from 
juridical hazards associated with late notice, but it does so by excusing the 
insurer from any obligation to perfonn and by denying all recovery to the 
insured. This potential mismatch between the costs that the insurer avoids 
when the condition is satisfied and the costs that the insured bears when the 
condition is not satisfied is different in kind from the rather incidental 
mismatches due to moral hazard and juridical hazard we encountered with the 
deductible and the rodent exception. The condition purports to authorize the 
insurer to deny all obligations to the insured whether or not the failure of 
condition prejudiced the insurer.264 
The same phenomenon can be seen at work in "continuing warranties" 
employed by insurers to control their exposure to moral and physical 
hazards.265 Consider, for example, the once--common provision in property 
Alan O. Sykes, "Bad Faith" Breach o/Contract by First-Party Insurers, 25 1. LEGAL 
STUD. 405, 424-25 (1996) (noting one exception: travel insurance with elaborate 
provisions governing presumption of death). Compared to the complete contingent 
claims contract with which Professor Sykes is comparing standard insurance policy 
forms, that is doubtless true. But insurance policies do display efforts to deal with 
factual uncertainties, most notably by employing express conditions that turn on 
easily-established facts rather than real object of the insurer's concern. 
264. Of course, an insurer need not assert a defense every time the policy 
language provides a colorable argument that a claim is not covered. What in 
Scandinavian insurance circles is called kulanse, see, e.g., Knut S. Selmer, Gratuitous 
Deviationfrom the Terms o/Form Contracts: Scandinavian Insurance Companies' 
Administration o/Deferred Acceptance-of-Risk Clauses, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 502,503 
(1966), and in this country sometimes is called a payment ex gratia, is simply 
recognition of the discretion that broadly-framed policy language can confer. 
Apparently that recognition is sometimes formalized in claims adjustment manuals: 
"If there is six months to a year delay, use your discretion relative to acceptance if 
there is no prejudice." AETNA TECHNICAL CLAIM MANUAL B-5-1 (Oct. 1977), 
quoted in Anderson, Draconian Forfeitures, supra note 232, at 862-69. In legal 
terms, the result often is characterized as a ''waiver.'' See generally RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84 (1981). See also Baker & McElrath, supra note 134 
(exploring exercise of discretion in adjustment of claims). 
265. See generally PATTERSON, supra note 173, §§ 53-55 at 199-204 (detailing 
a "conception of warranty that includes the purposes for which warranties are used, 
the legal consequences which flow from noncompliance, and the evils or injustices 
that ameliorative statutes are intended to remedy"); Edwin Patterson, Warranties in 
Insurance Law, 34 COLUM. L. REv. 595 (1934); Edwin Patterson, The Apportionment 
o/Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 335 (1924). William 
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insurance policies declaring the policy void "if the property ... shall be 
encumbered by mortgage."266 The primary purpose of such provisions was 
unremarkable: to alleviate insurer concerns that less-than-full ownership of 
insured property might entail greater moral hazard than if the insured's 
interest were full. But the method of the moral hazard warranties created the 
same potential for a fundamental mismatch between the costs the insurer 
avoids when the condition is satisfied and the costs the insured bears when 
the condition is not satisfied as do notice provisions and other loss adjustment 
conditions explicitly aimed at controlling the insurer's exposure to juridical 
hazards. In theory, an insurer who recognized that informational asymmetries 
and quantification difficulties will make it impossible to price the moral 
hazard posed by a mortgage on the property could choose to limit its exposure 
to the most egregious manifestations of moral hazard by crafting a narrowly 
tailored exception from coverage for losses "caused by reduced incentives 
to care resulting from a change in the insured's ownership interest." Such a 
provision would respond directly to the insurer's concerns about having its 
costs increased by moral hazard, but-as the recent history of "expected or 
intended" litigation demonstrates-that formulation obviously would present 
the insurer with a considerable juridical hazard. A provision declaring the 
policy void "if the property ... shall be encumbered by mortgage" involves 
much less juridical hazard than would one that required the insurer to show 
that partial ownership contributed to the loss, for the simple reason that a trip 
to the register of deeds for proof of a failure of condition usually will be much 
easier than would be a courtroom safari through the insured's psyche or soul. 
But this effort to avoid the juridical hazards associated with more nuanced 
risk allocation provisions comes at a price: a potential mismatch between the 
costs avoided by the insurer when the provision is satisfied and the costs 
borne by the insured when it is not. 
R. Vance, The History o/the Development o/Warranty in Insurance Law, 20 YALE 
L.J. 523 (1911), is much less helpful, for it focuses chiefly on the struggle over 
whether insurers would be allowed to convert pre-issuance underwriting 
representations into warranties in order to avoid the materiality and other limitations 
of the law governing rescission on the grounds of misrepresentation. See note 196 
supra and accompanying text. The warranties we are considering are those which 
would be satisfied, or not, by what occurs during the term of the policy. 
266. See generally PATTERSON, supra note 173, § 68 at 280-90; George W. 
Goble, The Moral Hazard Clauses o/the Standard Fire Insurance Policy, 37 COLUM. 
L. REV. 410 (1937). 
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So too with physical hazard warranties. It is not difficult for us to 
imagine the concerns about physical hazards that prompted insurers to 
include "vacancy or unoccupancy" clauses in their property insurance 
policies. And it is not difficult to understand why they did not choose to 
frame those clauses to except from coverage losses "caused by" vacancy and 
unoccupancy. Such a provision would require that the insurer demonstrate a 
causal nexus between the fact that the owners were on sabbatical in New 
Zealand and destruction of their house by a covered peril. In some proportion 
of fires that occur while the owners are away, the insurer will not be able to 
convince the trier of fact of the causal nexus; even when it succeeds, the 
effort may prove costly. By crafting the policy as a warranty that will be 
violated if the loss occurs ''while'' the house is vacant or unoccupied, the 
insurer can avoid even having to try. Choosing a ''while'' formulation rather 
than a "caused by" formulation thus produces a reduction in the expected 
value of the insurer's loss costs and loss adjustment costs under the policy, 
but it also creates a potential that the insured will suffer a forfeiture that is 
disproportionate to the costs the insurer thereby avoids. 
Evidentiary conditions like the familiar "visible external marks of forced 
entry" requirement of some theft coverages267 pose the same potential for a 
267. "External marks" conditions are the most familiar example of evidentiary 
conditions, chiefly because they posed the problem for two judicial decisions that are 
much studied in American law schools. See Ferguson v. Phoeniz Assur. Co., 370 
P.2d 379,387 (Kan. 1962) ("[W]here a rule of evidence is imposed by provision of 
an insurance policy, as here, the assertion of such rule by the insurance carrier, 
beyond the reasonable requirements necessary to prevent fraudulent claims against 
it in proof of the substantive conditions imposed by the policy, contravenes the public 
policy of this state."); C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 
(Iowa 1975) (placing result on grounds of "reasonable expectations," "implied 
warranty," and "unconscionabilty"). Together the two opinions provide a mini 
catalog of the sort of ex ante regulatory perspectives that still dominate the thinking 
in insurance. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 128, prefer their "good faith in 
enforcement" analysis. 
Another fecund source of evidentiary condition litigation are conditions found 
in policies that promise benefits if the insured dies, or is disabled, or suffers a 
dismemberment, as a result of an accident. In order to avoid the juridical hazard 
associated with such causal inquiries, insurers sometimes condition liability on proof 
that the death, disability, or dismemberment occurred within a specified period of 
time. See generally Eric M. Holmes, Interpreting an Insurance Policy in Georgia: 
The Problem of the Evidentiary Condition, 12 GA. L. REV. 783 (1978); William 
Young, Insurance Policy Defenses: In Search of Restatements, 34 ARK. L. REV. 507, 
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mismatch between costs avoided by the insurer when the condition is 
satisfied and costs borne by the insured when it is not. We can acknowledge 
the legitimacy of the insurer's wish to limit its exposure to some juridical 
uncertainties about whether a theft, as opposed to an inside job, really 
occurred, but at the same time recognize that failure to narrowly tailor the 
evidentiary condition to serve that purpose could pennit denial of a claim 
even when there is no doubt that a theft occurred. But with evidentiary 
conditions there is at least a taxonomic difference. Compliance with the 
notice condition and moral and physical hazard warranties usually will be 
within the control of the insured. Those provisions could be characterized as 
designed to create incentives for the insured to provide timely notice, leave 
the property unmortgaged, and keep furniture and people in the insured 
dwelling, and the insurer's failure to more narrowly tailor those conditions to 
fit those purposes could be explained in at least two ways: as an effort to 
avoid the juridical hazards that would result from the use of more nuanced 
provisions, or as an effort to create even more powerful incentives to comply. 
Just as contracts scholars speculate that basketball fanatics who worry that 
default rule damage measures may not give the bus driver with whom they 
have contracted sufficient incentives to get them to the tournament on time, 
and may thus bargain for a contract provision requiring super-compensatory 
damages in the event of breach in order to create additional incentives for 
timely perfonnance,268 so we might imagine that insurers employ broadly 
framed strict conditions in order to create a threat of a complete forfeiture as 
an added inducement to the insured to make sure that the conditions are 
satisfied. But with evidentiary conditions, that alternative explanation for the 
broadly-framed condition is not available. The point of the evidentiary 
condition requiring visible external marks is not to change the insured's 
conduct. The point is to avoid a juridical hazard. 
Still, our concerns about the potential mismatch between risk avoided and 
risk retained occasioned by such provisions do not depend on whether we 
think a particular policy condition was drafted to playa "risk allocation" or 
"incentive creating" role. Whether we understand the overbreadth to be the 
product of sloppy drafting, a conscious program to minimize juridical hazard, 
521-23 (1981); Laurent B. Frantz, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Provision 
in Accident Insurance Policy Limiting Coverage for Death or Loss of Member to 
Death or Loss Occurring Within Specified Period After Accident, 39 A.L.R.3D 1311 
(1971). 
268. The hypothetical Case of the Anxious Alumnus was introduced in Goetz & 
Scott, supra note 145, at 578-79. 
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an effort to create supercompensatory incentives, or a cynical effort to create 
random defenses of the sort so often encountered in comic strips, in 
application it may operate as a kind of penalty provision, and-as Justice· 
Peters recognized-in those circumstances noncompliance should be excused 
to the extent necessary to prevent disproportionate forfeiture. 
We can now attempt a modest and provisional summation of the way 
section 229 should be applied to failures of insurance policy conditions. An 
insured who does not recover on a fIre policy because a rodent exception was 
not satisfIed suffers a forfeiture, but the forfeiture is not disproportionate 
because the provision operates to protect the insurer from the very costs that 
are thereby assigned to the insured. However, an insured who does not 
recover on a fIre policy because a notice condition was not satisfIed suffers 
a forfeiture that mayor may not be disproportionate depending upon how the 
failure to satisfy the notice condition affected the insurer. In both cases, ''the 
coverage is less" in the sense that the insured is bearing more risk than would 
have been the case if the condition were not present, "and so, therefore, is the 
cost." But less is a "syntactically mobile modifIer"269 and section 229 asks 
us to consider whether the coverage afforded the insured is less in quite a 
different sense: less than it need be in order to achieve the insurer's purpose 
in employing the condition. The rodent exception cannot make the coverage 
"less" in this second sense, for it subjects the insured to the risk of forfeiture 
of all claims for rodent damage in order to protect the insurer from the risk 
of having to pay for rodent damage. However, the notice condition may make 
the coverage less in this second sense, for it subjects the insured to the risk of 
forfeiture in order to protect the insurer from some of the costs associated 
with claims adjustments--costs that in particular cases may range from zero 
to well in excess of the value of the insured's claim. 
Of course, this sort of imbalance does not make an auto policy with a 
notice provision substantively unfair, any more than the rodent exception 
made the homeowners policy substantively unfair. Viewed ex ante, which is 
the only proper perspective when the question is whether a provision is to be 
treated as an enforceable part of the contract, it makes sense to say of all these 
conditions: "the coverage is less, but so, therefore, is the cost." But section 
229 tells us to take a "second look" ex post at provisions that undeniably are 
a part of the contract in order to determine whether on particular facts a 
failure to satisfy the condition should be excused, and sometimes from that 
vantage loss adjustment conditions, warranties, and evidentiary conditions 
269. George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 
953 (1985). 
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will be seen to work a fundamental mismatch between the costs that would 
have been avoided by the insurer if the condition had been satisfied and the 
costs the insurer says should b~ borne by the insured because the condition 
was not satisfied. 
Does that mean that an insurer is acting in "bad faith" if denies what is 
clearly an otherwise covered theft claim because a "visible external marks" 
condition has not been satisfied? Professors Burton and Andersen say 
"yes."270 Does that mean that any insurer who invokes a failure of condition 
defense when to do so is not necessary to protect the insurer against the costs 
that prompted inclusion of the provision is behaving "opportunistically?" 
That is the label employed by Professor Muris and a number of other 
commentators.271 Of course, so long as "bad faith" and "opportunism" are 
deployed within texts where their meanings and consequences can be 
carefully controlled, there is no reason to quarrel with these characterizations. 
But in application, where the critical differences between Professor 
Andersen's "contractual bad faith in enforcement" and the bad faith that gives 
rise to extra-contractual damages may prove illusive,272 the rhetoric that asks 
whether a particular failure of condition should be excused in order to avoid 
a disproportionate forfeiture can claim important advantages. In conventional 
270. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 128, at 194. They acknowledge that 
"[t]he effect of such holdings [under section 229] is often identical to that of an 
application of the good faith in enforcement analysis." Nevertheless, they conclude: 
"The good faith analysis provides a more focused approach to achieving the end 
sought by § 229." Id. Elsewhere, Burton and Andersen provide this capsule 
summary: 
.... [I]f the facts of the particular case make it plain that the safe 
burglary was not an inside job, then the court is justified in 
declining to give effect to the condition. Doing so would fail to 
advance the purpose for which the condition was included in the 
agreement in the first place. Claiming the benefit of it for other 
reasons would be bad faith. 
Steven J. Burton & Eric G. Andersen, The World of a Contract, 75 IOWA L. REv. 861, 
874 (1990) (citation omitted). 
271. See generally authorities cited supra note 95. 
272. For an exploration of the way in which "fear of imposing exemplary 
damages for breach of implied duties ... led the Texas Supreme Court to gut the 
doctrine of good faith in contract," see Mark Gergen, A Cautionary Tale About 
Contractual Good Faith in Texas, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1235,1237 (1994). 
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usage, "bad faith" and "opportunism" carry connotations of blameworthiness 
and breach of duty that we may be reluctant to ascribe to an adjuster or 
lawyer who believes in the strict common law rule and uses it to justify 
denying a claim on the basis of a technical failure of condition. Section 229 
trains attention where it should be: on the effect of the failure of condition on 
the insurer. 
Even those who see in section 229 an analog to more familiar 
mechanisms for ex post policing of limited remedies and penalty provisions 
may resist this effort to lay a section 229 template over insurance cases. Thus, 
their argument might go, in neither the rodent damage case nor the late notice 
case is the forfeiture "disproportionate" because the fmancial consequences 
to the insurer when there is compliance with the condition are commensurate 
with the financial consequences to the insured when there is not compliance. 
If a house covered by fue insurance suffers $100,000 in damages, that 
$100,000 loss will be borne by the insurer ifthe damage was caused by fire 
and all other conditions were satisfied; however, the $100,000 loss will be 
borne by the insured if the damage was caused by rodents, or if the notice 
was not timely, or if any other policy condition was not satisfied. Thus, the 
argument might go, there is nothing disproportionate about a result that 
denies compensation to an insured because of a failure of condition-any 
failure of condition. 
This argument misunderstands the question the Restatement poses for us. 
Under section 229 we are not to compare the fmancial consequences to the 
insurer of compliance with all conditions (insurer pays) with the financial 
consequences to the insured of noncompliance with even one condition 
(insurer does not pay). Rather, we are to compare the costs avoided by the 
insurer when there is compliance with the condition with the costs avoided 
by the insurer (and thus borne by the insured) when noncompliance with the 
condition gives the insurer a defense.273 When we put a failure to satisfy a 
273. Although a focus on the relative impact of compliance and noncompliance 
on the insurer might seem to shift attention away from the forfeiture suffered by the 
insured when there is a successful failure of condition defense, we must remember 
that there is no question about the extent of the insured's forfeiture: it equals the 
amount of the insurer's nonpayment. The question is whether that forfeiture is 
"disproportionate." To what? To the costs caused by noncompliance with the 
condition. Framing the question in this way keeps attention on the relevant issue: 
does enforcing the term "advance the purposes for which it is included in the 
agreement without imposing needless costs on the [insured]." BURTON & ANDERSEN, 
supra note 128, at 194. See also Gergen, supra note 142, at 70 ("Disproportionate 
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rodent condition on the section 229 scales, we fmd that the cost avoided by 
the insurer and thus borne by the insured by virtue of a successful failure of 
condition defense ($100,000 in damages caused by rodents) is at least roughly 
commensurate with the cost that would have been avoided by the insurer had 
the condition been satisfied ($100,000 in damages caused by rodents). The 
same will be true of most insurance policy conditions dealing with traditional 
"coverage" questions: what property, whose interests, what events, caused by 
what perils, with what limits, during which period? Such provisions do 
operate to allocate roughly proportionate risks to one party and away from the 
other, and thus failure to satisfy such provisions will never be excused under 
section 229. But when we put a failure to satisfy a notice condition on the 
section 229 scales, we fmd that the cost borne by the insured as a result of the 
failure of condition ($100,000 in damages) mayor may not be commensurate 
with the costs to the insurer caused by failure to comply with the condition. 
In order to determine whether the failure of condition works a 
disproportionate forfeiture we will have to put a value on the costs to the 
insurer that would have been avoided by compliance with the condition but 
were not avoided because of noncompliance. 
Sometimes that will be easy. At one end of the spectrum is the case most 
closely analogous to Jacobs & Youngs v. Kent: the notice condition was not 
satisfied, but both parties agree that the insurer was in no way prejudiced. At 
the other end of the spectrum is another easy case: the condition was not 
satisfied, and as a result the insurer lost its right to recover the full amount of 
its obligation from a third party. In the first, the failure of condition defense 
would produce a disproportionate forfeiture, and the failure of condition 
should be excused; in the second, the forfeiture suffered by the insured is 
matched by the harm to the insurer that could have been avoided by 
compliance, and thus the failure of condition should not be excused. 
But what about cases that fall somewhere in between? What ifthe late 
notice caused an adjuster to spend an extra half-day in his car retracing a 
route already taken, or meant that one of six witnesses no longer is available? 
In Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, the decision that the construction company was 
entitled to the final progress payment depended in part on the conclusion that 
Kent did not need the protections of withholding payment because he could 
be protected by his ability to recover damages resulting from breach of the 
promise to provide Reading Pipe. Of course, in insurance, failure to satisfy 
forfeiture occurs when enforcement of a condition would leave the obligee with a 
reliance loss while significantly overcompensating the obligor for his loss from 
nonfulfillment of the condition."). 
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a condition almost never will be a breach of promise and thus damages are 
not an option. Can section 229 accomplish the same thing by authorizing 
excuse of the nonoccurrence of the condition only to the extent necessary to 
avoid disproportionate forfeiture?274 Or do the costs of applying that more 
discriminating standard warrant recourse to relatively crude proxies like the 
"prejudice" and "materiality" standards?275 And who bears the burden of 
proof on these questions?276 
274. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 (1981). 
275. Some insight may be provided by theoretical work on the optimal degree of 
tailoring of contractual rules and standards, which in tum draws on the burgeoning 
debate about rules versus standards and the optimal complexity of each. See, e.g., Ian 
Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L. J. 1 (1993). See also Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of 
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE LJ. 65 (1983); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An 
Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Louis 
Kaplow, A Modelfor the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
150 (1995); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 557, 624-29 (1992); Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 101 (1997). But our very real concerns that the benefits of 
more nuanced approaches to determining the effects of failures of insurance 
conditions wiII be overwhelmed by the costs of administration should be seen in light 
of the many other ways in which the law of contracts seeks to reconcile "the 
competing goals of contract enforcement: securing to the injured party the benefits 
of its bargain and avoiding the imposition of unnecessary costs on the breaching 
party." Andersen, supra riote 139, at 301. For an accessible introduction to the subtle 
difficulties of determining the costs and benefits of judicial approaches to policing 
opportunism, see Cohen, supra note 95, at 987-90; Muris. supra note 95, at 529-31. 
276. The "notice-prejudice rule" at an early stage divided into two lines of 
authority, one placing the burden of showing that the insurer was not prejudiced on 
the insured, and the other placing the burden of showing that the insurer was 
predjudiced on the insurer. See generally WINDT, supra note 21, § 1.04 (collecting 
authorities). For surveys of the allocation of burdens of proof in notice-prejudice rule 
jurisdictions, see BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON 
INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 4.02[b][5] (8th ed. 1995); Anderson, Draconian 
Foifeitures, supra note 232, at 862-69. WINDT, supra note 21, § 1.04. at 15, reports 
that the rule placing the burden on the insurer "is followed in most states, and it is 
continuing to gain wider acceptance." Of course, in other settings, the mitigation 
doctrine normally assigns to the breaching party the burden of establishing that part 
of the loss actually incurred could have been avoided by the victim of the breach. 
See, e.g., III FARNSWORTH, supra note 169, § 12.12. at 228. As often has been noted, 
shifting burdens may serve as transitional devices from one substantive rule to 
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The moment we begin to ask such questions, we invite several obvious 
potential objections to using section 229 to police against disproportionate 
forfeitures. If, as I have argued, policy provisions should be interpreted 
purposively, and if a plausible understanding of loss adjustment conditions 
and continuing warranties and evidentiary conditions includes recognition 
that their apparent overbreadth may reflect insurer efforts to avoid juridical 
hazard that would attend more nuanced provisions, won't holding out the 
possibility that a failure of condition might be excused subject the insurer to 
exactly the kind of juridical hazards the insurer sought to avoid? Or, put 
another way, isn't the insurer prejudiced whenever it is required to attempt to 
prove whether or how much it was prejudiced by a failure of condition, or 
even to defend against claims that it was not prejudiced? The answer, of 
course, is "yes." Once we move beyond classroom hypotheticals where the 
critical facts concerning the impact of the failure of condition on the insurer 
can be supplied by assumption, any approach that denies the insurer the 
benefits of the strict common law rule can be said to prejudice the insurer 
because a more nuanced treatment of the effects of noncompliance will, on 
average, be more costly to apply. When we make the factual and legal 
predicates for decision more complicated, we create additional juridical 
hazards for the parties. 
Shouldn't the insurer be as free to choose which juridical hazards it is 
willing to assume as it is to choose which physical hazards or moral hazards 
it is willing to assume, and shouldn't it be as free to manifest those choices 
in insurance policy boilerplate? The answer, of course, is "yes." The 
underwriting discretion traditionally enjoyed by insurers should apply also to 
juridical hazards. Section 229 does not police the insurer's ends, only its 
means. Section 229 still permits the insurance contract to assign the costs of 
juridical hazards to insureds, so long as the means employed are narrowly 
tailored to accomplish that result.277 Thus, section 229 in no way affects the 
another. See generally Tamar Frankel, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof as Tools 
for Legal Stability and Change, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 759 (1994). 
277. In the same way that the law encourages contracting parties to create bonds 
and other hostage mechanisms as incentives for performance, but balks when the 
hostages are human and when the self-help collection techniques include the 
application of ball bats to kneecaps, so in insurance it balks when the policy 
provisions sweep so broadly that they produce disproportionate forfeitures. For a 
sophisticated and entertaining introduction to these themes, see Charles J. Goetz, 
Contractual Remedies and the Normative Acceptability of State-Imposed Coercion, 
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ability of an insurer to assign juridical costs to the pool of insureds by 
incorporating such costs in its premium calculations, and section 229 would 
not inhibit efforts by an insurer to provide that the payout to an individual 
insured will be offset by an amount equal to the juridical costs caused by the 
individual insured's delay in giving notice, including the costs of determining 
the application of section 229 to the individual insured's claim.278 But when 
a condition operates to assign costs to an individual insured that are 
significantly greater than the costs that compliance with the condition would 
allow the insurer to avoid, that is a penalty, works a disproportionate 
forfeiture, and section 229 tells us the failure of condition should be excused 
to the extent necessary to avoid that disproportionate forfeiture,279 
Won't excusing some failures of condition mean an increase in the loss 
and expense costs for the insurer's risk portfolio, and aren't those costs likely 
to be reflected in insurance prices? Of course. But the assertion that an 
unnuanced, broadly-framed, cheaply-applied provision may be in the 
interests of both insurer and insureds as a group ought not to carry the same 
4 CATO J. 975 (1985). See also F. Eric Fryar, Note, Common-Law Due Process 
Rights in the Law of Contracts, 66 TEX. L. REv. 1021 (1988). 
278. For a familiar example of contract provisions explicitly allocating some of 
the costs of juridical hazard, see III FARNSWORTH, supra note 169, § 12.18, at 310 
(attorney's fees provisions). Of course, efforts to allocate juridical costs to the 
individual insured creating them in practice likely will be limited to direct costs; 
uncertainty costs and reputational costs likely will be so difficult to value that they 
will be borne by the party bearing the burden of proof. But that is not unique to 
excuse of express conditions; it is a usual consequence of mitigation rules. 
279. But wait, a skeptic who has followed the argument this far might object. 
Why measure the amount of the forfeiture in the individual failure of condition 
scenario against the effect on the insurer of the individual failure of condition? Is not 
the more relevant question whether the costs of forfeitures worked by all failures of 
conditions in this class of cases are disproportionate to the juridical costs imposed on 
insurers and the pool by all failures of condition in this class of cases? The response 
is simple. Both questions are relevant. A pool can be priced in an appropriate way, 
on average, but still create disproportionate forfeitures if strict conditions operate to 
penalize insureds who fail to satisfy conditions beyond what is necessary to 
compensate the pool for the costs of noncompliance. We do not say that penalties are 
permissible because they reduce the ex ante costs for everyone, and we police limited 
remedies in sales of goods to assure not only that there is real agreement, and that the 
agreement is conscionable, but also that the conscionable and bargained for remedy 
does not "fail of its essential purpose." V.C.C. § 2-719 (1981). So too with failures 
of express conditions under § 229. 
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rhetorical weight now that we have been reminded of Jacob & Youngs and 
Britton and section 229 and their analogs throughout contracts and insurance 
law. We are unlikely to think Kent should escape his obligation to make the 
last progress payment on his mansion because he is economically literate 
enough to speculate that the purchase price of the house must have included 
an implicit risk premium to compensate Jacob & Youngs for the expected 
value of the risk that accidental use of functionally equivalent but 
nonconfonning pipe would cause a forfeiture of the last payment. And we 
will not think it an answer to Britton's restitution claim to be told that his 
wages must have been enhanced to compensate him for the expected value of 
the risk that he might enrich his employer by walking away from both work 
and wages. Why not? Because, though we must concede that the parties are 
free to strike bargains that included egoistic gambles on whether Cohoes pipe 
would show up in Kent's basement or Britton would leave after nine months, 
we simply do not think that they did choose to roll the dice in that way. As 
Cardozo put it, several different ways: 
This is not to say that the parties are not free by apt and 
certain words to effectuate a purpose that perfonnance of 
every tenn shall be a condition of recovery. . .. This is 
merely to say that the law will be slow to impute the 
purpose, in the silence of the parties, where the significance 
of the default is grievously out of proportion to the 
oppression of the forfeiture.280 
So too with boilerplate conditions in standard insurance policy fonns. If 
fully-infonned insureds blessed with unbounded rationality really were 
choosing from a menu of policy conditions that includes both the narrowly 
tailored and those with a potential for disproportionate forfeitures, each with 
its associated price tag, we would have no compunctions about telling the 
insured whose gamble on a cheaper policy with a strict notice condition turns 
out to be a loser to toss his claim fonn in the trash along with his losing 
lottery tickets. But in a world that poses few such clear-cut choices to 
insureds ex ante and where bounded rationality constrains the insured's 
280. Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. at 891. Earlier in the opinion, Cardozo 
sounded the same refrain: "Intention not othelWise revealed may be presumed to hold 
in contemplation the reasonable and probable. If something else is in view, it must 
not be left to implication. There will be no assumption of a purpose to visit venial 
faults with oppressive retribution." Id. 
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ability to evaluate the options that are available, the important choice often 
will be the ex post choice of what purpose(s) we should impute to the 
language that did make it into the standard insurance policy. 
For most insurance policy conditions, the argument from costs infonns 
this interpretive enterprise in familiar ways. When the issue is whether a loss 
was caused by a rodent or medical expense resulted from "experimental 
treatment," the interpretive heuristic that asks "what coverage and implied 
cost these consumers would want ex ante, when faced with the choice and the 
bill"281 functions chiefly as a reminder that we should regard the insurer as 
trustee for the greater number of insureds who comprise the risk pool, and 
thus should insist that conditions that allocate roughly commensurate costs to 
the insured and away from the insurer (and the pool of insureds) should be 
rigorously enforced undiluted by ex post sympathies for individual claimants. 
As Patricia Danzon, focusing on medical expense coverage disputes, makes 
the familiar point: 
Courts must recognize that insurance creates an intrinsic 
conflict between the insured patient's preferences ex ante, 
when he or she selects a health plan and pays the premium, 
and those preferences ex post, when illness strikes and care 
appears to be virtually free, because of insurance coverage. 
An alternative view of this ex ante versus ex post tension is 
the conflict between the individual interest of the patient 
who wants care and the interest of insured consumers as a 
group, all of whom face some probability of falling ill and 
who collectively bear the cost of care through higher 
premium payments .... [E]fficient standards of care should 
reflect the ex ante preferences or, equivalently, the average 
preferences of insureds as a group.282 
281. Patricia Danzon, Tort Liability: A Minefield for Managed Care?, 26 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 491, 494 (1997). 
282. !d. at 493. Of course, opposition to ex post second looks at the risk 
allocations worked by contract provisions is a natural concomitant of contract models 
that assume complete presentiation, for on that assumption the individual insured is 
trying to shift responsibility for costs not covered by the insurance to the larger group 
of insureds. See generally Louis E. Wo1cher, The Accommodation of Regret in 
Contract Remedies, 73 IOWA L. REV. 797, 800-03 (1988). If the insured has not 
accurately discounted the possibility that his initial decision to purchase might be in 
error, this objection loses much of its force. See id. (identifying ways in which legal 
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And that seems exactly right. The purpose of such conditions, though not 
the precise boundaries of their application, rarely will be in dispute. Section 
229 should offer no help to homeowners with squirrel damage or medical 
expense insureds seeking insurance funding for experimental treatments 
because we recognize that the purpose and effect of denying those claims is 
to shield the insurer and the pool from roughly the same costs unsuccessful 
claimants thereby will be forced to bear. 
rules governing contract remedies accommodate ex post regret); Eisenberg, supra 
note 93 (tying "second look" to cognitive limitations that prevent full presentiation); 
Gergen, supra note 142, at 46 (denying tension between concerns for freedom of 
contract and ex post doctrines of impracticability, mistake, penalties, forfeiture, and 
good faith, which operate in a "twilight zone of contract where terms malfunction 
because of the unexpected"). 
However, when assumptions of complete presentiation are relaxed so that there 
is genuine uncertainty about the contours of the agreement of the parties, the concern 
about the ex post perspective is not that it may produce decisions that trump earlier 
choices, but that the first serious look at the question will come after a low-
probability contingency has occurred and a particular victim has been identified. For 
example, when the question is what frontier medical treatments are or should be 
covered by medical expense insurance-a question that may be posed by vague 
policy language about medical necessity-"disputes are most appropriately viewed 
as an insurance-purchasing decision by a pool of subscribers, not a medical treatment 
decision made by an individual patient." MARK HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING 
DECISIONS: THE LAW, ETHICS, AND ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS 70 
(1997). See generally id. at 68-73; Einer Elhauge, AI/ocating Health Care Morally, 
82 CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1464-65 (1994). PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL 
REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 192 (1988), makes the point this way: 
[S]table insurance requires unemotional assessment of risk and 
disbursement of payments, with the temperament of an actuary and 
a bookkeeper, treating people as statistics. The driving force in 
liability law today is sympathy and emotion in the individual case. 
Legal rules rooted in a spirit of compulsion, and applied 
emotionally case by case, are profoundly inimical to insurance. 
/d. But see Don Welch, Ruling with the Heart: Emotion-Based Public Policy, 6 S. 
CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 55 (1997) (decrying the general aversion to affective, emotion-
based arguments): "Heeding one's emotions can, in general; be a good guide to 
remaining in harmony with the fundamental commitments that result from one's 
considered judgment." /d. at 85. 
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But when the argument from costs is applied to a loss adjustment 
condition, a warranty, or an evidentiary condition, it may appear to frame a 
choice between two quite different ways of understanding the purpose(s) of 
the provision. Thus, to contend that we should not excuse failure of a notice 
condition even when the failure did not prejudice the insurer's efforts to 
adjust the individual claim because to do so will increase the cost of insurance 
is to challenge the assumption that the purpose of a notice provision is to 
protect the insurer from increased juridical costs caused by late notice. The 
implicit assertion is that insurers also employ unnuanced notice conditions in 
order to be able to deny payments to insureds whose notice is late even if the 
insurer's claims-adjusting efforts and other juridical costs were not affected 
by the delay, and that insureds should be taken to have consented to this 
allocation of risks in order to secure less costly coverage. In this 
interpretation, insurers (and insureds) expect a number of successful defenses 
based upon failures of condition-some prejudicial and some not prejudicial 
-and to deny them the savings that result from those defenses will drive up 
claims costs and prices, to the detriment of all but the unfortunate few caught 
in the snare set by the conjunction of express policy conditions with the strict 
common law rule. 
Faced with a choice between interpreting a notice condition as designed 
to protect the insurer from adverse effects on its claims adjustment efforts, or 
as designed also to create a reverse lottery in which savings on juridical costs 
and occasional disproportionate forfeitures fund small premium reductions for 
the many, both Cardozo and the Restatement counsel choosing the 
interpretation that reduces the risk of disproportionate forfeitures.283 And that 
too seems exactly right. Acknowledging that a forfeiture may redound to the 
benefit of the other, more fortunate, members of the pool does not make that 
forfeiture any more or less disproportionate; if compliance with a notice 
condition saves the insurer (or the pool) $500, and noncompliance costs the 
insured $100,000, the disproportion of the forfeiture is the same whether the 
windfall is pocketed by the insurer's shareholders or its policyholders. 
The reality is that the argument from costs, if framed in the usual way as 
a speculation about the choices prospective insureds might make if presented 
283. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227 (1972). See also 
ROBERT E. Scon & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 606 (2d ed. 
1993) ("Since viewed from the lens of a typical transaction, the express condition 
appears unusual, it is treated with suspicion. A metaphor such as how 'the law abhors 
a forfeiture' is simply a reflection of the presumption that ordinary people do not 
expressly condition their obligations. "). 
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with a complete menu of appropriately priced policy conditions, cannot tell 
us which interpretation should prevai1.284 Perhaps a representative insured, 
if squarely presented with the choice, might opt to save a few dollars in 
premium costs by authorizing the insurer to deny payment if notice is late 
without regard to the effects of that tardiness on the insurer. But, then again, 
perhaps she would not. True, we all know individuals who leave their insured 
homes to drive to the convenience store in their insured automobiles in order 
to buy a lottery ticket, but the apparent incongruity of this juxtaposition of 
risk-avoiding and risk-seeking behaviors is less than it may appear.285 When 
insureds arrive at the convenience store, they bet a few.dollars, not the house 
or the car. 
Not everything has a price, after all, and security perhaps least of all. My 
complaint that there are few good restaurants in Lincoln scarcely is met by 
the rejoinder that at least they're cheap, and my discovery that the dark things 
in my scone are not raisins is unlikely to be more pleasant because I am told 
that rat droppings are free and that lax sanitation keeps the price of bakery 
products low. So too with insurance policies. Do we really think that a 
284. For particularly accessible introductions to why, see Gillette, supra note 
109, at 542 (explaining why "the area ofremote risks ... is not a fruitful area for 
application of rnajoritarian default rules"); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Trends and Traces: 
A Preliminary Evaluation o/Economic Analysis in Contract Law, 1988 ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 73, 100-04 (demonstrating "practical indetenninacy" of efforts to derive 
efficient default rules); JeftTey L. Harrison, The Chicago School and the Development 
0/ a Comprehensive Legal Theory: A Comment on Profossor Crespi, 22 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 185, 187 (1997) (rehearsing reasons conventional economic thinking cannot 
illuminate preferences regarding "qualitative differences among contracts"). 
285. Edward J. McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and Why it Matters, 1994 
WIS. L. REV. 71 (discussing efforts to square participation in lotteries with usual 
assumptions concerning consumer choice under uncertainty): "A general teaching of 
[the literature of cognitive biases] is that, due to the reflection effect, individuals are 
risk averse as to gains but risk preferring as to loss. This finding ... would have 
individuals failing both to take fair gambles and to insure against likely losses." Id. 
at 78. In fact, of course, individuals routinely do both. McCaffery's resolution "has 
people rationally playing lotteries to get what lotteries rather efficiently, easily and 
uniquely offer: a shot at instant wealth." !d. at 93. In short, "people may have a 
• compartmentalized' view of their life and finances, with different utility functions 
for different spheres of activity. In particular, individuals might consider their 
periodic lottery play as a certain type of savings, while pursuing more risk averse 
activities in other areas." Id. at 122. For an historical treatment of the tension 
between gambling and insurance, see Baker, supra note 255, at 257-59. 
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policy provision declaring that one in every one thousand meritorious fire 
insurance claims will be randomly denied, with savings in premium costs for 
everyone, would be embraced by the hypothetical fully-informed rationally-
maximizing insureds of the simpler economic models? Or, for that matter, 
that the hypothetical fully-informed rationally-maximizing insurer would 
choose to reduce premiums enough to induce those insureds to retain a 
forfeiture risk more cheaply diversified by the insurer?286 And if we are not 
confident that the answer is ''yes,'' then why should we impute to real-world 
insureds an intent to use a strict notice condition unconcerned with how the 
tardiness affected the insurer? 
Section 229 and its subterranean analogs throughout contracts and 
insurance law are confirmation that we need not, and should not, no matter 
what the strict common law rule may purport to say about it. By making the 
interpretive inquiry focus on the purpose(s) of the insurer in employing the 
condition, and counting those purposes as served to the extent the insurer 
escapes costs that would have been avoided had the condition been 
satisfied,287 they free us from fruitless speculations about what faceless 
286. Eisenberg, supra note 93, at 240, makes the obvious point: 
It might be argued that even if one party, A, would be reluctant to 
agree to a condition if he fully understood that he would face 
draconian sanctions for insignificant variations from perfect 
fulfillment, the other party, B, would insist on those sanctions. 
That is possible, but unlikely. If both parties fully understand the 
operation of the condition, then the price B pays for A's 
performance will be higher than it otherwise would be, to reflect 
A's additional risks. Given perfect knowledge by both parties, B 
would probably prefer to pay less, without the power to impose 
draconian sanctions for imperfect fulfillment of the condition, than 
to pay more with that power. 
287. In the words of the Restatement, the task is to identify the "risk from which 
[the insurer] sought to be protected and the degree to which that protection will be lost 
if the non-occurrence of the condition is excused to the extent required to prevent 
forfeiture. " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 cmt. b (1981). But room 
for disagreement about the exact nature of that risk does not mean that the parties left 
a gap to be filled by speculation about what arrangements fully rational bargainers 
would prefer. See Burton & Andersen, supra note 270, at 865 (urging contextual 
interpretive efforts rather than immediate recourse to supplemental gap fillers). Ifwe 
remember that the task is to ascribe purposes to policy language chosen by the 
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insureds might choose or expect, and remind us that we need not accept as 
axiomatic the assumption that each additional condition in an insurance 
policy makes the coverage, and thus the price, less by assigning to the insured 
only those costs thereby defl~cted away from the insurer (and the pool). 
Most do, but some do not. When our understanding of the purpose( s) of a 
condition tells us that an insurer is using noncompliance with a condition to 
impose on the insured costs that are disproportionate to the costs that the 
insurer would have avoided had there been compliance, nonoccurrence of the 
condition should be excused to the extent necessary to prevent 
disproportionate forfeiture. 
III. ApPLICATION OF THE MODEL To CLAIMS-MADE LIABILITY 
FORMATS 
Enough! It is time to return at least briefly to deepest claims-made land, 
there to test our new tools against two of the thorniest problems in the 
claims-made thicket: the "forfeiture risk" created by "claims-made-and-
reported" and "potential-claims-discovered-and-reported" triggers, and the 
"classification risk" created by triggers that fall so late in the tort liability 
sequence that the insurer knows of the potential claim before any policy has 
been triggered. As we have seen, when lawyers first ventured into these 
precincts, they came ill-equipped to locate the notice-prejudice rule within 
contract law's larger agenda of policing against opportunism or to debate 
whether it should be applied to failures of reporting conditions in claims-
made policies. On a return trip, might a lawyer with section 229 in his kit bag 
be able to see distinctions where before none appeared? Would appreciation 
that most insurance policy conditions are narrowly tailored to allocate 
commensurate risks between insurer and insurer but that others pose the 
potential for disproportionate forfeitures prove adequate to the task of 
identifying which failures of condition might on appropriate facts be 
excused? Or does the simple classificatory method sketched above falter 
when asked to do duty beyond tame hypotheticals involving excepted causes, 
insurer, we will find it easier to take the insurer at its word and to use the costs 
avoided by satisfaction of the condition as the baseline against which to measure the 
cost of noncompliance to the insurer. The insurer has said that it is content to pay if 
the notice is on time, the house doesn't remain too long vacant, or the theft is 
evidenced by visible external marks. By focusing on why the insurer is content to pay 
under those circumstances, we have a baseline against which to measure the effects 
of what actually did happen. 
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loss adjustment conditions, continuing warranties, and evidentiary 
conditions? 
Section 229 invites us to ask questions the neo--classical tradition keeps 
carefully submerged. Why did the insurer make the provision creating the 
condition a part of the insurance contract? What insurer purposes(s) does it 
serve? What costs does compliance with the condition permit the insurer to 
avoid? Or-the same question-how, exactly, does occurrence of the 
condition make the policy cheaper? 
The conventional explanation for why claims-made policies are less 
expensive than occurrence policies is that claims-made formats reduce 
insurers' costs by shielding insurers from some of the uncertainties and 
expenses associated with intramural disputes about which insurers are to be 
tagged with responsibility for coverage obligations under difficult-to-apply 
"occurrence" triggers, and by reducing the need for loadings to compensate 
insurers for subjecting themselves to the uncertainties associated with longer-
tailed occurrence policies. Of course, those explanations, though accurate, 
are not complete. A fuller answer also would acknowledge that new claims-
made policies should be significantly cheaper than occurrence policies 
because retro dates and "other insurance" clauses mean that claims-made 
policies take a number of years to mature; in medical malpractice insurance, 
for example, 
Claims-made policies are lower in cost in the first few years 
of coverage because the insurer's risk exposure is lower. 
Claims resulting from medical services rendered during the 
first year of coverage wi111ikely not be asserted against the 
physician during that year. The cost of the premium 
increases, thereafter, on a yearly basis, as the insured's 
cumulative exposure to claims increases. The yearly 
increases in premiums are referred to as "steps" and 
represent the insurer's increasing liability exposure as the 
physician's period of exposure also increases. . .. The 
increases in cost level off when the physician reaches a 
"mature" level, after approximately 5 years of claims-made 
coverage. After the mature level has been reached, the costs 
of claims-made and occurrence premiums are generally 
comparable.288 
288. Johnson, supra note 27, at 1571. See also KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 
9, § 5.10(d)(1) & (3), at 594-96, 598-01 (emphasizing that lower costs of claims-
634 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:2 
And, to be truly complete, an explanation for why claims-made policies 
generally are cheaper also should recognize the contributions of multiple-
event triggers and triggers that operate late in the tort liability sequence: in 
theory, an insurer who anticipates that multiple-event triggers will permit 
successful failure of condition defenses in some instances even though the 
denial of compensation to the insured exceeds the costs of noncompliance to 
the insurer can reflect the expected windfalls worked by those forfeitures in 
its premium calculations, and an insurer who expects to be able to use 
renewal underwriting to avoid some idiosyncratic risks after they have 
become known can be paid a reduced premium to reflect that assignment of 
classification risk to the insured. 
A. Ameliorating the Forfeiture Risk in Claims-Made Policy 
Formats? 
But, of course, section 229 does not ask why claims-made policies in the 
aggregate are cheaper than occurrence policies, or why a particular claims-
made format is cheaper than would be an occurrence policy with otherwise 
identical coverage provisions, or even how a particular condition in a claims-
made policy makes that policy cheaper than it otherwise could be. Section 
229 is concerned with when a particular instance of noncompliance with a 
particular condition might be excused, and thus asks us to explore the extent 
to which that particular instance of noncompliance added to the insurer's 
costs. A simple analogy may help with this critical distinction. Just as in 
misrepresentation litigation we may acknowledge that the insurer's question 
to the applicant clearly is a material part of the insurer's underwriting efforts 
but nonetheless conclude that the applicant's misrepresentation was not 
materially false, so in excuse litigation under section 229 we may concede 
that each policy condition contributes to controlling insurer costs but 
nonetheless be interested in the extent to which a particular failure of 
condition did or did not impose upon the insurer costs the condition was 
intended to avoid. 
Sometimes application of the section 229 template to failure of a 
condition in a claims-made policy will appear easy. If an insured against 
whom a claim was made on January 2, 1997 tries to argue that the insurer 
whose pure claims-made policy lapsed at midnight the preceding December 
made coverage in first years are due in large part to the immaturity of the experience). 
"Much of the impetus for development of 'claims made' coverage was an interest in 
deferring a 'crisis' over costs of malpractice coverage. Predictably, 'claims made' 
coverage temporarily deferred, but did not resolve, the 'crisis' over costs." Id. at 598. 
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31 nonetheless should be Case 1: Failure to Satisfy Single Event Trigger 
obligated to provide 
coverage for the claim 
because a January 2 
claim is no more costly 
than a December 30 claim, 
1996 - INSURER A 
CONDITION: 
FACTS: 
Claim Made in 96 
Claim Made in 97 
we will have no difficulty concluding that the failure of condition should not 
be excused under section 229. Why? Because we understand the policy 
provision to be a definition of the insured event that shields the insurer from 
the same costs that it thereby imposes on the insured: it protects the insurer 
from responsibility for costs of claims made before and after the policy period 
by leaving a commensurate responsibility~osts of claims made before and 
after the policy period-with the insured. Such a condition cannot work a 
disproportionate forfeiture. So too with any single event-negligence, 
exposure, injury, manifestation, discovery of something by someone, claim 
by someone against someone, report of something by someone to someone-
a policy might establish as a trigger for coverage. There is nothing for section 
229 to do with single-event triggers for the same reason there is nothing for 
section 229 to do with a rodent exception: in each case, we ascribe to the 
provision the purpose of protecting the insurer from the very costs that the 
provision allocates to the insured. 
What if an insured under a policy with a "reported potential claim" 
trigger makes a timely report to the insurer of an injury to a third party caused 
by the insured's negligence, but fails to satisfy the policy condition requiring 
that the report include the "name and address of any witness?" Is that the 
kind of nonoccurrence of a condition that might be excused under section 
229? Indeed it is. But why? We would not be prepared to excuse failure to 
report a potential claim Case 2: Failure to Satisfy Loss Adjustment 
during the policy period no Condition 
matter how minimal the 
delay. Why should we 
contemplate excusing failure 
to make the report in the 
prescribed fashion? The 
answer must be that we 
understand the report of a 
potential claim to be a 
single-event trigger of 
coverage that necessarily 
1996 - INSURER A 
CONDITIONS: 
Report in 96 of Potential Claim 
Witnesses fully identified 
FACTS: 
Report in 96 of Potential Claim 
Witnesses not fully identified 
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allocates to the insured costs commensurate with the protections it provides 
the insurer, but we understand the purpose of the requirement that witnesses 
be identified to be to cabin the juridical hazards associated with adjusting the 
claim. Because the insurer's legitimate interest in controlling that juridical 
hazard is expressed in a policy condition that puts the insured's entire 
coverage at risk, and because the costs that failure of condition may impose 
on the insurer can range from zero to well in excess of the value of the 
insured's claim, we recognize that failure of the condition could in some 
scenarios work a disproportionate forfeiture. Thus, the section 229 inquiry 
should proceed as it does with any loss adjustment condition. 
But why, we might wonder, do we understand the single-event trigger in 
Case 2 to be "report of potential claim" rather than "report-of-potential-
claim-including-names-and-addresses-of-witnesses?" Why cannot the 
complementarity of burden avoided and burden retained that we assume for 
single-event triggers insulate the failure to comply with the fuller description 
of what the report should include? The answer is implicit in section 229's 
functional focus on the additional protections each additional condition 
provides the insurer, but the English language is slippery, and the term 
"condition" is one of most difficult to keep in hand. When we ask what 
additional protections ''the condition" affords the insurer, our focus should 
not be on the policy provision but rather on the circumstance or action that 
the policy provision insists must occur if the insurer is to have a duty to 
perform. Section 229 does not contemplate excuse of nonoccurrence of a 
policy provision; it contemplates excuse of nonoccurrence of a state of affairs 
identified by a policy provision as a condition. To accept the argument that 
the state of affairs that did not happen in Case 2 was "report-of-potential-
claim-inc1uding-names-and-addresses-of-witnesses" would be to exalt form 
over function. We are not likely to allow a homeowner's insurer to convert 
notice requirements currently subject to the notice-prejudice rule into 
immune triggers of coverage by defming the triggering event in that 
occurrence policy as "physical injury to person or property ... of which 
notice to the insurer is given in timely fashion." And we should not think that 
a claims-made insurer can through creative drafting make identification of 
the witnesses an indivisible part of a "report of circumstances" trigger of 
coverage. 
Of course, this threshold question of how to identify the "condition" 
nonoccurrence of which might or might not be excused is not free from 
difficulty. Even if we conclude that a single event-for example, a "claim" 
made by the victim against the insured, or a "report of potential claim" by the 
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insured to the insurer-is the relevant trigger, we must still determine 
whether the essential constituent elements of that event in fact occurred. 
When does a billing dispute with a client ripen into a "claim" against the 
insured? Will identification of a potential claim in a renewal application 
satisfy the "report of potential claim" condition in the current policy? Will a 
blanket notification to the insurer that some of the financial institution's 
employees made improper loans be enough to satisfy that condition? If we 
conclude that a communication from insured to insurer can be a "report of 
potential claim" even though it does not identify every witness with 
particularity, but that it cannot be a "report of potential claim" unless it is in 
a form that differentiates it from the paper generated by normal renewal 
underwriting and unless it identifies a particular incident with some 
particularity, we are ascribing a purpose to the "report of potential claim" 
provision and declaring that the purpose has been satisfied in the first instance 
but not in the second and third. Of course, both the identification of purpose, 
and the determination of whether that purpose was satisfied in the particular 
case, may be hotly contested. But once we determine that identification of a 
particular incident is a necessary constituent element of a "report of potential 
claim," we entail the conclusion that failure to identify a particular incident 
is a failure of condition that is not subject to excuse. 
Multiple-event triggers add 
another level of complexity to C 3 CI· M d d R rted T . ase : alms- a e-an epo r1l!l!er 
the process of ascribing 
purposes to policy provisions. 
What if an insured with a 
"claims-made-and-reported" 
policy for 1996 is the subject 
of a claim during the 1996 
policy year, but does not report 
1996 - INSURER A 
CONDITIONS: 
FACTS: 
Claim in 96 
Reoort in 96 
Claim in 96 
Rep_ort in 97 
the claim to the insurer until 19917 Should we regard the tardy report as the 
kind of nonoccurrence of condition that might be excused under section 229? 
Or should we treat it as part of an indivisible "claims-made-and-reported" 
definition of the insured event both parts of which must be satisfied in 1996 
if the insurer is to be liable? Or might there be other alternatives? 
Here, for the first time, we confront directly the special problems posed 
by multiple-event triggers of coverage. By itself, a claims-made trigger 
involves no overbreadth and poses no potential for disproportionate 
forfeitures. By itself, a reporting trigger involves no overbreadth and poses 
no potential for disproportionate forfeitures. But linked together in a 
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multiple-event "claims-made-and-reported" trigger, they may pose the 
potential for the sort of disproportionate forfeiture that we normally associate 
with warranties, loss adjustment conditions, and evidentiary conditions. Why 
is that? 
The explanation is implicit in section 229's focus on identifying the 
additional protections each new condition affords the insurer. With single-
event triggers, we necessarily start from a baseline of zero. Because we 
cannot imagine an insurance policy without a trigger of coverage to tell us 
whether or not a particular policy is applicable to a particular insurance story, 
we have no difficulty ascribing to any single-event trigger the insurer may 
choose to employ the function of protecting the insurer from the very costs 
that the provision thereby assigns to the insured.289 But with a multiple-
event "claims-made-and-reported" trigger like that in Case 3, an insured 
might argue, we do not start with a baseline of zero. By making it a condition 
of the coverage that the insured be the subject of a claim during the policy 
year, the policy insulates the insurer from responsibility for costs of claims 
not made within the policy period, and does so by assigning those costs to the 
insured. What additional protections, section 229 tells us to ask, does the 
insurer get by insisting that the report also be made within the policy period? 
As we have seen, insurers and the courts are ready with an answer-the 
insurer cannot be truly free from the "incurred but not reported" (IBNR) 
exposure that is said to have prompted the move to claims-made formats 
unless its coverage obligations are limited to claims that have been reported 
to the insurer by the end of the policy period. Changing from an occurrence 
trigger to a single-event, claims-made trigger frees the insurer from some but 
not all of the IBNR problem: requiring that the claim first be made during the 
policy period shields the insurer from the portion of the IBNR exposure 
289. So long as the trigger is conceptualized as a single event, it can-at least in 
the philosophical systems in which most of us work-be an event which occurs in one 
and only one policy period. Cf Fischer, supra note 11, at 676 ("[A] claim is either 
made or it is not."). If the "report of potential claim" was not made in 1996 because 
there was not sufficient detail for us to treat it as a "report of potential claim," then it 
can still be made in the future when there is sufficient detail. But if the trigger is 
conceptualized as involving two different events-for example, a claim first made 
against the insured and a report of that claim by the insured to the insurer-then the 
first logically can fall in one and only one period and the second in one and only one 
period. By the terms of such dual-event triggers, ifboth events fall in the same policy 
period, that policy is triggered; if they fall in different policy periods, neither policy 
is triggered. 
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attributable to claims incurred but not made (IBNM) by the end of the policy 
year, but it leaves the insurer to bear the remainder of the IBNR exposure-
claims made but not reported (MBNR) by the end of the policy year. Thus, 
the purpose for requiring report of the claim within the policy year is to free 
the insurer from the MBNR as well, and the reporting condition trigger 
accomplishes that by assigning the MBNR to the insured. And so, the 
argument would go, refusing to excuse a failure to satisfy the reporting 
condition cannot involve a disproportionate forfeiture. 
But that is an explanation for why the insurer would choose to make a 
reporting condition the trigger of coverage, not an explanation for why an 
insurer would choose to employ a multiple-event trigger requiring both that 
the claim first be made against the insured during the policy period and that 
the claim be reported to the insurer during the policy period. If the insurer 
can be shielded from the entire IBNR exposure by a single-event reporting 
condition trigger that would allocate that IBNR exposure to the insured, isn't 
use of a multiple-event "claims-made-and-reported" trigger the same sort 
of failure to tailor means narrowly that we encountered with loss adjustment 
conditions, continuing warranties, and evidentiary conditions? 
Indeed it is. Multiple-event triggers remind us of Kent and his flashlight, 
and one obvious possible response to the overbreadth of the "claims-made-
and-reported" triggers would be to treat the claim as the trigger and to put the 
reporting condition on the section 229 scales. So long as challenges to late-
report claims denials were framed as efforts to apply the "notice-prejudice 
rule" to reporting requirements in claims-made-and-reported formats, it was 
easy enough for courts to conclude that late reports must necessarily prejudice 
the insurer's pricing efforts. Section 229's requirement that the prejudice be 
proportionate to the amount of the insured's forfeiture would force us to 
confront the realities of claims-made pricing to determine how, exactly, a late 
report interferes with the insurers loss adjustment and pricing efforts, and 
under that standard insurers would be much less likely to prevail. 
Still, recognizing that multiple-event triggers pose problems similar to 
those presented by loss adjustment conditions, warranties, and evidentiary 
conditions does not necessarily mean that section 229 should put courts in the 
business of weighing the extent of the harm to an insurer caused by late 
reports. There is another alternative. Rather than interpreting "claims-made-
and-reported" formats as establishing the "claim" as the baseline trigger and 
then asking what additional protections the reporting condition trigger 
provides, might we instead interpret the "report" as the baseline trigger and 
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ask what additional protections the insurer gains by also insisting that the 
"claim" be made in the same policy period? 
Consider Case 4. The facts are the same as those in Case 3, with one 
addition: the insured bought identical "claims-made-and-reported" coverage 
from the same insurer in both 1996 and 1997. For a lawyer with only the 
Case 4: "Claims-Made-and-Reported" Triggers; Same Insurer 
1996 - INSURER A 1997 - INSURER A 
CONDITIONS: Claim in 96 CONDITIONS: Claim in 97 
Report in 96 Report in 97 
FACTS: Claim in 96; Report in 97 
"notice-prejudice rule" to bring to bear on behalf of the insured, nothing has 
changed. Success still depends on convincing the court that the claim 
triggered the 1996 policy and that the late report did not prejudice the insurer. 
But section 229 opens up another alternative. Why, it invites us to wonder, 
should we automatically assume that a "claims-made-and-reported" insured 
who satisfies the "claim" condition of the 1996 policy and the "report" 
condition of the 1997 policy will be seeking to excuse the reporting condition 
of the first policy in order to trigger its coverages? Might not an insured take 
seriously the rhetoric that declares that ''the essence of claims-made policies 
is a report to the insurer" and seek to invoke coverage under the second policy 
on the grounds that the failure to have a claim in that policy year should be 
excused? Why not conclude that in a claims-made-and-reported format the 
report is the trigger and that the failure to have a claim during the policy 
period is the condition non-occurrence of which might be excused? 
This way of interpreting "claims-made-and-reported" formats-by 
ascribing to the reporting condition the function of identifying the essential 
trigger of coverage-is not as strange as it first might appear. Insurer 
insistence that the report is "essential" has always seemed elusive. 
Understood as an assertion that insurers cannot run a claims-made insurance 
program without making report of a claim during the policy period a 
condition of coverage, it is clearly nonsense; many claims-made policies do 
not require that the report be made during the policy year. Understood as an 
assertion that a late report necessarily prejudices the insurer because it 
interferes with the insurer's pricing efforts, it is clearly suspect both because 
it is difficult to credit the contention that a single late report can much affect 
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the insurer's pricing290 and because it provides no way to distinguish the 
prejudice a late report causes a claims-made-and-reported insurer from the 
prejudice late reports cause other insurers-both "occurrence" and "c1aims-
made"-that do not insist that the report be made during the policy period. 
But understood as an assertion that we should interpret a c1aims-made-and-
reported policy as making the report the trigger of coverage, it makes sense. 
We can concede the insurers' premise that the move to claims-made formats 
was prompted by a desire to reduce the insurers' IBNR exposure, and grant 
also that the exposure cannot totally be eliminated if a policy can be triggered 
before the claim has been reported, but still point out that muItiple-event 
triggers are an unnecessarily unnuanced way to accomplish that goal. Faced 
with a choice of interpreting a c1aims-made-and-reported policy as making 
the claim, or the report, or both, the trigger, we should follow Cardozo and 
section 229 and choose the interpretation that minimizes the chances for 
forfeitures without denying the insurer the essential protections we believe 
the language was intended to provide. And that, it might appear, could mean 
treating the report as the condition which must happen within the policy 
period if a "c1aims-made-and-reported" policy is to be triggered, thus putting 
courts in the business of weighing the harm to the insurer caused by the fact 
that the claim was early!291 
The possibility that the "report" could be regarded as the baseline trigger 
of coverage would appear to fit dual-event "potential-claim-discovered-
and-reported" formats at least as well. The promiscuity with which courts 
c ase 5 "P : ° l-CI ° n° d dR otentla alID- Iscovere -an - epo rt d" T ° e ne:e:er 
1996 - INSURER A 1997 - INSURER A 
CONDITIONS: Discovery in 96 CONDITIONS: Discovery in 97 
Report in 96 Reoort in 97 
FACTS: Discovery in 96; Report in 97 
290. See generally notes 22,81-82, and accompanying text. 
291. If the insured is in its first year with the c1aims-made-and-reported insured, 
it might seem obvious that the failure of the claim to occur during the policy year 
should not be subject to excuse. Any other result would open the insurer to adverse 
selection. But, of course, the inquiry into the impact on the insurer of a failure of the 
"claim" condition would require examination of the other underwriting and risk 
control mechanisms being employed by the insurer, and if those mechanisms include 
a retro date, the objection could lose much of its force. See generally infra cases 7-
10. 
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and commentators use "discovery" and "claims-made" and "reporting" as 
labels for all manner of c1aims-made formats might lead the incautious to flirt 
with the idea of treating "discovery" of circumstances that might ripen into 
a future claim as the trigger for coverage and subjecting failure to report that 
discovery to the section 229 calculus, but that interpretation would deny the 
insurer almost all of the advantage of the move to "claims-made" triggers. 
Here, at least, the industry rhetoric complaining that application of the notice-
prejudice rule to reporting conditions in claims-made formats would convert 
claims-made coverage into occurrence coverage is closer to the mark. 
Excusing the failure to make a report in a potential-claim-discovered policy 
would have the effect of making the trigger-discovery of a potential claim 
-something very much like the trigger in an occurrence policy applicable to 
professional negligence. Might we instead treat the report as the essential 
trigger and contemplate on some circumstances excusing the fact that the 
discovery of the claim did not occur in the policy year?292 
Of course, these speculations do not mean that we would be compelled 
to indulge the suggestion that a report is essential to the functioning of every 
claims-made format. Many claims-made policies contemplate that some 
claims that ultimately will be associated with a particular policy period will 
not be reported during the policy period. Some require only that notice of a 
claim be given "as soon as practicable," others that the notice be given within 
60 days of the claim, still others that the notice be given as soon as 
practicable but in no event more than 60 days after the end of the policy 
period. For such formats, there seems to be no reason not to take the insurer 
at its word. The policy does not try to achieve complete elimination of the 
Case 6: Failure to Satisfy Non-Trigger Notice Provision 
1996 - INSURER A 1997 - INSURER B 
CONDITIONS: CONDITIONS: 
Claim in 96 Claim in 97 
Notice "as soon as practicable" Notice "as soon as practicable" 
FACTS: Claim in 96; Notice Tardy and in 97 
292. Policies with alternative "claims-made-and-reported" and "potential-
claims-discovered-and-reported" triggers appear to pose no new challenges. Either 
the claim or the report of claim should be treated as the singl~vent trigger for the 
first prong, and either the discovery of potential claim or the report of potential 
claim the single--event trigger for the second prong. Of course, the window for 
insurer opportunism is smaller when a claims-made-and-reported trigger is joined 
by an alternative "potential-claim-discovered-and-reported" trigger. 
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IBNR exposure from the insurer's portfolio. The policy says that a claim first 
made within the policy year is the single-event trigger. In such policies, the 
provision requiring a "report" or "notice" of the claim to the insurer should 
be understood to function just as it does in occurrence formats: it provides the 
insurer with protections for both its claims-adjustment and its pricing efforts. 
And under both occurrence and claims-made policies in which the claim in 
the trigger of coverage, section 229 authorizes an inquiry into whether in the 
particular case the loss of those protections due to the tardiness of the notice 
is enough to keep the forfeiture from being disproportionate. 
Thus, when the policy is a pure "claims-made" policy, we should regard 
the claim as the trigger that is necessarily immune from excuse arguments. 
When confronted with a dual "claims-made-and-reported" policy, we should 
treat either the claim or the report, but not both, as the immune trigger; when 
faced with a dual "potential--claim-discovered-and-reported" policy, we 
should treat either the discovery, or the report, but not both as the immune 
trigger. But how should we regard "retro date" provisions? What if a "pure" 
Case 7: Pure Claims-Made Trigger with Retro Date 
1996 - INSURER A 
CONDITIONS: Negligence after 111196 
Claim in 96 
FACTS: Negligence in 95 
Claim in 96 
claims-made policy promising that the insurer will respond to a claim made 
against the insured during calendar year 1996 also makes it a condition of the 
insurer's obligation that the negligence precipitating the claim have taken 
place after January I, 1996? Do our concerns about multiple-event triggers 
mean that section 229 should be available to an insured wanting to argue that 
it is not significantly more difficult to adjust a 1996 claim based on 1995 
negligence than to adjust a 1996 claim precipitated by 1996 negligence? She 
should not, for the retro date shields the insurer from costs-of claims 
precipitated by pre-1996 negligence-that are commensurate to the costs-of 
claims precipitated by pre-1996 negligence-thereby assigned to the insured, 
just as the claims-made condition in the same policy allocates commensurate 
costs away from the insurer to the insured. The combination of a retro date 
with another trigger does not involve the overbreadth encountered in c1aims-
made-and-reported and potential--claim-discovered-and-reported policies 
because we ascribe different and independent timing purposes to the retro 
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date and to the single-event trigger. With c1aims-made-and-reported and 
potential--claim--discovered-and-reported formats, one of the multiple-event 
triggers appeared to be redundant. But a retro date cannot guarantee the 
insurer freedom from claims first made after 1996, and the claims-made 
condition cannot guarantee the insurer freedom from negligence occurring 
before 1996, and thus in Case 7 we are not presented with that sort of timing 
redundancy. 
The distinction is easier to see if we assume that the same insurer renews 
the policy for calendar 1997, with the retro date remaining January 1, 1996. 
Case 8: Pure Claims-Made Trigger with Retro Date Fixed at Inception 
of Relationship 
1996 - INSURER A 1997 - INSURER A 
CONDITIONS: Neg after 111196 CONDITIONS: Neg after 1/1196 
Claim in 96 Claim in 97 
FACTS: Neg in 96; Claim in 97 
The retro date condition continues to allocate consequences of pre-1996 
negligence away from the insurer and to the insured, and the claims-made 
condition allocates the costs of pre-1997 and post-1997 claims away from 
the insurer and to the insured. Consequently, each should be classified as 
immune from section 229 scrutiny. 
What is more, this conclusion does not change if we assume that the 
insured moves to a new insurer in calendar 1997 and that the new insurer 
employs a January 1, 1997, retro date. The purpose of the retro date 
provision in Insurer B's policy is to shield the insurer from liability for claims 
Case 9: Pure Claims-Made Trigger with Retro Date; Different Insurers 
1996 - INSURER A 1997 - INSURER B 
CONDITIONS: Neg after 111196 CONDITIONS: Neg after 1/1197 
Claim in 96 Claim in 97 
FACTS: Negligence in 96; Claim in 97 
arising out of negligence prior to the inception of its relationship with the 
insured, and that is precisely the risk that thereby is assigned to the insured. 
True, the insured now faces a potential gap in coverage because claims after 
January 1, 1997, precipitated by negligence before 1997 will not be covered 
by any policy, but that is not a problem to which section 229 can respond. 
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The forfeiture which the insured will suffer is not disproportionate to the 
protections the provisions provide the insurer. 
But what if we imagine that the insured does not change insurers, but at 
renewal the insurer nonetheless "advances the retro date" in the 1997 policy 
to January 1, 1997? In form, the provision operates as did retro dates in the 
preceding three hypotheticals. But in context we may be tempted to regard 
the insurer's reasons for employing this retro date condition quite differently. 
In Case 7, Insurer A established the retro date at the inception of the 
relationship; in Case 8, Insurer A kept the retro date at the inception of the 
relationship even in its renewal policy; in Case 9, Insurer B established a new 
retro date at the inception of its relationship with the insured. In each of those 
cases the insurer plausibly could contend that the purpose of the retro date 
provision was to protect the insurer against adverse selection; in those cases 
we have no difficulty understanding the use of the retro date provision to be 
an unexceptional exercise of the insurer's underwriting discretion to choose 
with whom and on what terms it will do business. 
Case 10: Pure Claims-made Trigger with Retro Date Advanced; Same 
Insurer 
1996 - INSURER A 1997 - INSURER A 
CONDITIONS: Neg after 111196 CONDITIONS: Neg after 111197 
Claim in 96 Claim in 97 
FACTS: Negligence in 96; Claim in 97 
With Case 10, however, that explanation will not do. In 1996, the insurer 
was willing to assume the risk of claims made and reported in 1996 based on 
negligence in 1996; in 1997, it is willing to assume the risk of claims made 
and reported in 1997, but not if they are based on negligence during 1996. 
Why not? Would it affect our understanding of the situation to be told that the 
insurer advanced the retro date for the individual insured because it had 
learned of negligence by the insured in 1996 that had not yet triggered any 
policy? And if so, in which direction does that bit of context cut? Is there 
a difference between employing a retro date in order to avoid adverse 
selection at the beginning of what may become a multi-year relationship and 
employing a retro date in order to avoid known risks at the beginning of a 
renewal policy? Would it be more or less troubling to learn that the insurer 
was not reacting to known circumstances but merely advancing the retro date 
for all renewal insureds in order to keep its claims-made exposures 
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immature? Clearly, there is something about an insurer advancing the retro 
date that nags, and it should not surprise us to learn that the practice is one 
against which regulators inveigh.293 But that does not mean the retro date 
provision is overly-broad. The insured's problem is not one for which section 
229 provides an answer.294 
What do these ten cases tell us about section 229 and the sensibilities it 
seeks to express? Three things in particular seem worth emphasizing. First, 
293. See, e.g., ARK. CODE § 23-79-306 (g) (1987): 
(1) A retroactive date may only be advanced with the written 
consent of the first named insured and upon one (l) or more of the 
following conditions: 
(A) If there is a change in insurer other than another insurer 
within the same insurer holding company or group; 
(B) If there is a substantial change in the insured's operations 
. which would have been a material factor in the insurer's 
acceptance or declination of the risk; or 
(C) At the request of the first-named insured. 
(2) Prior to the advancement of the retroactive date under 
subdivisions (1 )(A), (B), or (C) of this subsection, the insured must 
receive a disclosure form for his signature which acknowledges 
that he has been advised of his right to purchase an extended 
reporting period endorsement. 
In New York, the minimum standards for claims-made policies include the 
following: "A retroactive date may not be changed during the term of the claims-
made relationship and any new extended reporting period." Regulation No. 121, N.Y. 
COMPo CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 73.3 (b) (1993). Such formal regulatory 
restrictions remain relatively rare. 
294. This treatment of retro dates might suggest that we should revisit the 
suggestion that the "claim" condition in a "claim-made-and-reported" or a 
"discovery" condition in a "potential-daim-discovered-and-reported" policy might 
be subject to excuse arguments under § 227. On facts like those in Case 7, Insurer 
B plausibly might contend that the requirement that the claim first be made after the 
inception of the policy year should be ascribed a function it lacks in a renewal policy: 
it operates as a de facto retro date protecting the insurer from claims made prior to the 
inception of the relationship and allocating responsibility for those claims to the 
insured. Thus, the argument might go, it deserves to be treated as immune from 
excuse arguments for the same reason that retro dates fixed at the outset of the 
relationship deserve to be treated as immune. 
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the process of ascribing purposes is not easy. Exploding the positivist conceit 
that we can determine the meaning of a policy provision without regard to its 
consequences helps make the project more tractable; so too does shifting the 
focus away from vestigal will-theory fictions that pretend ~o be searching for 
ajoint intent and away from the overcompensations of insurance law's fatal 
fascination with the "objective reasonable expectations" of the insured. But 
even cast as a problem of ascribing purposes to the insurer, the project will 
not be easy. Context matters. Even if we are asking the correct question, 
ascribing appropriate purposes will require many return trips to different parts 
of the claims-made thicket. 
The second thing these cases tell us is that classifying policy provisions 
as vulnerable to section 229 oversight or as immune from such review is only 
the first step. Even if we have correctly isolated the purpose(s) that should 
be ascribed to the particular policy condition, we still must determine to what 
extent those purpose(s) have been satisfied. In this first survey of claims-
made conditions we have not attempted to confront those questions directly, 
but we have seen enough of the complexity that waits once we move beyond 
hothouse hypotheticals to warn us that section 229's authorization to courts 
to engage in a fme-tuning of the burden avoided and burdened assumed may 
well be beyond what we reasonably can ask lawyers and courts to do. If the 
issue is not whether the insurer was prejudiced, but how much it was 
prejudiced, the inquiry will be much more difficult and the allocation of 
burdens of proof and persuasion will be much more important. Australia 
currrently is trying to apply a statutory rheostat that requires courts to 
calibrate with precision the harm done to an insurer by a failure of 
condition,295 and the early experience there suggests that other alternatives 
to the strict common law rule that do not require such fme-tuning should be 
explored.296 But details of how the standard should be framed can be worked 
out through experience if we keep our eye on the point of the exercise: 
ameliorating forfeitures that are not necessary to protect the insurer from the 
costs it sought to avoid. 
The third and most significant reason that section 229 may seem to come 
up short as a way of dealing with the problems posed by claims-made 
formats is that section 229 is an attempt to deal with only one specific 
manifestation-overbreadth-of the larger problem of how to determine the 
295. See authority cited supra note 201. 
296. I explore the Australian experience in Bob Works, Excuse of Failure of 
Insurance Conditions Turned Upside Down: The View from Down Under 
(forthcoming). 
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mix of contractual and regulatory institutions best suited to police the 
potential for insurer opportunism created by the combination of bounded 
rationality and transaction-specific investments. Section 229 insists that 
discretion created by unnuanced insurance policy conditions should be 
exercised only to guarantee to the insurer the protections the provision was 
inserted to provide, and should not be employed to create windfalls for the 
insurer even if those windfalls ultimately redound to the benefit of 
policyholders. But that "forfeiture risk"-though it has dominated this essay 
-is only one part of the larger problem of how to police the potential for 
opportunism that goes with bounded rationality and sunk investments. As 
these last examples make clear, pushing coverage triggers later into the tort 
liability insurance sequence makes it more likely that an insurer will be able 
to employ its underwriting discretion-through cancellation of an existing 
contract, refusal to renew at the end of the term, or renewal with advanced 
retro dates, laser exclusions, or dramatic price effects-after the. insurer 
knows a particular insured is likely to be subject to a claim but before any 
policy has been triggered. The problem posed by late triggers is not a 
problem of overbreadth; the uncertainties that claims-made insurers avoid by 
pushing the trigger for coverage later into the tort liability claim sequence are 
commensurate with the uncertainties thereby assigned to insureds. But late 
triggers nonetheless are a concern because they can be used to subject 
individual insureds, perhaps unnecessarily, to classification risk. 
B. Ameliorating the Classification Risk in Claims-Made Policy 
Formats? 
What do we mean by "classification risk?" When insurance is written 
for a specific term, the choice of whether to trade a premium for a transfer of 
risk can be revisited by both parties at the end of each policy period. If things 
have changed since the last underwriting review, then the price/coverage 
relationship also is likely to change. What sort of things may have changed? 
Some involve the expected value of the loss: what might change is the 
probability of loss, or the potential amount of loss, or the insurer's faith in its 
ability to make appropriate predictions about those risk factors. But other 
factors that may influence the insurer's willingness to assume the risk transfer 
have nothing to do with changes in the perceived riskiness of prospective 
insureds; rather the insurer may be more or less willing to write a renewal 
contract due to different capacity constraints, changes in its agency force, 
different projected overhead costs, better or worse investment returns, or 
alterations in its business philosophies. By keeping the term of the insurance 
contract short, the insurer limits its exposure to the risk of changes; by 
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lengthening the tenn, or-the same thing-by providing some guarantee of 
renewability, the insurer increases its share of the risk of changes. Risk of 
change not assumed by the insurer stays with insureds. 
The market offers several different models of how parties to insurance 
contracts can assign the risk that circumstances will change during the 
term.297 At one end of the spectrum are the fixed tenn policies that 
predominate in most ofthe property--casualty industry. The insurer assumes 
the risk of changes in the desirability of the exchange during that term, but 
limits its exposure to that risk by keeping the tenn short. At the other end of 
the spectrum is the "perpetual policy"; in exchange for a single pre-paid 
premium, the insurer undertakes to insure the property for so long as the 
insured desires.298 Between these two extremes fall a variety of "guaranteed 
297. For a sophisticated effort to model the possibilities, see Mark V. Pauly, 
Howard Kunreuther & Richard Hirth, Guaranteed Renewability in Insurance, 10 J. 
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 143 (1995). See also Kevin D. Cotter & Gail A. Jensen, 
Choice of Purchasing Arrangements in Insurance Markets, 2 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 
405 (1989): 
, Most health insurance, as well as a substantial portion of life and 
disability insurance, is purchased on a risk-pooling basis. 
[statistics] . .. Virtually all group contracts pool risks, in which all 
members of the group have identical premiums and benefits 
regardless of their loss experience or risk factors. Individually 
purchased life insurance is usually either whole-life, renewable 
term, or extended-period term, all of which guarantee coverage 
over an extended period with no change in premium other than for 
age. . .. This contrasts with the purchase of automobile, personal 
property, and personal liability insurance. Contracts in these lines 
are typically short-term (one year or less), renewal is rarely 
guaranteed, and premiums are based on loss experience. 
Other studies of multi-period contracting in the presence of classification risk 
include Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care. 
53 AM. Ec. REV. 941 (1963); Thomas R. Palfrey & Chester S. Spatt, Repeated 
Insurance Contracts and Learning, 16 RAND J. Ec. 356 (1985); Mark Pauly, The 
Welfare Economics of Community Rating, 37 J. RISK & INS. 407 (1970). 
298. The Philadelphia Contributionship for the Insurance of Houses from Loss 
by Fire, the nation's oldest property insurance company (1752), still offers 
homeowners perpetual policies, paid off with single deposit, with full premium 
refunded when policy is canceled. Terrence Samuel & Duane Winner, Historic 
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renewable" contracts that provide a pre-commitment from the insurer, but 
with no enforceable obligation for the insured to renew,299 
Simple enough. The complication lies in this question: when we say that 
a policy provision limiting coverage to a particular term protects the insurer 
from some of the risk of changes, do we mean that it assigns that risk to the 
pool of insureds, or to the individual insured? Some hazards are correlated 
for all members of the insured pool; others are not. Some contributors to 
adverse changes in an insured's risk profile will affect all members of the 
insured pool: inflation, new technologies, new environmental exposures, 
epidemics. Some will be idiosyncratic to an individual insured: although 
there has been no change in the likelihood that members ofthe insured pool 
will develop multiple sclerosis, and no increase in the costs of treating 
multiple sclerosis, this insured did develop multiple sclerosis. Every insured 
for a term assumes the risk that correlated risk factors may change before the 
end of the term, making the pool of risks less desirable in future terms. The 
"classification risk" is the additional risk that idiosyncratic, uncorrelated risk 
Insurance Company Makes Another Historic Move, PHIL. INQ., Aug. 12, 1996, at C2, 
col. 3. 
299. See Cotter & Jensen, supra note 297 (explaining why long-term pooling 
contracts are possible in health, life, and disability insurance but difficult to sustain 
in property and liability insurance): 
One possible reason for these differences in purchasing 
arrangements is that the classification risk of future uncertain 
changes in one's risk type provides an incentive for long-term risk 
pooling contracts. . .. Such contracts are feasible, however, only 
when the loss probabilities increase with age. When loss 
probabilities decrease with age, it is generally not possible to write 
a long-term pooling contract that discourages older individuals 
with a favorable loss history from leaving the contract in lieu of 
coverage on more favorable terms. Consequently, sequential 
short-term pooling contracts arise as a second-best arrangement 
when neither group nor individual long-term pooling contracts are 
feasible. Property and liability insurance do not involve loss 
probabilities related to age, but a lack of classification risk in these 
lines of insurance decreases the incentive for long-term 
arrangements. 
Id. at 406. As we shall see, when liability policies do involve classification risk the 
same imperatives apply. 
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factors may change for an individual insured before the end of the term, thus 
adversely affecting the individual insured's desirability for the next term 
when compared to the rest of the pool. 
How do claims-made formats allocate the classification risk? In the 
academic models that grace the finance literature, the answer is clear: the risk 
of idiosyncratic changes in an insured's desirability continues to be 
diversified across the pool of insureds.300 Of course, this answer is driven by 
the assumptions of the model. Working from the initial premise that the 
insurer's role in traditional commercial insurance arrangements stems from 
its comparative advantage in dealing with uncorrelated risks, the fmance 
literature explains claims-made formats as an effort to decompose risk into 
two categories-correlated risk, which cannot be diversified in an insurance 
pool and which therefore should not be transferred to the insurer, and 
uncorrelated idiosyncratic risk, for which the magic of the law of large 
numbers still operates. Needless to say, such models do not confront the 
possibility that reporting requirements, renewal applications, laser exclusions, 
or mobile retro date provisions may be used to force the individual insured to 
bear the costs of idiosyncratic risks that have ripened into known preexisting 
circumstances before any policy has been triggered. By assuming that all 
claims are paid when made, that all claims-made policies automatically are 
renewed, and that retrospective rating makes the pool of insureds bear its own 
costs, such models take the insurer out of the risk assumption business almost 
entirely, and collapse almost completely any distinction between a reciprocal 
mutual pooling arrangement administered by an insurer and claims-made 
policy formats marketed by a commercial insurer.30 J In such a world, the 
300. See, e.g., Doherty, supra note 8; Luc Grillet, Corporate Insurance and 
Corporate Stakeholders: Limits of Insurability and Public Policy, 11 1. INS. REG. 291 
(1993); Anne E. Kleffner & Neil A. Doherty, Costly Risk Bearing and the Supply of 
Catastrophic Insurance, 63 1. RISK & INS. 657 (1996). 
301. As Grillet summarizes: 
The movement from constant to random premium contracts can be 
illustrated with Doherty's framework. In essence, the insurance 
market employs constant premium contracts if risks are easily 
diversifiable, or in other words, if the risk-pooling properties of the 
Law of Large Numbers hold. If a segment of the insurance market 
is plagued by substantial event and/or information correlation, risk-
spreading for these undiversifiable risks will be achieved through 
random premium or risk-sharing contracts. . .. The insurer will 
offer random premium contracts, which in the extreme case means 
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costs of both correlated and uncorrelated risks are borne by the insured pool. 
In such a world, it makes sense to say that "the claims-made form represents 
a preferred form of contracting under conditions of non independence 
between insurable risks."302 
Of course, within the orthodox intellectual traditions of insurance law, a 
different answer is equally clear: the classification risk is borne by the 
individual insured. In insurance, as elsewhere, freedom of contract fmds its 
"first and most important application ... in the right to choose one's trading 
partners,"303 and unless the insurer has promised to renew regardless of 
changes in the desirability of the insured, it matters not whether that 
underwriting discretion is manifested as an initial refusal to deal, as a refusal 
to renew, or as a renewal that carves known potential claims out of the 
renewal coverage. Because an insurer can choose to reject the application 
of a new prospective insured, it can choose to limit the coverage it does write 
on a new applicant by a laser exclusion of idiosyncratic circumstances known 
to the insurer or by a retro date that excludes later claims based on 
circumstances known to the insured at the inception of the contract. As 
Judge Posner correctly notes: 
Like the exclusion of a known preexisting condition from a 
health insurance policy, the exclusion from a claims-only 
policy of claims based on conduct that occurred before the 
that he base[d] the premium [charge] to the policyholder on the 
information available after the loss has been realized. This enables 
him to remove the event and information correlation from his 
portfolio .... The policyholder still achieves partial risk-shifting. 
Why? The policyholder shares his loss with the losses of the other 
pool members. He can insure his idiosyncratic risk, because his 
retroactively calculated premium is not based on his individual loss 
but on his individual share in the realized collective loss of the 
insurance pool. 
Grillet, supra note 300, at 310. Professor Doherty makes the same point: "The 
intention is not to nullify the effects of insurance against the policyholder's 
idiosyncratic risk, but to remove insurer risk. Thus the retroactive correction to the 
individual's premium is not based on his or her individual loss but on the collective 
loss in the pool." Doherty, supra note 8, at 232. 
302. !d. at 243. 
303. RICHARD EpSTEIN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION IN HEALTH CARE: COMMUNITY 
RATINGS AND PREEXISTING CONDITIONS 1 (1996). 
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policy was issued and that was known to have claim 
potential is uncontroversially proper.304 
653 
But is it also ''uncontroversially proper" for an insurer that was providing 
claims-made coverage when the conduct took place and became known-to 
the insured, to the insurer, or to both305_to employ its renewal underwriting 
discretion to make certain that it will assume no responsibility for known 
circumstances under future policies? Within a spot-market paradigm that 
understands insurance contracts as short-term relations that must be formed, 
and then performed, after which they cease to exist, there is no reason to 
distinguish between Case 7, where the retro date protects the insurer from 
adverse selection at the inception of its relationship with the insured, and 
Case 10, where the advanced retro date seeks to protect the insurer from 
potential claims based on conduct that occurred and became known while the 
same insurer was on the risk. So long as each insurance contract is seen as 
a simple transfer of risk for a term, the question will be whether the insurer 
agreed to assume any of the classification risk to which the insured otherwise 
would be subject. Posed that way, the answer usually will appear to be ''no.'' 
Thus, in the still-dominant insurance law way of thinking, a ten-year 
history of renewals with the same insurer is just a history of ten different 
contracts, and preexisting conditions that became known before the first 
contract takes effect should be treated no differently than conditions that 
became known between the sixth and seventh renewal. However, a neo-
institutional perspective sensitive to the vulnerabilities that go with relation-
304. Truck Ins. Exchange v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 951 F.2d 787, 791 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(citations omitted). Indeed, Judge Posner added, sounding a note we have heard 
before, there is "nothing exploitive about such limited coverage if the insurance 
premium were correspondingly small." Id. at 790. 
305. Insurers may underwrite against "preexisting conditions" directly on the 
basis of information known to insurer, or indirectly by expressly excluding claims 
based on information known to the insured at the time the policy was issued or by 
relying on the implicit "fortuity defense. See generally Stephen A. Cozen & Richard 
C. Bennett, Fortuity: The Unnamed Exclusion, 20 FORUM 222 (1985) (summarizing 
recent developments including growing use of subjective standard focusing on 
knowledge of insured); Richard L. Fruehauf, Note, The Cost of Knowledge: Making 
Sense of "Nonfortuity" Defenses in Environmental Liability Insurance Coverage 
Disputes, 84 VA. L. REv. 107 (1998) (contending that "nonfortuity" arguments add 
little to existing policy and misrepresentation and concealment defenses, but that 
actual knowledge of legal liability variant of "nonfortuity" arguments may function 
as per se concealment defense). 
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specific investments might see a distinction between Case 7 and Case 10. 
Claims-made contracts conceived, not as a simple transfer of risk from an 
insured to an insurer, but as a reciprocal undertaking by members of an 
insured pool with the commercial insurer functioning as their agent for 
administering the pool, might carry quite a different set of implications about 
whether the costs of idiosyncratic risk that becomes known after the inception 
of the relationship is to be shared among members of the pool or whether 
instead it is to be visited upon the individual insured in order to reduce costs 
to the pool. 
Of course, the reality necessarily is more complex than either the 
reciprocal pooling arrangements of the fmancial models or the spot market 
exchanges between strangers with no common history and no common future 
that so dominate conventional insurance law thinking. Claims-made policies 
can not effect a complete mutualization of correlated and uncorrelated risks 
without the very strong assumptions of the financial models; the commercial 
claims-made insurer has a stake in the claims costs of the pool of insureds, 
and those claims costs can be affected by preventing known potential sources 
of claims from being admitted or readmitted to pool. Moreover, Judge 
Posner's analogy to medical expense insurance is double-edged, and not just 
because federal COBRA306 and HIP AA307 legislation and their state 
complements now trump the common law assumption that refusal to insure 
known medical expense risks "is uncontroversially proper" even for 
individuals who have managed to gain initial access to an insured pool.308 
Some claims-made insureds will fmd unrestricted renewal coverage at the 
pool price even after their idiosyncratic sources of potential claims have 
become known, just as in group medical expense insurance before COBRA 
and HIP AA, because the classification risk has been mutualized by their 
membership in a community-rated pool. But others will not, and the later 
trigger of claims-made formats means that a greater number of insureds 
306. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (Supp. 1995). 
307. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 
308. For insureds who have once gained admission to medical expense insurance 
through an employee group plan, COBRA guarantees continuing coverage from that 
group plan for a period after the loss of eligibility; HIP AA allows qualifying members 
of a group health plan to apply credit earned by participation in their old group plan 
against waiting periods and preexisting condition limitations if they move to a new 
group or individual plan. See generally JOSEPH A. SNOE, AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 
DELIVERY SYSTEMS 80-123 (1998). 
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under liability policies will be exposed to the application of renewal 
underwriting discretion after their idiosyncratic risk potential has become 
known, just as the later trigger of medical expense insurance imposes a 
greater exposure to the classification risk on medical expense insureds not 
sheltered by a community-rated pool or ameliorating federal legislation. 
A few examples may help to highlight how the classification risk 
imposed by claims-made fonnats can differ from the classification risk borne 
by insureds covered by policies with more traditional triggers. When my 
daughter turns sixteen and begins driving, we expect that the increase in risk 
will be reflected in an increase in the price charged for the family's auto 
coverage. We have no reason to be offended by such efforts at risk 
classification; in a competitive insurance market, classification of exposures 
on the basis of perceived contributions to the expected losses of the pool is 
necessary for rate equity and to prevent the insured pool from unraveling. 
But expected loss is a prediction about the average loss of the pool of risks 
being combined. Actual losses of individual members of the pool still are 
largely a function of chance. When my daughter backs the family car into the 
neighbors' recreational vehicle, we may worry that her negligence may be a 
precursor to further price hikes or even a refusal by the insurer to provide 
further coverage, but we do not worry about whether the damage to the 
recreational vehicle will be covered. The occurrence trigger of the auto 
policy guarantees that the policy will have been triggered before anyone has 
any opportunity to know that she has distinguished herself from the majority 
of insureds who will not be making a claim. The classification risk to which 
we are subject includes the risk that my daughter may signal to the insurer 
that she is a poorer risk than the ordinary sixteen-year-old driver, and that the 
new infonnation may be used by the insurer in its renewal underwriting, but 
it does not include the risk that damage she causes while insured will not be 
covered. Or, to put the matter yet another way, at the end of a policy period 
we expect that insurer concerns about any "known risks" may be reflected in 
price or underwriting effects, but we expect any "known losses" already will 
have triggered a policy. 
In the abstract, and with simple examples, the assumption that the 
classification risk borne by an individual insured includes "known risk"-
the chance that during the policy tenn the insured will discover idiosyncratic 
risk factors that so far have not triggered any policy and that legitimately may 
affect an insurer's willingness to accept a future risk transfer-but not 
"known losses"--events that simultaneously trigger any policy then in effect 
and make the loss no longer insurable because no longer "fortuitous"--can 
656 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:2 
seem obvious and uncontroversial. A fire loss in 1996 triggers a 1996 
property insurance policy insuring against the perils of fire; when renewal 
time arrives, the 1996 fire is relevant to the 1997 renewal decision only to the 
. extent that it supports inferences about potential losses that could trigger the 
1997 policy. And messier facts need not destroy that fundamental 
complementarity. Thus, no one would doubt that a fire started by New Year's 
Eve revelers that destroys part of the insured house before the midnight 
expiration of the 1996 policy, and the rest after the ball has dropped, will be 
treated as a fire that occurred in the 1996 policy period. Under the "loss-in-
progress" rubric, efforts by the 1996 fire insurer to argue that its liability is 
limited to damage that occurred before midnight simply should fail; efforts 
to tag the 1997 fire insurer with responsibility for damage that occurred after 
midnight should be equally unavailing.309 Indeed, we expect the same 
complementarity to prevail when occurrence triggers in liability policies must 
be applied to progressive personal injuries or property damage. As two recent 
authors capture the conventional understanding: 
The fortuity principle and trigger analysis are distinctly 
different but complementary. When applied in the context 
of a continuous or cumulative personal injury or property 
damage case, these interrelated concepts provide that 
coverage would be triggered under the policy in effect when 
damage or injury first occurs (or becomes manifest). 
Liability for the CGL carrier on the risk at that time is 
contractually fixed, whether or not all resulting injury or 
damage has occurred during that policy period. Damage or 
injury caused by the same occurrence but materializing after 
309. See Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 24 Cal. Rptr. 44 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1962) (if contingent event insured against occurred during policy period, insurer is 
liable for full loss even if extent of damage cannot be ascertained at end of policy 
period). Other contexts beget other rubrics. Thus, in accident and disability insurance 
settings, the "process of nature" rule is used to justify the conclusion that 
complications and intensification of injury that result from an accident should be 
treated as occurring on the watch of the insurer at the time of the accident even if they 
are experienced in later policy periods. See, e.g., National Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. 
Edwards, 174 Cal. Rptr. 31 (Cal. App. 1981). See generally Fischer, supra note II, 
at 627,664-65,677-86. Cf James F. Hogg, The Tale ofa Tail, 24 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 515 (1998) (challenging argument that responsibility of occurrence insurer 
for progressive injury losses should be reduced if losses continue during years in 
which insured had untriggered claims-made coverage). 
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termination of the triggered policy is not insured under 
subsequent policies due to the loss-in-progress rule.3 10 
657 
Such examples, though useful, can obscure a fundamental point: the 
comforting complementarity on display in these familiar stories is dependent 
upon the policy triggers being employed. In these cases, the very event that 
triggers one policy is the event that renders the damage no longer fortuitous 
and thus not insurable under a subsequent policy. And, in these cases, the 
trigger usually is satisfied before the insurer gains knowledge of the 
idiosyncratic circumstances that distinguish this insured from other insureds 
and that might prompt a negative underwriting decision. But as another look 
at our exploded liability insurance claim sequence should remind us, a policy 
trigger set late in th.e tort liability insurance claims sequence sometimes will 
not be satisfied until after the loss has become certain or after the insurer has 
learned of an idiosyncratic risk factor that seems certain to produce a loss. 
Potential Stages in the Evolution of Liability Insurance Claims 
allegedly tortious act or omission by insured 
exposure of potential victims 
injury in fact 
manifestation of victim's injury 
insured should have discovered circumstances that may give rise to a claim 
insured discovers circumstances that may give rise to a claim 
insured discovers specific acts or omissions that may give rise to a claim 
insured reports to insurer circumstances that may give rise to a claim 
insured reports to insurer specific acts that may give rise to a claim 
insured reports to insurer circumstances that may give rise to a claim 
claim for compensation by victim against insured 
insured reports claim to insurer 
victim files suit against insured 
investigation by insurer 
defense and reserving decisions by insurer 
negotiations between insured and victim 
judgment or settlement 
payment to victim 
310. Harold M. Provizer & Noel F. Beck, Making Sense of the Fortuity Doctrine, 
FOR THE DEFENSE, February 1996, at 20, 25. See also Richard L. Antognini, When 
Will My Troubles End? The Loss in Progress Defense in Progressive Loss Insurance 
Cases, 25 LOY. L.A. L. Rev. 419 (1992). 
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What if an explosion during the term of a pure claims-made policy has 
leveled adjoining buildings and sent numerous victims to hospitals and 
morgues, but by the end of the policy period no claims have yet been filed? 
Can the claims-made insurer simply walk away at the end of the term? Or 
consider the situation of a lawyer continuously insured under pure claims-
made policies issued by the same insurer from 1986 through 1996 who 
realizes in September, 1996, that he negligently missed a July 1, 1996, statute 
of limitations filing deadline. Had the lawyer been insured under old-
fashioned professional liability formats once in vogue, the lawyer's 
negligence during the 1996 policy year would have triggered the 1996 policy 
and would be relevant to the 1997 renewal decision only to the extent that it 
supports inferences about the lawyer's riskiness in the future. But with a pure 
claims-made trigger, not only is the 1996 policy not triggered, but now the 
insured knows of the potential claim, and if the insured truthfully answers the 
questions on his renewal application, soon the insurer will know as well. In 
these cases the comforting complementarity usually worked by occurrence 
triggers is absent. Not only have the explosion and missed filing deadline 
failed to trigger any policies, but we may wonder whether renewal 
underwriting by insurers and the fortuity requirement will permit any 
subsequent policy to be triggered. 
Well, might be the response, so what?311 That is the nature of claims-
made formats. They are cheaper because less risk is being transferred. 
Academic models and appellate opinions may emphasize that claims-made 
formats protect the insurer from the risk of correlated changes in liability 
rules, inflation, medical technology, and the like by assigning those risks to 
insureds. But another part of the risk being assigned to the insured is the risk 
that the renewal insurer will choose to exercise its underwriting discretion to 
keep known idiosyncratic risk factors-including "known losses" that have 
not triggered earlier policies-from becoming a burden to the insurer and 
ultimately to the pool of insureds. Policy triggers that operate at the same 
time or before losses become known do not create opportunities for insurers 
to underwrite in order to avoid a "known loss"; there the classification risk 
includes only the possibility that known risk factors will influence the 
311. See, e.g., Jaap Spier, Long Tail (Liability) Risks and Claims Made Policies, 
23 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 152 (1998) (claims-made formats designed to 
shift risks to insureds). However, even in the course of a spirited defense of claims-
made formats, Professor Spier acknowledges room for possible concern "in the case 
of 'classical damage', occurring just before the elapsing of the contract, if the 
damage would not be covered under any policy." /d. at 166. 
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willingness of the renewal insurer to assume responsibility for future losses, 
but it does not include the possibility that the insurer will choose to duck 
responsibility for losses that have already become inevitable. With policy 
triggers that operate later in the sequence, the insurer's discretion is not so 
obviously limited, and in the conventional understanding there is no reason 
to think that the claims-made insurer is obligated to react any differently to 
knowledge of explosion-caused death and destruction or a missed statute of 
limitations deadline than it does to knowledge that a factory lacks a sprinkler 
system or that a lawyer has new clients in the savings and loan industry or no 
longer maintains a formal docket control system. Once a policy term ends 
with the policy still untriggered, both idiosyncratic "known risks" and 
idiosyncratic "known losses" that might trigger a subsequent policy will be 
factors to be considered when a renewal insurer makes underwriting and 
pricing decisions for subsequent terms. In the orthodox understanding, that 
is part of the classification risk to which the claims-made insured is subject, 
just as it is part of the classification risk to which some medical expense 
insureds still are exposed.3 12 
312. As we have seen, in the positive analysis of institutional economics, one 
of the chief detenninants of long-tenn contractual commitments is the presence of 
relation-specific investments; long-tenn commitments may be necessary to induce 
a party to make the relation-specific investment that creates the vulnerability to 
hold-ups at the end of short-tenn contract. See generally WILLIAMSON, supra note 
95, at 71-84. Applied to insurance, that means that we should expect fully-
infonned, fully-rational insureds to react to the vulnerabilities to classification risk 
that go with late-operating triggers by demanding that insurers make long-tenn 
commitments or allow the trigger to be pulled earlier in the tort liability sequence. 
And sometimes insureds do react in that way. The practice literature addressed to 
insurance-buying professionals routinely suggests that the only real protection 
against classification risk is to establish long-tenn relations with an insurer. See, 
e.g., Thomas A. Konopka, The Advantage ofe/aims-Made Forms for Insurance 
Buyers, RISK MANAGEMENT REPORTS, July/Aug., 1991, at 11, 16 (chief protection 
against classification risk is "selecting a carrier with a demonstrable commitment to 
meeting the insured's long-tenn-liability protection needs"). Consequently, there 
is significant resistance to claims-made fonnats and, when occurrence policies are 
not available, insistence that nominally "claims-made" fonnats include extended 
reporting periods, "circumstances discovered and reported" triggers, and guarantees 
that retro dates not be advanced. But such protections are far from universal, they 
provide only limited protections against opportunism at renewal, and they constitute 
a fundamental retreat from the implications of pure "claims-made" and "c1aims-
made-and-reported" triggers. 
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But is it really so obvious that the classification risk to which insureds are 
exposed by late triggers must include not only "known risks" but also "known 
losses?" Imagine the polar example of a late trigger, a "claims-paid" policy 
trigger providing that the insurer's obligation to pay will not be triggered until 
a claim against the insured actually had been paid-and the insurer, as under 
most mainstream liability insurance policies, asserts a right to control the 
defense. How would we react to a policy trigger that cannot be satisfied 
unless the insurer permits it to be satisfied? The choice will seem familiar to 
those whose memories of first-year contracts include Cardozo and Lady 
Duff-Gordon:313 either we say the insurer's control of the timing of the 
However, the institutional implications of the claims-made insured's 
vulnerability to classification risk may be even more fundamental. As Brent Clark 
has noted: "as loss situations become known, claims-made insurance has a tendency 
to 'evaporate' as it becomes increasingly difficult to transfer the risk of a known loss 
to an insurer. Thus, the purchase of claims-made insurance may create the illusion 
of risk transfer that could involve finns in extremely damaging situations later on." 
Brent M. Clark, The Broad Implications 0/ Claims-Made Insurance, RISK 
MANAGEMENT REPORTS, Vol. XIII, No.4, at 9, 23 (1986). Recognition of this 
reality means that, for some corporate buyers, what is nominally liability insurance 
becomes a mechanism by which the individual insured employs claims-made 
coverage with paid-loss retrospective rating to smooth the impact of at least some 
of the losses that it ultimately will bear itself. "Thus, the broad implication of 
claims-made insurance may be a decreasing reliance on commercial insurance to 
finance risk." Id. at 31. 
Doubtless concern about these vulnerabilities has been one important 
contributor to the proliferation in recent decades of a variety of captives, reciprocals, 
risk retention groups, and other fonns of mutual organization distinguished from 
commercial liability insurance enterprises by the fact that "[r]isk is pooled amongst 
those who are commonly exposed rather than transferred to external risk bearers." 
Neil A. Doherty & Georges Dionne, Insurance with Undiversifiable Risk: Contract 
Structure and Organizational Form o/Insurance Firms, 6 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 
187, 188 (1993) (mutual organizational fonns and claims-made policies modeled 
as giving policyholders stake in the residual value of the insurer; thus are alternative 
responses to correlated uncertainties about liability insurance payouts). See also 
John M. Marshall, Insurance Theory: Reserves versus Mutuality, 12 ECON. INQ. 476 
(1974) (reserve principle appropriate where law of large numbers can provide 
acceptable predictability; mutualization where it cannot). The same point has been 
applied to the recent history of liability insurance by Doherty, supra note 300, at 
239-240; Grillet, supra note 300, at 308-311. 
313. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214,214 (N.Y. 1917): 
1999] CLAIMS MADE FORMATS . 661 
triggering event makes the putative risk transfer illusory, or we say the risk 
transfer is not illusory because the insurer's discretion is "instinct with an 
obligation" to make its decisions in good faith314 -and then we worry about 
what the flexible standard of good faith might be made to mean in this setting. 
In fact, we are unlikely to encounter such a brazen effort to preserve 
underwriting discretion until after both the fact and the magnitude of a loss 
have been determined. But we will encounter many instances in which the 
liability insurer gains knowledge of irremediable idiosyncratic circumstances 
before a policy has been triggered, and not only when the format is some 
variation of "claims-made." Occurrence triggers too can operate after a 
known loss.315 Thus, for example, recognition of the vulnerability that goes 
with late triggers was an important factor in judicial rejection of 
"manifestation" as the sole trigger of coverage for claims involving asbestosis 
and other "progressive loss" claims. As the opinion in Keene Corp. v. 
Insurance Company o/North America316 explained: 
To demonstrate why the policies require that both exposure 
and manifestation trigger coverage, we begin by positing a 
rule in which manifestation is the sole trigger of coverage. If 
that interpretation were adopted, ... [the insured] Keene 
would not be covered for diseases manifesting themselves 
The law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the 
precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal 
... A promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be 
'instinct with an obligation,' imperfectly expressed ... We are not 
to suppose that one party was to be placed at the mercy of the 
other. 
314. See Robert A. Hillman, "Instinct with an Obligation" and the "Normative 
Ambiguity of Rhetorical Power," 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 775 (1995). 
315. See generally Geert Schoorens & Caroline Van Schoubroeck, Insuring the 
Uninsurable? The Appeal of the Circumstances Clause, 23 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK 
& INS. 169 (1998) (urging use of circumstances-reported triggers to avoid 
classification risk posed by both occurrence and claims-made formats); Gerhard 
Wagner, Comments on the Appeal of the Circumstances Clause and the 
Uninsurability of Long Tail Risks, 23 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 178 (1998) 
(questioning costs of such an approach). 
316. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See also Insurance Co. ofN. Am. v. 
Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1230 (6th Cir. 1980) (Merritt, J., 
dissenting). 
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after 1976. By that time it was widely known that prolonged 
inhalation of asbestos has a high probability of causing 
disease. From about then on, insurance companies ceased 
issuing policies that adequately cover asbestos-related 
disease. Yet we can still expect thousands of cases of those 
diseases to manifest themeselves throughout the rest of the 
century. If we were to hold that only the manifestation of 
disease can trigger coverage, the insurance companies would 
have to bear only a fraction of Keene's total liability for 
asbestos-related diseases.317 
In Keene and other "triple trigger" and "continuous trigger" decisions, the 
courts are able to avoid leaving insureds to bear the costs of known exposures 
that have not yet triggered a policy by saying that what would be a preexisting 
condition for a renewal policy with a manifestation trigger-the known 
exposure--also is enough to trigger the earlier policy. Of course, other 
interpretive moves sometimes may accomplish the same result. For example, 
in Chemstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,318 faced with twenty-
eight different product liability claims for damage to twenty-eight different 
properties over a four-year period based on plaster pitting that manifested 
itself in different policy periods, the court rejected the continuous trigger 
interpretation but still was able to "protect the insured's access to insurance" 
by holding that coverage was triggered for all claims when the problem first 
manifested itself in the first claimant's house.319 In such decisions, the 
317. Keene Corp., 667 F.2d at 1045-46. 
318. 797 F. Supp. 1541 (C.D. Cal. 1992), ajJ'd, 41 F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 1994). 
319. Id. at 1552. As the court explained: 
[U]nlike the continuous injury trigger, the manifestation trigger 
avoids a conflict with the loss-in-progress rule. The loss-in-
progress rule is based on the principle that insurance is designed 
to protect against contingent or unknown risks of harm, rather 
than harm that is certain or expected. Accordingly, the loss-in-
progress rule precludes coverage for losses that were known 
before the policy period, even if the damage progresses during the 
policy period. 
The loss-in-progress rule and the manifestation trigger 
complement one another and protect the insured's access to 
insurance: To use the current case as an example, even after 
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vulnerability to renewal underwriting that would result from a trigger that 
might not be satisfied until after an injurious process has become known is a 
powerful argument for interpreting the occurrence trigger as satisfied by 
events that fall early in the sequence.320 Indeed, in Montrose Chemical Corp. 
plaster-pitting manifested in the first home, subsequent insurers 
would be willing to issue policies to Chemstar because they could 
rely on the loss-in-progress rule to preclude coverage for 
progressive plaster-pitting. By contrast, the continuous injury 
trigger risks exposing the insured to gaps in coverage: Once 
plaster-pitting manifests in the first home, a potential insurer that 
is aware of the heightened risk of further plaster-pitting in other 
homes would be unwilling to issue policies to Chern star because 
the insurer would be held liable for plaster-pitting that occurs 
during its policy period. 
Id. at 550-51 (citations omitted). 
320. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. ofN. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 
1981). 
This conclusion is consistent with the law involving insurance 
coverage of losses that begin during a period of coverage but 
continue to develop after a policy's expiration. For example, 
Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Casualty. Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 827, 
24 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1962), ... stated that "[t]o permit the insurer to 
terminate its liability while the fortuitous peril which materialized 
during the term of the policy was still active would not be in accord 
either with applicable precedents or with the common 
understanding of the nature and purpose of insurance." 
These cases illustrate the principle that when it becomes known 
that an occurrence has set in motion a process that has a significant 
probability of resulting in a covered loss, the insurer on the risk at 
that time is liable for the full loss. It does not matter whether the 
insurer learns of a progressing loss through direct observation, as 
in Snapp, or through statistical inference, as in asbestos-injury 
cases. It is the use of that knowledge to shift a covered risk back to 
the insured that is not permitted. 
Id. at 1046-47. 
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v. Admiral Ins. Co. ,321 in rejecting an interpretation of an occurrence policy 
that would have created just that vulnerability, the court seemed to make the 
preexisting condition problem the synecdoche for the distinction between 
occurrence and claims-made policies: "To read an occurrence policy to afford 
coverage only when the injury or damage becomes manifest during the policy 
period ... unfairly transforms the more expensive occurrence policy into a 
cheaper claims made policy."322 
With claims-made formats, such interpretive moves usually will not be 
available. Explosions and missed statutes of limitations are not "claims 
made" against the insured, and there is no point in trying to argue that they 
should be enough to trigger a "claims-made" or "c1aims-made-and-
reported" policy in effect when they happened. But acknowledging that 
claims-made triggers subject insureds to discretionary renewal underwriting 
decisions, and that sometimes that discretion will be exercised after losses 
become both inevitable and known, need not mean that the exercise of that 
discretion must be unconstrained. Perhaps there is a middle ground between 
insurance law's traditional assumption that the insured bears the full burden 
of classification risk no matter how many policy renewals he's been through 
and the fmance literature's assumption that the idiosyncratic portion of· 
classification risk is fully mutualized in the pool. Might we take our lead 
321. 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). See also Harford County v. 
Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 610 A.2d 286, 294 (Md. 1992) (quoting Montrose with 
approval). 
322. Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 368 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992). The opinion of the Court of Appeals later was displaced by the 
opinion of the Supreme Court, but not· without this confirmation of the 
characterization: "We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeal below that to 
apply a manifestation trigger of coverage to Admiral's occurrence-based CGL 
policies would be to effectively rewrite Admiral's contracts of insurance with 
Montrose, transforming the broader and more expensive occurrence-based CGL 
policy into a claims made policy." Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 
P.2d 878 (Cal. 1995). 
Note that the vulnerability to renewal underwriting after a loss has become 
inevitable can arise even with earlier occurrence triggers. For example, on the 
Chemstar facts it would be possible for the insured and the insurer to learn of 
potential for plaster-pitting even before some ultimate users were exposed; of course, 
in theory alternative measures-an aggressive recall campaign, for example-might 
stiII prevent the risk from coming to fruition with respect to those future end users. 
See also Fischer, supra note 13, at 675-76 (noting that breast implants pose similar 
potential). 
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from the assumptions of the fmance literature and its less formal echoes in 
some appellate opinions and conclude that the purpose of even pure c1aims-
made formats is to insulate the insurer from uncertainties about correlated 
risks, but to continue to allow idiosyncratic risks to be combined and 
diversified through the pool, and that therefore it is bad faith for an insurer to 
exercise its underwriting discretion to force the occasional individual insureds 
whose idiosyncratic circumstances become known before renewal to bear the 
full costs of their own misadventures? There are interesting potential 
parallels in the law and literature of employment law, where the obligation of 
good faith and fair dealing may on appropriate facts provide some protections 
against opportunistic efforts by employers to terminate employees at will,323 
and in the law oflender liability, where good faith may sometimes set limits 
on a lender's discretion to decide whether to renew a financing arrangement 
with a debtor.324 In each of these arenas, judicial use of the good faith 
standard is more likely after sunk investments have rendered the other party 
vulnerable to opportunistic exercise of discretion granted or permitted by the 
contract. In the employment setting, the fundamental transformation comes 
323. See, e.g., Schwab, supra note 148 ("courts have been boldest" in protecting 
nominally at will employees where protection is most needed, i.e., at the beginning 
and end of employees' careers, where employees' investments in firm-specific skills 
trap workers in their present jobs and render them vulnerable to employer 
opportunism). See also WEILER, supra note 148, at 63-67; Kenneth G. Dau-
Schmidt, Employment Security: A Comparative Institutional Debate, 74 TEX. L. REv. 
1645 (1996). Contra Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of 
Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1913 (1996) (sunk 
investments and potential for opportunism prompt "internal labor markets" to develop 
informal practices and norms that provide just cause protections in fact even where 
legal rule is employment at will). 
324. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 109 (advocating thick contextual inquiries to 
determine whether a lender who refuses to renew is acting in good faith, while 
acknowledging difficulties of trying to determine whether a particular relationship is 
straight loan with both lender and borrower engaged in egoistic gambles about what 
the future may hold, or whether the lender has tied up the borrower's collateral so as 
to create a monopoly with respect to future extensions of credit). In lender liability 
litigation, the sunk investments may take the form of grants of security to a lending 
institution that effectively prevent the borrower from seeking secured loans elsewhere. 
See Gillette, supra note 109, at 565-74. See also Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics 
of Lender Liability, 99 YALE LJ. 131, 139 (1989) (lack of access to new lenders 
likely when lender has acquired costly information about borrower, and where the 
market cost of credit has risen). 
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in the fonn of relationship specific investments that cannot be transferred to 
other employers; in the lender liability setting, the fundamental 
transfonnation occurs when security arrangements effectively prevent the 
borrower from gaining access to other credit markets. Might we conclude 
that in claims-made insurance, the fundamental transfonnation occurs and 
thus the obligation to exercise renewal underwriting discretion in good faith 
arises when an idiosyncratic loss becomes inevitable during the tenn of a 
claims-made policy? 
Still, analogies to the ways in which flexible standards of good faith can 
be used to police discretion in employment contracts and lending 
arrangements, though easily asserted, may prove too facile. Exercise of 
renewal underwriting discretion is not opportunism unless it is offends the 
letter or spirit of the agreement, and the news that claims-made fonnats are 
sold subject to a tacit understanding that the insurer will not visit the costs of 
an irremediable idiosyncratic risk on an individual member of the pool when 
it could be diversified through the pool likely will come as a surprise to 
anyone accustomed to viewing insurance transactions as involving but two 
parties, the insurer and the insured, and insurance contracts as transfers of 
discrete risks for a tenn. But might we look to the models of claims-made 
contracting in the fmance literature, not as part of an orthodox ex ante 
perspective asking if assumptions of those models somehow have become 
incorporated into the expectations of the parties to claims-made contracts, but 
instead as Schwab uses the assumptions of the life-cycle model of 
employment contracts325 and Gillette employs alternative understandings of 
lending relationships,326 as a guide to where the occasions for opportunism 
are most pronounced and where the expenditure of judicial resources in an 
effort to prevent bad faith is most likely to prove productive? 
Of course, fmding a doctrinal handle is not the only problem. Difficulties 
of application will prove daunting. We can opine with confidence that an 
insured should not be able to row through flood waters threatening his house 
in order to buy flood insurance for the first time,327 and that an insurer that 
325. See Schwab, supra note 148, at 38-51 (arguing that courts intelVene despite 
at-will presumption in portions of life-cycle when dangers of employer opportunism 
are high). 
326. See Gillette, supra note 109, at 552-74 (discussing spectrum of commercial 
relationships). 
327. "A homeowner could not insure his house against flood damage when the 
rising waters were already in his front yard." Bartholomew v. Appalachian Ins. Co., 
655 F.2d 27, 29 (lst Cir. 1981). See Summers v. Harris, 573 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 
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has written flood insurance should not be permitted to cancel or nonrenew 
when the flood waters begin lapping at the door.328 But beyond such obvious 
examples, our efforts to fmd something in the relationship to tell us whether 
the insurer or the insured should bear a particular portion of the classification 
risk will be very difficult. Insurance opinions are full of unsatisfactory efforts 
to explain the line of demarcation between "known loss" and "known risk" 
when the issue is whether the risk has become so certain that it is no longer 
a fortuity. Can we expect any better when the issue is whether the loss has 
become so certain that it should be bad faith not to renew? 
Perhaps not, but our understanding of both issues would be advanced by 
explicit recognition of the vulnerabilities worked by the "fundamental 
transformation." Underwriting discretion that is unexceptionable when 
employed in a competitive setting, before the fundamental transformation has 
occurred, may be inappropriate when employed after the insured has been 
locked in by an irremediable change in circumstances. Thus, if I negligently 
leave a boulder perched on the precipice at the edge of my property, and the 
insurer learns of that idiosyncratic potential for causing damage to my 
neighbor in the valley below, I will have no reason to object if the insurer 
reacts by raising my rates, incorporating a laser exclusion of damage caused 
by rolling rocks, or refusing to insure me at all--either initially or at renewal. 
The rock is still but a potential cause of loss; I can still take other measures 
to eliminate or ameliorate the risk. But once the boulder begins to roll and 
damage to neighboring persons and property becomes inevitable, I am locked 
in and it should be too late for the insurer to price or to underwrite against 
that loss even if as yet no perambulators have been crushed and no lives 
ruined.329 
That simple intuition can, on appropriate facts, survive the trip to the 
claims-made setting. If the factory already has exploded, it should be too late 
for even a claims-made liability insurer to walk away. In Heen & Flint 
Associates v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,330 the court vindicated that instinct by 
1978) ("loss in progress" rule prevents coverage for damage by flood water that 
entered house during policy period; flood was continuation of flooding process "in 
progress" at policy inception). 
328. Fire, not flood, was featured in the most-familiar aphorism: "Of what avail 
would it be, to take a policy against fire, to permit its cancellation when the fire is 
approaching." Home Insurance. Co. v. Heck, 65 Ill. III, 114 (1872). 
329. See generally Schoorens & Van Schoubroeck, supra note 315 (urging use 
of potential claims reported triggers to help ameliorate vulnerabilities of lock-in). 
330.400 N.Y.S.2d 994 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1977). 
668 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:2 
declaring the claims-made trigger unconscionable because it appeared to 
permit the insurer to refuse to renew for future years in order to avoid future 
claims certain to ensue)3) In Helfand v. National Union Fire Insurance 
Co.,332 faced with an attempt by National Union to cancel the third year of 
a claims-made policy when it learned that "that there were significant law 
suits pending against the directors and officers and more were expected to be 
filed,"333 the court chose to attack the exercise of the discretion granted by 
the absolute cancellation clause rather than the substance of the clause itself. 
The traditional understanding that cancellation provisions in an insurance 
policy are not contrary to public policy and need not be exercised for cause 
did not mean that the insurer was free to cancel after knowledge of imminent 
legal action make it impossible for insureds to seek alternative coverage 
elsewhere in the market. 
Liability carriers do not have an unfettered right to cancel 
coverage, notwithstanding mutual cancellation clauses to 
that effect. Cancellation provisions in an insurance contract 
are subject to the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing just like any other clause. 
331. /d. at 998-99: 
It is my detennination that a provision in a "claims made" policy 
that pennits an insurer, where it has notice of a potential claim, to 
refuse to renew that policy, is unconscionable. Such a provision 
allows an insurer to avoid the risk of serious potential claims 
arising from accidents committed within the policy period, and 
leaves the insured without coverage after the expiration of the 
policy, since no other insurer will be willing to accept the known 
risk and thus buy its way into a potential lawsuit. 
I, therefore, limit the provision of the Travelers' policy that 
requires a claim to be made against the insured during the policy 
period, to instances where continued coverage is available from the 
same or from some other insurer .... 
332. 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 824 
(1993). 
333. /d. at 315-16. 
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An arbitrary cancellation is a breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. "Where a contract confers on one party 
a discretionary power affecting the rights of the other, a duty 
is imposed to exercise that discretion in good faith and in 
accordance with fair dealing." To exercise that power 
arbitrarily and to the detriment of the other party IS 
inconsistent with that party's justified expectations.334 
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Of course, within the inherited traditions of the private insurance 
enterprise, cancellation is one thing, nonrenewal quite another.335 Should the 
obligation to exercise underwriting discretion in good faith apply there as 
well? "Yes," the Colorado Supreme Court recently held. In Yasuzawa v. 
PHICO Insurance Co.,336 the insurer's argument ''that it does not have a duty 
of good faith toward its insureds in the nonrenewal or negotiation context"337 
was flatly rejected. 
334. Id. at 315-17. The Helfand court invoked the old saw from Home Ins. v, 
Heck, 65 III. 111, 114 ( 1872) (quoted supra note 328). 13 Cal. Rptr 2d at 317. See 
also Murphy v. Seed-Roberts Agency, Inc., 261 N.W.22d 198 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) 
(bad faith to exercise cancellation clause in medical malpractice policy in order to 
offer reinstatement at much higher premium); L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., 
394 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1968) (violation of public policy to cancel malpractice policy 
in effort to affect conduct of insured in pending malpractice suit). The scant authority 
and commentary is collected in Johnathan M. Purver, Annot., Liability Insurer's 
Unconditional Right to Cancel Policy as Affocted by Considerations of Public Policy, 
40 A.L.R.3d 1439 (1971). Of course, efforts to analogize to the understandings in 
other kinds of insurance can cut both ways; in medical expense insurance, for 
example, there is no similar practice of treating cancellation as impermissible once 
medical expenses become inevitable. 
335. See, e.g., STATE OF NEW YORK INS. DEP'T, THE PUBLIC INTEREST Now IN 
PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE REGULATION 49 (1969) (elaborating reasons 
for traditional pattern of regulatory restrictions on cancellations but not nonrewals); 
Robert Works, Whatever's FAIR-Adequacy, Equity, and the Underwriting 
Prerogative in Property Insurance Markets, 56 NEB. L. REV. 445, 487-90 (1977) 
(same). For an indication of just how firmly entrenched the prerogative not to renew 
has been, see Martin J. McMahon, Annot., Insured's Right of Action for Arbitrary 
Nonrenewal of Policy, Where Insurer Has Option Not to Renew. 37 A.L.R.4th 862 
(1985). 
336.875 P.2d 1354 (Colo. 1993) (citations omitted), rev'g Ballow v. PHICO Ins. 
Co., 841 P.2d 344 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992). 
337. Id. at 1362. 
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As a general principle, we agree than an insurer may choose 
to nonrenew an insured for any reason. However, an insurer 
is required to act in good faith when carrying out its decision 
not to renew either a single insured or entire blocks of 
business. In this setting, we believe that good faith should be 
measured according to the legal standard used in the fIrst-
party context: unreasonable conduct and either knowledge or 
reckless disregard of the unreasonableness of the conduct.338 
As the court's elaborate recitation of the facts made clear, the insurer's 
bad faith in PHICO lay in assuaging insureds' fears about the classifIcation 
risk problem that is intrinsic to claims-made fonnats, then leaving them in 
the lurch with accumulated practice histories and no access to tailor 
replacement nose coverage. The concurring opinion thought the majority 
opinion should have taken even greater pains to tie the renewal obligation of 
good faith to the peculiar lock-in worked by claims-made formats: "[Claims-
made coverage] makes the policyholder a virtual economic captive of the 
insurer. The unique nature of claims-made insurance gives rise to heightened 
duties during renewal negotiations because claims-made insurance 
contemplates a continuing relationship between the parties."339 
That, ultimately, is the question. Should we continue to assume that each 
liability insurance arrangement can be modeled as a discrete purchase of a 
risk transfer for a tenn, and thus continue to sweep claims-made fonnats 
within the general rule that treats the distinction between cancellation and 
[d. 
338. !d. at 1363 (citations omitted). 
PRICO enticed the doctors to purchase claims-made coverage 
through promises of longevity and assurances that the terms and 
method of calculating the premium for a tail policy would be fixed. 
It then undermined these promises by unilaterally changing the 
terms of the tail policy to discourage renewal by the doctors, and 
without disclosing its plan to nonrenew them. Instead, PRICO 
continued to reassure doctors that it had no intention of leaving the 
state in the several months prior to its withdrawal from the 
Colorado market. Rather than dealing with the doctors in good 
faith once it decided not to renew them, PRICO concealed its 
intention and actively misled the doctors to their detriment. 
339. [d. at 1372-73. 
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nonrenewal as inviolate?340 Or should our appreciation of the fundamental 
transformation suggest a more complex and interdependent relationship? 
CONCLUSION 
Within the neo-classical habits of thought still dominant in insurance 
law, ''the coverage is less, but so, therefore, is the cost" is a conversation-
stopper, reassurance that-even with bounded rationality and mass marketed 
standard insurance policy forms-the disciplines of competitive insurance 
markets still provide the best answers to most questions concerning the 
quantity, quality, and price of insurance products. As redeployed in this 
essay, however, it is but the beginning of a further conversation, a reminder 
of the vulnerability to opportunism worked by the fundamental 
transformation, and thus an invitation to ask how-exactly, as applied in the 
individual case-the policy provision makes the coverage less. 
The still-unfamiliar ways in which claims-made insurance policy 
formats allocate "forfeiture risk" and "classification risk" are a useful place 
to begin these discussions. Recognition that competitive markets at the 
inception of insurance relationships cannot guarantee freedom from 
opportunism ex post will do much to remedy the inadequate descriptions of 
claims-made formats that first prompted this extended meditation, and will 
help to identify the practices that should attract special attention, but it does 
not entail any particular institutional response. Deciding what combination 
of contract terms, market developments, and legislative and judicial 
initiatives can best cabin exercise of the discretion claims-made formats 
confer will require many more forays into the claims-made thicket. 
Of course, the habit of asking how, exactly, a policy condition makes the 
coverage less should prove helpful well beyond the problems posed by 
multiple-event and late-operating triggers in liability policies. The 
difficulties with claims-made formats, though real and relatively intransigent, 
in time will wane. Increased understanding of the claims-made forfeiture 
risk and classification risk will yield more circumstances-discovered-and 
reported triggers, more long-term contracts, more mutualization, more 
careful compliance with conditions, and, where they do not, better bases for 
340. See, e.g., Gahres v. PRICO Ins. Co., 672 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Va.1987); 
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lesher, 231 Cal. Rptr. 791 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)); Coira v. 
Florida Medical Ass'n, 429 So. 2d 23 (Fla. App. 1983); Egnatz v. Medical Protective 
Co., 581 N.E.2d 438 (Ind. App. 1991); Armstrong v. Safeco Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 276 
(Wash. 1988). 
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assessing assertions that legislative or judicial amelioration is appropriate. 
But the broader issues will remain. A century ago proof-of-Ioss conditions 
in fire policies required a signature of the local magistrate, and lawyers and 
judges of the day wondered how to frame their resistance to the 
disproportionate forfeitures that would have resulted from blind enforcement 
of those conditions.341 'Today we wonder how we should respond to a 
reporting condition in medical malpractice policies that purports to require 
the names and addresses of all potential witnesses, and whether the notice-
prejudice rule should apply to other post-loss failure of conditions342 and 
beyond liability insurance.343 A century ago, insurance law was wrestling 
with what to do with good health clauses and affirmative warranties that 
purported to shift classification risk to insureds;344 today we worry about 
late-operating liability and medical expense insurance triggers; tomorrow 
classification risk concerns will surface in other settings. 
The methodological uncertainty that has prevented insurance law from 
adequately acknowledging the challenges of claims-made policy formats is 
the same methodological uncertainty that for most of the twentieth century 
has left insurance law unsure of where to fmd its conceptual bearings. "What 
do they know of the law of insurance, who only the law of contracts 
know?"345 was a good question when Professor Woodruff first posed it, and 
it is a good question now, but both the question and the responsory judicial 
mantra reassuring that "a contract of insurance is no different from any other 
contract" fudge a fundamental question. Is the contract law that insurance 
law is-or is not-like the abstract conceptualism of classical contract, with 
its foundational belief in individualism and freedom of contract and its 
methodological preference for treating legal categories acontextually and 
language as objective? Or is it the contract law of standard forms and 
contracts of adhesion, where recognition of the lack of actual assent to many 
of the provisions found in standard forms can produce a judicialfmger on the 
341. See, e.g., Gennan-American Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 41 N.W. 406 (Neb. 1889); 
Works, supra note 222, at 241-43. 
342. See, e.g., Anderson et aI., supra note 232, at 842-45. 
343. See, e.g., Michael E. Brown, Property and Prejudice: Must Insurers Show 
Prejudice When Denying Coverage Based on Conditions in the Property Policy?, 
TIPS COMMITIEE NEWS, INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION COMMITIEE, Summer, 
1997, at 1. 
344. See generally Vance, supra note 265. 
345. EDWIN H. WOODRUFF, SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 5 
(2d ed. 1924). 
1999] CLAIMS MADE FORMATS 673 
interpretive scales or the substitution of gap-filling default rules said to 
vindicate the hypothetical "objective reasonable expectations" of insureds? 
Or is it the contract law of modern neo-institutional thought, with its 
attention both to bounded rationality and to the potential for opportunism and 
its concern to identify both private and public devices for policing against 
opportunism? 
The answer matters, for recognizing the aridity of the acontextual, 
formalistic approaches still ascendant in much of insurance law is only the 
first challenge; the second, and more difficult, question for modern insurance 
law remains what part of the insurance context makes insurance different, and 
what reactions those differences should suggest. "Situation sense" works only 
if we are confident we know what it is about the situation that should interest 
us. Efforts to capture contextual concerns about insurance contracting in the 
"Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations" are radically incomplete because they 
focus on ex ante-formation-difficulties and ignore ex post-performance 
and enforcement-difficulties. Often the relevant contextual detail in 
insurance disputes is not that the insured did not understand what was in the 
policy, or lacked any practical alternative to what was in the policy, but that 
the policy creates occasions for opportunism which are being exploited in the 
particular case. Insurance law needs to acknowledge that not all questions 
can be answered by reference to the actual or assumed intent of the parties, 
and to recognize explicitly that for some cases an ex post perspective will be 
an appropriate complement to more familiar ways of looking at insurance 
questions. By raising "Excusing Nonoccurrence of a Condition to Avoid 
Disproportionate Forfeiture" to the same level of explicit principle as 
"Vindicating Objective Reasonable Expectations," we will come closer to 
having the tools we need to wrestle effectively with insurance law's enduring 
puzzles. 
